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ABSTRACT
We are witnessing a steady growth in the use of Internet in the electronic commerce
field. This rise is promoting the migration from traditional processes and applica-
tions (paper based) to an electronic model. But the security of electronic transac-
tions continues to pose an impediment to its implementation. Traditionally, most
business transactions were conducted in person. Signing a contract required the
meeting of all interested parties, the postman delivered certified mail in hand, and
when paying for goods or services both customer and provider were present. When
all parties are physically present, a transaction does not require a complex proto-
col. The participants acknowledge the presence of the other parties as assurance
that they will receive their parts, whether a signature on a contract, or a receipt,
etc. But with e-commerce growing in importance as sales and business channel, all
these transactions have moved to its digital counterpart. Therefore we have digital
signature of contracts, certified delivery of messages and electronic payment sys-
tems. With electronic transactions, the physical presence is not required, moreover,
most of the times it is even impossible. The participants in a transaction can be
thousands of kilometers away from each other, and they may not even be human
participants, they can be machines. Thus, the security that the transaction will be
executed without incident is not assured per se, we need additional security mea-
sures. To address this problem, fair exchange protocols were developed. In a fair
exchange every party involved has an item that wants to exchange, but none of the
participants is willing to give his item away unless he has an assurance he will re-
ceive the corresponding item from the other participants. Fair exchange has many
applications, like digital signature of contracts, where the items to be exchanged are
signatures on contracts, certified delivery of messages, where we exchange a mes-
sage for evidence of receipt, or a payment process, where we exchange a payment
(e-cash, e-check, visa, etc.) for digital goods or a receipt.
The objective of this dissertation is the study of the fair exchange problem. In
particular, it presents two new scenarios for digital contracting, the Atomic Multi-
Two Party (AM2P) and the Agent Mediated Scenario (AMS), and proposes one op-
timistic contract signing protocol for each one. Moreover, it studies the efficiency
of Multi-Party Contract Signing (MPCS) protocols from their architecture point of
view, presenting a new lower bound for each architecture, in terms of minimum
number of transactions needed. Regarding Certified Electronic Mail (CEM), this
dissertation presents two optimistic CEM protocols designed to be deployed on the
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current e-mail infrastructure, therefore they assume the participation of multiple
Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs). In one case, the protocol assumes untrusted MTAs
whereas in the other one it assumes each User Agent (UA) trusts his own MTA.
Regarding payment systems, this dissertation presents a secure and efficient elec-
tronic bearer bank check scheme allowing the electronic checks to be transferred
fairly and anonymously.
RESUM
L’ús d’Internet en l’àmbit del comerç electrònic està experimentant un creixement
estable. Aquest increment d’ús està promovent lamigració deprocessos tradicionals
i aplicacions (basades en paper) cap a un model electrònic. Però la seguretat de
les transaccions electròniques continua impedint la seva implantació. Tradicional-
ment, la majoria de les transaccions s’han dut a terme en persona. La firma d’un
contracte requeria la presència de tots els firmants, el carter entrega les cartes certi-
ficades enmà, i quan es paga per un bé o servei ambdós venedor i comprador hi són
presents. Quan totes les parts hi són presents, les transaccions no requereixen un
protocol complex. Els participants assumeixen la presència de les altres parts com
assegurança que rebran el que esperen d’elles, ja sigui la firma d’un contracte, un
rebut d’entrega o un pagament. Però amb el creixement del comerç electrònic com
a canal de venda i negoci, totes aquestes transaccions s’hanmogut al seu equivalent
en el món electrònic. Així doncs tenim firma electrònica de contractes, enviament
certificat de missatges, sistemes de pagament electrònic, etc. En les transaccions
electròniques la presència física no és necessària, de fet, la majoria de vegades és
fins it tot impossible. Els participants poden estar separats permilers de kilòmetres,
i no és necessari que siguin humans, podrien ser màquines. Llavors, la seguretat de
que la transacció s’executarà correctament no està assegurada per se, necessitem
proporcionar mesures de seguretat addicionals. Per solucionar aquest problema,
es van desenvolupar els protocols d’intercanvi equitatiu. En un intercanvi equitatiu
totes les parts involucrades tenen un objecte que volen intercanviar, però cap de les
parts implicades vol donar el seu objecte si no té la seguretat que rebrà els objectes
de les altres parts. L’intercanvi equitatiu té multitud d’aplicacions, com la firma
electrònica de contractes, on els elements a intercanviar son firmes de contractes,
enviament certificat de missatges, on s’intercanvien unmissatge per una evidència
de recepció, o un procés de pagament, on intercanviem un pagament (e-cash, visa,
e-xec, etc.) per bens digitals o per un rebut.
L’objectiu d’aquesta tesi és estudiar el problema de l’intercanvi equitatiu. En
particular, la tesi presenta dos nous escenaris per a la firma electrònica de con-
tractes, l’escenari multi-two party atòmic i l’escenari amb agents intermediaris,
i proposa un protocol optimista per a cada un d’ells. A més, presenta un estudi
de l’eficiència dels protocols de firma electrònica multi-part (Multi-Party Contract
Signing (MPCS) protocols) des del punt de vista de la seva arquitectura, presen-
tant una nova fita per a cada una, en termes de mínim nombre de transaccions
xvii
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necessàries. Pel que fa al correu electrònic certificat, aquesta tesi presenta dos pro-
tocols optimistes dissenyats per a ser desplegats damunt l’infraestructura actual de
correu electrònic, per tant assumeix la participació de múltiples agents de transfer-
ència de correu. Un dels protocols assumeix que cap dels agents de transferència
de correu participants és de confiança, mentre que l’altre assumeix que cada usuari
confia en el seu propi agent. Pel que fa a sistemes de pagament, la tesi presenta un
esquema de xec bancari al portador, eficient i segur, que garanteix que la transfer-
ència dels xecs es fa de manera anònima i equitativa.
Before starting I would like to thank everyone who helped me to get here. This
document is the result of some years of work, but even though it bears my name,
the merit is not just mine.
The merit goes to my own family, who always supported me... now you’re going to
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going on an Erasmus again, to Norway. You start working, about time! And now
you start studding again, a PhD, What’s that?. But it doesn’t end here, now you’re
going to Singapore, and now to Austria! Son, will you ever finish? Well, dear
parents, uncles, brothers and nephews, with this document I’ve reached a
milestone, but I warn you... It doesn’t end here.
The merit goes to my thesis directors, my colleagues, my supervisors and friends
abroad. They have givenme infinite patience. Always open to discuss my new
idea, and to right me every time I’ve been wrong... which never happens!
The merit goes to my friends who have been with me as student fellows,
coworkers, flatmates, and over all as friends. Giving me advice (thanks but I don’t
need it), even offering me a job position... (thanks but I refuse).
And It’s better to leave it here, lest some of the acknowledged comes to claim a
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THANK YOU ALL!!!

Abans de començar voldria donar les gràcies a tothom que m’ha ajudat a arribar
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INTRODUCTION
The expansion of Internet has been fueled by the evolution of fixed broadband tech-
nologies first (ISDN, xDSL, Fiber,...), and the progress of mobile broadband tech-
nologies later, along with the mobile terminals (smartphones, tablets, etc.). In 2001
only 8% of the world population had access to Internet, while in 2011 this number
increased to a 32,5% (figure 1.1). Governments have also played an important role
in the growth of Internet, developing policies to improve the competitiveness of
the electronic communications market. With the Universal Service Directive [1, 2]
the European Union (EU) defines universal service as: minimum set of services of
specified quality to which all end-users have access, at an affordable price in the
light of specific national conditions, without distorting competition. In particular,
the eighth paragraph of the Directive 2002/22/EC [1], states that all users must be
able to have Internet access with a minimum quality, limited to narrowband con-
nections for primary location/residences. This limitation was eliminated in a later
modificationmade byDirective 2009/136/EC (fifth paragraph) [2], delegating to the
Member States of the EU the decision of the minimum quality requirements. In the
case of Spain, the article 52 from the Ley 2/2011 de 4 de marzo [3], defines the min-
imum quality of the Internet Universal Service must be at least 1Mbit per second
(download), and 256Kb per second (upload).
E-commerce can be defined as the object of conducting business transactions
over electronic means, including: Internet, fax, sms, Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI), etc. A company selling books by phone (typically a landline) or through in-
fomercials or teleshopping is doing e-commerce. It is a typical example of e-com-
merce before the boom of Internet, but nowadays most e-commerce transactions
are, at some point, conducted over the Internet. The first image that comes to our
mind when we think of e-commerce is retail shopping. As customers, we access
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to some online store and we order some products or services. But there are many
other activities that can also be considered as e-commerce, like online advertising,
online auctioning, etc. If we focus on the participants in a commercial transaction,
a typical classification of e-commerce would be the following:
• Business to Business (B2B) where both participants are companies. An exam-
ple could be a company buying travel services for their employees’ business
trips.
• Business to Consumer (B2C) where the business transaction is between a
company and a customer (end-user). The example of retail-shopping, is a
B2C scenario.
• Consumer to Consumer (C2C) where both participants are end-users. Auc-
tion siteswhere users sell secondhandor newproducts directly to other users,
would be a C2C scenario.
An alternative classification for e-commerce defines a subgroup namedMachine to
Machine (M2M) where e-commerce transactions are automated and executed by
machines. But as technology advances, e-commerce also evolves and new scenar-
ios and applications appear, like mobile commerce (m-commerce) where business
transactions are executed frommobile devices (smartphones, tablets, etc.), or social
commerce (s-commerce) where e-commerce interacts with social networks provid-
ing customers with tools to help them through the decision process (e.g., customer
ratings, likes, reviews, etc.).
E-commerce offers many benefits to consumers and providers. Through Inter-
net, providers can have immediate access to millions of potential consumers. And
at the same time, consumers are just a few clicks away from any service or provi-
der they could need. Providers can reduce or even eliminate their products’ stock,
enhance the processes and communication flowwith consumers (customer loyalty
programs, behaviour analysis, etc.) and providers, etc. Consumers can compare
products and services frommany different providers and choose the one that suits
them better, etc.
We cannot deny that e-commerce has become an important sales and business
channel, even now when we are still suffering an economic crisis. According to the
last report from the ONTSI1 on B2C e-commerce, in 2011 the Spanish B2C market
generated a turnover of 10.917 M e, an increase of 19,8% over 2010, and close to
100% over 2007, when the B2Cmarket generated a turnover of 5.911Me. The study
also reflects the behaviour of Spanish customers, highlighting price and comfort as
themain drivers behind their decision to buy on Internet. Another interesting result
is the classification of the online purchases in business sectors, being the touristy
(travel tickets, accommodation services, etc..) related services the most demanded.
But the study also reflects the obstacles that customers find when they have to
decide whether to make an online purchase or not: the lack of trust is the main
1http://www.ontsi.red.es/ontsi/ Observatorio Nacional de las Telecomunicaciones y de la Sociedad
de la Información
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obstacle to prevent it. More than 50% of customers (people who has purchased
something within 2011) are concerned about the use of their personal information.
Among ex-customers (people who bought something in 2010 or previous years, but
not anymore), 22% think the system is not secure. This percentage increases to
more than 50% among non-customers (people who has never bought through In-
ternet), who also shows their distrust (45%) regarding the payment systems. This
leads us to think that there are still security problems related to e-commerce that
are not well solved.
In the physical world there are many situations in which we give the result for
granted. When we sit in a terrace and order breakfast, we expect to receive food
in exchange for money, when we sign a job offer, we assume we will get a copy of
the signed contract (by all parties), and if we send a certified mail, we expect to re-
ceive evidence of reception. But it is not just some food and some money, or some
contract, or some reception ticket. We want a particular kind of food in exchange
for a particular amount of money, we want a copy of the same contract we have
signed (which we agree on terms), and the evidence of receipt of the message we
have sent. In any situation we assume we will receive some particular item in ex-
change of some other item we have. In other words, we expect the exchange to be
fair. This fairness is based in the fact that we trust the other part will fulfil his duty,
and in case they do not do it, we know who is to blame and we can report it to the
pertinent authority.
But these kind of trusted relations do not happen in the electronic world. The
problem is the ubiquity of the entities participating in the transaction and the na-
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ture of the digital world. We do not really know who the other parties are, we are
not even sure if they are a “who" or a “what", e.g., the other parties can be a soft-
ware application. Moreover, digital resources can be forged or copied. Therefore we
need mechanisms to ensure fairness in electronic transactions, and those are the
protocols for Fair Exchange of Values.
1.1 E-commerce and Fair Exchange
Fair Exchange of Values is a problem that aims to solve a scenario where two parties,
Alice and Bob, want to exchange some item between them, but Alice does not want
to give her item to Bob unless she has an assurance that Bob will give her the item
she is waiting for. When we have more than two parties involved, we talk about
Multi-Party Fair Exchange. It has many applications, such as digital signature of
contracts, where the items to be exchanged are signatures on contracts, certified
delivery of messages, where we exchange a message for evidence of receipt, or a
payment process, where we exchange a payment (e-cash, visa, e-check, etc.) for
digital goods or a receipt.
The scientific community is working since late 1980’s on secure protocols for
the Fair Exchange of Values. Initially, two different research lines appeared to ad-
dress fairness, protocols relying on a Trusted Third Party (TTP) and protocols with-
out TTP. The TTP is an external entity who guarantees the fairness in a transaction.
The solutions without TTP were based on the gradual exchange of secrets [4, 5, 6]
or on probabilistic approaches [7, 8]. In these protocols the probability of achieving
fairness increases along with the number of messages exchanged among the partic-
ipants, the more messages exchanged the higher probability of achieving fairness.
The main drawbacks in those kind of proposals are the assumption of equal com-
putational power (in the case of gradual exchange of secrets), which is unlikely to
happen in the real world (e.g., an end-user vs. a large corporation), and the great
number of transmissions needed to complete the exchange in both cases. There-
fore the majority of scientific proposals tend to use TTPs. Fair exchange protocols
are usually classified in three groups, according to their use of the TTP:
Inline TTP In these protocols the TTP acts as a proxy between the participants, in-
tervening in each protocol step (the participants do not have direct commu-
nication). It means that the TTP has to process each message sent during a
protocol execution, with the consequent computational cost, and the risk of
becoming a bottleneck.
Online TTP In an online TTP protocol the TTP participates in every protocol ex-
ecution but not in every step. The participants communicate directly with
each other, until they reach a point in the protocol execution where they re-
quire something from the TTP, typically at the beginning or end of the pro-
tocol. Online TTPs are subjected to a lower computational load that inline
TTPs, and the risk of becoming a bottleneck is much lower.
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Offline TTP Also called optimistic protocols. In these protocols the TTP only in-
tervene in case of dispute, which is expected to be an exceptional case. If all
participants behave according to the protocol rules and there is no network
failure, the protocol will end without contacting the TTP. In case there is a
dispute, any participant can contact the TTP and claim the missing evidence.
Despite their use of the TTP, there are other properties we can use to classify fair
exchange protocols, like synchronous vs. asynchronous, two-party vs. multi-party,
or their protocol architecture (ring, serial, star, etc.). Synchronous solutions use a
time deadline to specify a limit for the duration of the protocol execution, while
asynchronous do not have it, they rely on the protocol flow to end it. The main
drawback to synchronous solutions is the clock synchronization among all the par-
ticipants, but they are usually simpler than asynchronous solutions, which usually
have a more complex execution flow. The difference between two-party (Alice and
Bob) and multi-party (Alice, Bob, Chris,...) solutions is the number of participants,
which will be determined by the application scenario. Finally, the protocol archi-
tecture is established by the communication flow between the participants, and in
some cases, it can be restricted by the application.
1.2 Fair Exchange Requirements
Fair exchange and its applications is a problem that has beenwidely studied, result-
ing in a great number of heterogenous solutions. Even though we have a set of fea-
tures we can use to classify fair exchange protocols (e.g., asynchronous, optimistic,
number of participants), solutions within the same classification group can still dif-
fer on the set of security requirements the protocol meets, moreover, even the same
security requirement can have different meanings depending on the author.
Nevertheless, most authors agree on a set of minimum requirements that fair
exchange protocols must meet. In particular, one of the most cited references to
define the requirements for optimistic fair exchange protocols is Asokan et al. [9]:
effectiveness, fairness (strong and weak), timeliness, non-repudiation and verifiabil-
ity of the TTP. Later, Zhou et al. [10], re-formulated these requirements for fair
exchange.
Fair Exchange An exchange is considered to be fair if dishonest participants can-
not gain advantage over the honest ones, neither during the exchange nor
after it.
We will classify the security requirements for fair exchange protocols into core
requirements (section 1.2.1) and additional requirements (section 1.2.2). The core
requirements are the minimum set of requirements a protocol must meet to be fair.
The additional requirementswill provide theprotocolwith other desired properties,
such as verifiability of the TTP. Requirements particular to fair exchange applica-
tions, like abuse-freeness for digital signature of contracts (chapter 2), non-selective
receipt for certified e-mail (chapter 3) or unforgeability for electronic checks (chap-
ter 5), will be addressed in the corresponding chapter of this dissertation.
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1.2.1 Core Requirements
By definition, in an optimistic protocol the TTP only intervenes in case of a dis-
pute arises. This is reflected in the effectiveness requirement, therefore it is a core
requirement for optimistic fair exchange protocols.
Effectiveness If all participants in a fair exchange protocol behave correctly (and
there are no network errors), the protocol will finish without the intervention
of the TTP.
Fairness is a core property of fair exchange protocols, yet we can find different
definitions in the scientific literature [9, 11, 12, 13]. The most referenced definition
is the one by Asokan et al. [9], where two notions of fairness are provided: strong
and weak. Intuitively, strong fairness means that either all the honest participants
receive the item they expect from the other participants, or none receives it. While
weak fairness means that whatever happens, the honest participants will be able to
prove they behaved honestly (according to the protocol).
Strong fairness Upon finalization of a fair exchange protocol, either all honest par-
ticipants have the item they expected from the other participants, or all of
them have proof that the exchange has been canceled. None of the partici-
pants can receive evidence that contradicts the final state of the protocol ex-
ecution.
Weak fairness Upon finalization of a fair exchange protocol, either strong fairness
is met or all honest participants can prove they have behaved correctly.
Another core requirement for fair exchange protocols is non-repudiation. The
non-repudiation requirement assures that the protocol generates enough evidence
to allow the honest participants to maintain fairness, even when the other partici-
pants misbehave.
Non-repudiation Upon finalization of a fair exchange protocol, none of the par-
ticipants can deny having participated. In particular, the participants cannot
deny having originated (non-repudiation of origin) or received (non-repudi-
ation of receipt) the items exchanged.
The timeliness property assures that any participant in a fair exchange protocol
can finish its execution any time, maintaining fairness. And why is timeliness im-
portant? Imagine Alice, Bob and Charles initiate a fair exchange protocol. Once the
protocol reaches the point where the only item to be exchanged left is Charles’, he
decides to delay his delivery, hoping to gain advantage on the situation. If Alice and
Bob cannot contact the TTP to finish the protocol execution, they will be at Charles’
will, they may have resources or goods committed to this fair exchange.
Timeliness Any participant in a fair exchange protocol can be sure that the dura-
tion of the protocol execution is finite. And once the protocol is finished, any
honest participant will maintain the level of fairness obtained.
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Lemma 1.1 An asynchronous optimistic protocol meeting timeliness, can only meet
the weak fairness requirement.
Proof To meet the timeliness requirement any party must be able to contact the
TTP to finish the protocol execution and obtain evidence of the result, either fin-
ished or canceled. Therefore, a dishonest party Pd can follow the protocol to the
end (optimistic execution, without intervention of the TTP), obtaining the evidence
of all the other participants. Later, Pd can contact the TTP and obtain a cancel evi-
dence. The TTP only has the information received in Pd ’s request, thus if Pd forges a
request complying the TTP’s criterion for canceling the protocol, he will get a cancel
token. In this situation, Pd will have evidence of finalization and evidence of can-
celation. But the latter will not be useful in a dispute resolution because all other
parties will have enough evidence to prove that Pd misbehaved, therefore the pro-
tocol can only meet weak fairness.
1.2.2 Additional Requirements
The TTP is an external entity that ensures fairness is maintained in fair exchange
protocols: participating as a proxy between participants (inline TTP), taking part
only in certain protocol steps (online TTP), or being involved only when a dispute
arises (offline TTP). Usually, it is assumed to be trusted, i.e., it behaves according to
the protocol rules, without favoring any user. But the usual assumption also implies
that the TTP never fails. We cannot distinguish between amalfunction and amisbe-
haviour. Some authors adopt amore flexible approach, assuming it is semi-trusted.
The term semi-trusted was first introduced by Franklin and Reiter [14], referring to
a TTP that can misbehave (or malfunction) but not collude with other entities. In
this case, when we assume a semi-trusted TTP, if the TTP malfunctions or misbe-
haves, an honest participant could lose fairness, therefore we need the verifiability
of TTP requirement.
Verifiability of the TTP In a fair exchange protocol execution where the TTP inter-
venes, if the TTP malfunctions (either because of a system/network failure or
a malicious act), the participants can prove it.
Transparent (or invisible) TTP is a requirement first introduced by Micali [15]
in the field of certified e-mail. Informally, the objective of this requirement is to
prevent the detection of the intervention of the TTP in a protocol execution. The
rationale behind is related with trust. Neither the participants nor the TTP can al-
ways distinguish between a dispute related to a network or a system failure, from
a dispute related to malicious users or a protocol misuse. Therefore to avoid the
mistrust of protocol executions that required the intervention of the TTP to solve a
dispute, a transparent TTP could be desirable. But designing a protocol where ver-
ifiability and transparency are compatible is very complex. In fact, to date, there is
only one proposal where verifiability and transparency seems to coexist, Huang et
al. [16].
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Transparency of the TTP Upon finalization of a fair exchange protocol execution,
the evidence generated by the TTP does not allow to detect whether the TTP
has participated in the execution or not.
Finally, another additional requirement for fair exchange protocols is confiden-
tiality. This requirement prevents non-authorized entities to have access to the
items exchanged among the participants during the protocol execution.
Confidentiality In a fair exchange protocol, only the authorized participants must
have access to the item exchanged. Not even the TTP must be able to access
to its content.
1.3 Objectives of this Dissertation
A purchase of services (or products, digital goods, etc.) from an online provider is
a contract signing process, a particular case of fair exchange where the items to be
exchanged are signatures on contracts. And fair exchange is not a new problem,
but as the number of Internet users grow and the Information Communications
Technologies advance, the applications of fair exchange evolve and new scenarios
appear. Nowadays it is very common for consumers (in B2C is the end-user while
in the B2B is another company) to find different online providers offering the same
or similar services: consumers and providers are closer than ever.
One of these new scenarios is the Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) scenario. The
direct access to providers becomes especially interesting for consumers when they
decide to purchase amulti-product service, i.e., a package composed of several ser-
vices (flights, hotels, cars, tours, etc.). The end-users can compare different offers
for the same service from different providers and choose themost suitable one. In a
similar way, companies can have online access to their providers. This real-time ac-
cess to providers is especially beneficial for businesses which require a precise con-
trol of stocks and inventory. They can make real time orders of the many products
needed, assuring they will get them on time and within budget. The problem arises
at the moment of purchasing those products/services: for the consumer to obtain
her desired objective, she needs to purchase X different services from Y different
providers, therefore, she wants to have a commitment to all providers or none, oth-
erwise her objective will not be complete.
In an AM2P scenario, we have N parties (1 consumer, C , and N −1 providers,
Pi ) distributed as a set of (N − 1) pairs of parties {C ,P1}, {C ,P2}...,{C ,P(N−1)}, that
want to sign a set of (N − 1) contracts {M1,M2, ...,M(N−1)} pairwise, i.e., C and P1
want to sign the contract M1, C and P2 the contract M2, etc. But C does not want
to send her signature unless she has assurance she will receive all signatures from
P1, ...,P(N−1) , neither Pi wants to send his signature unless he receivesC ′s signature
on the contract Mi . Despite the great efforts dedicated to the study of Multi-Party
Fair Exchange, there are no solutions addressing this problem: digital signature of
contracts in AM2P scenarios. In fact, digital signature of contracts in AM2P scenar-
ios was a problem yet to be solved.
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If we switch the attention from the consumers to the intermediaries, we have
another new scenario, the Agent Mediated Scenario (AMS). The proximity of con-
sumers and providers could lead us to the conclusion that intermediaries are not
needed anymore. However, the truth is that the existence of intermediaries in elec-
tronic commerce is not unusual, moreover, in some cases is even desirable, as in the
online tourism industry [17]. Travel agencies (intermediaries) sell leisure activities
to consumers, but at the same time they buy these leisure activities from other pro-
viders. The problem is that the intermediary must execute two transactions: one
as provider with the consumer and another one as consumer with its own provider.
But in fact, these two transactions are part of the same one, a transaction between a
consumer C and some provider P , even though they do not have direct contact. In
this situation the intermediary is in an unfair position, because it has no means to
relate its transactionwith the consumer, with its transactionwith the provider, more
specifically, it cannot directly relate the results of both transactions. Consider the
situation where the intermediary signs a contract with a consumer to deliver some
services, but the intermediary’s provider does not sign the corresponding contract
with the intermediary. Hemay be forced to fulfil a contractwith a consumerwithout
having the necessary services.
Many research efforts have been dedicated to the study of the fair exchange
problem, including its application to Multi-Party Contract Signing (MPCS) proto-
cols. As a result we can find numerous proposals for MPCS protocols in the scien-
tific literature [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Even though there is a consensus about some
of the requirements all MPCS protocols must meet, like fairness, most authors im-
pose a set of different requirements. Moreover, sometimes they do no agree on the
definition of these requirements. Within these proposals, we can find some that
claim to propose optimal solutions or define lower-bounds to design MPCS pro-
tocols [18, 22, 23], but the different criteria applied to define requirements like fair-
ness, or terms like round, step, etc. make it difficult to assert that those solutions are
optimal. Moreover, even though we can use different topologies (ring, star,...) to de-
sign MPCS protocols, none of these optimal solutions contemplates the influence
of the topology on the overall result.
Nowadays almost anything can be stored and processed as digital data: docu-
ments, music, images, etc., without loosing any information and even increasing
the possibilities of their applications. As the information is converted to bits (ze-
roes and ones) and electronic impulses, so are the processes involved: payment,
digital signature, etc. But still, there are a few things that are only widespread in
the conventional world, like sending certified mails. With certified mail, items are
handed over to the recipient only in exchange for a receipt. Moreover, by signing
this receipt, the recipient cannot deny having participated in this exchange. Certi-
fied mail can thus be considered as a postal security service, which ensures a fair
exchange and non-repudiation. Standard communication systems like Internet e-
mail, equivalent to postal mail, have no security provisions in terms of a fair and
non-repudiable receipt of message exchange.
Certified mail is a postal security service, therefore, Certified Electronic Mail
(CEM) should be an e-mail security service. The majority of CEM proposals we can
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find in the scientific literature, require a direct interaction between the sender and
the recipient, which does not occur in traditional e-mail interactions: messages are
relayed through Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs). This circumstance has been taken
into account by some authors, which have adopted themodel of semi-trustedMTAs
to decouple the sender from the recipient. Still, most of these approaches use only
one MTA, which does not fully reflect the traditional e-mail architecture, where we
can have many MTAs between the sender and the recipient. Moreover, in these
protocols senders and recipients must be registered with the same transfer agent.
Regarding the security properties these proposals offer, most of them lack of ver-
ifiability of TTP, which assures the participants that the TTP cannot be dishonest
without them being able to prove it. As certifiedmail users, we are used to trust the
postal services, i.e., we trust the postman will only deliver the package/message in
exchange of a signed receipt. But this trust relationship between users and provi-
ders does not have a counterpart in the digital world.
Probably this disconnection between the scientific proposals and e-mail infras-
tructure has made that no real implementation of those technical solutions can be
found in general use. But, in recent years, some organizations (especially public
administrations) have demanded a CEM service. So, in different countries we can
find CEM services, many times with a limited scope, and without a standard guar-
anteeing the interoperability among different CEM services in different countries.
Obviously, it is not a desirable situation, and for this reason some additional work is
necessary.
As we previously explained, the boom of Internet has boosted the growth of
electronic commerce. Nowadays, the most used payment systems are credit card,
money transactions in COD (Collect OnDelivery) or bank transfers. Other payment
systems such as electronic money or micro-payment systems have a token pres-
ence. However, mentioned systems are not suitable for all scenarios of electronic
commerce. Credit card payments have limitationswhendealingwith large amounts
to be paid, and they do not provide anonymity to the participants. Money transac-
tions in cash, offer anonymity to the transactionparties, but require theparticipants
to carry these large amounts in cash, and some consumers may not feel comfort-
able carrying large amounts of cash. Even though bank transfers allow the payment
of large amounts and do not have credit limitations, they do not provide anonymity
to the consumer, allowing the profiling of the consumer’s habits.
Among the traditional payment systems, we have one that allow users to trans-
fer large amounts of money while maintaining the anonymity of the participants,
the checks. We can find different kinds of paper-based checks: order or bearer
checks, open or crossed, bank or personal checks, certified or non-certified, etc.
Each kind of check presents different features and different degree of security. The
paper based check is still widely used in traditional commerce; it has features that
differentiate it fromother payment systems. The check allows for payments of large
amounts (thereby overcomes the limitations of the credit card [24, 25]), can achieve
a high degree of anonymity (as opposed to bank transfers or credit card) and can
also be transferable (operation known as endorsement if a check is nominal, or de-
livery if it is bearer check). So, the first conclusion is that we need a functional equiv-
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alent in the electronic world for paper-based checks: electronic checks (e-checks).
There are real experiences of e-checks, among which stands out, above all, the
Financial Services Technology Consortium [26]. But these experiences are limited
in scope and they do not retain all the desired properties of paper based checks.
Obviously, an e-check system has to be practical, but the main concern when de-
signing a system for e-check is security. And the first issue to be resolved is that in
the electronic world there is no original and copy (unlike the paper world). There-
fore, security measures should be taken that prevent the same e-check can be used
to make various payments. A second important issue for users is to guarantee that
e-checks will be paid (avoid the situation in which the check bounces and cannot
be cashed). And finally, a third issue is that users are becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the privacy of electronic transactions (especially when dealing with
electronic payments).
1.3.1 Contributions
This dissertation presents contributions on three fields related to fair exchange: dig-
ital signature of contracts, certified e-mail and payment systems. In the following
paragraphs these contributions are presented.
Digital Signature of Contracts
The contributions in the field of digital signature of contracts presented in this dis-
sertation are manifold. First, it presents two new scenarios for the digital signature
of contracts: the AM2P and AMS scenarios. Both scenarios are described and the se-
curity requirements for fairness are developed, adapting them when necessary. For
each new scenario an optimistic protocol is presented, meeting all the core security
requirements, and some additional ones. Finally, the protocols are accompanied
with a revision of the security requirements, to prove they aremet.
On the other hand, this dissertation presents an efficiency study of fair exchange
protocols for Multi-Party Contract Signing (MPCS), from their architecture point of
view, an approach that has not been previously used. A set of common topologies
is presented and defined: ring, star sequential and mesh. Some common terms
and notions, as the meaning of round and message, are defined according to the
topology where they are applied. The suitability of such common terms to mea-
sure the efficiency of the protocols is discussed, and the measure of transmissions
is presented as alternative. Finally, an optimistic MPCS protocol meeting all the
core security requirements is presented for each topology, proving that in each case
the solution is optimal, improving the existent proposals of lower-bounds for fair
MPCS protocols.
Certified ElectronicMail
This dissertation presents two optimistic CEMprotocols designed considering their
deployment into the traditional e-mail infrastructure. Both proposals allow the use
of multiple MTAs, avoiding inline and not-verifiable TTPs and letting both sender
and recipient to choose their own MTA. This way, the CEM protocols can be more
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easily deployed on the Internet, allowing the use of Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
(SMTP) as underlying protocol for transferring the messages.
The first proposal is the first of its kind to consider an optimistic approach with
multiple untrusted MTAs, i.e., they can cheat/fail and collude with other entities.
This strong assumption increases the complexity of the protocol, therefore in the
second proposal this assumption has been relaxed, allowing users to trust their own
MTA, while the others remain untrusted. Both proposals meet all the core security
requirements (effectiveness, fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation), some ad-
ditional ones (verifiability of the TTP and confidentiality) and a specific one, non-
selective receipt. Like many CEM optimistic protocols, both approaches provide a
non-repudiation of origin as well as a non-repudiation of receipt service, attesting,
the latter, that the recipient actually has received the message. Since both protocols
support multiple MTAs, they further provide a non-repudiation of submission ser-
vice, attesting that the sender has actually handed over a message to his MTA, and
non-repudiation of delivery, attesting that the message has been delivered to the
recipient’s MTA.
Payment Schemes
This dissertation proposes an electronic bearer bank check scheme allowing the
electronic checks to be transferred fairly and anonymously. In addition, the pay-
ment of this kind of electronic check is guaranteed because it is a bank check, and
this feature can facilitate the expansion of such mean of payment. Moreover, the
proposed scheme provides a lightweight solution for the client side because this is,
normally, the more restrictive participant in terms of computational resources.
1.3.2 Outline of this Work
The solutions for digital signature of contracts are presented in chapter 2. In chap-
ter 3 the solutions for certified e-mail are presented, and the payment protocol is
presented in chapter 4. Finally, in chapter 5 the final conclusions are presented.
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DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF CONTRACTS
As we have seen in section 1.1, fair exchange is a well known problem that has been
extensively studied. But as e-commerce evolved, fair exchange scenarios have also
evolved. This chapter is dedicated to the application of fair exchange to two of these
new scenarios: Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) scenarios (section 2.1) and Agent
Mediated Scenarios (AMSs) (section 2.2). In particular, this chapter is dedicated
to the application of digital signature of contracts to these scenarios, presenting
one optimistic contract signing protocol for each scenario. Additionally, section
2.3 studies the efficiency of asynchronous optimistic Multi-Party Contract Signing
(MPCS) protocols in relation to their topology. As a result, one optimal solution
meeting all the core security requirements is presented for each topology.
2.1 AtomicMulti-Two Party (AM2P) Scenarios
Nowadays it is very common for consumers (in B2C is the end-user while in the B2B
is another company) to find different online providers offering the same or similar
services/products. In some sectors, like leisure activities, this direct access to pro-
viders becomes especially interesting for consumers when they decide to purchase
amulti-product service, i.e., a package composed of several services (flights, hotels,
cars, tours, etc.). The consumers can compare different offers for the same service
from different providers and choose the most suitable one. In a similar way, com-
panies can have online access to their providers. This real-time access to providers
is especially beneficial for businesses which require a precise control of stocks and
inventory. They can make real time orders of the many products needed, assuring
they will get them on time and within budget. The problem arises at the moment of
purchasing those products/services: for the consumer to obtain her desired objec-
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tive, she needs to purchase X different services from Y different providers, there-
fore, she wants to have a commitment to all providers or none, otherwise her objec-
tive will not be complete. Without loss of generality and for ease of explanation, we
will consider that the consumer wants a product/service from each provider.
In this section we present a new contract signing scenario, the Atomic Multi-
Two Party (AM2P) scenario, where we have one consumer andmany providers will-
ing to sign a contract pairwise (consumer-provider), with the particularity that the
consumer needs all the providers’ signatures. We also propose a solution, an asyn-
chronous optimistic protocol for AM2P contract signing, which is the first solution
to solve this problem.
2.1.1 Motivation
In this section we will provide 2 examples of use cases to show the possible benefits
of having AM2P solutions. In particular, we will present a B2C scenario, where a
consumer purchases a leisure trip, and a B2B scenario, where a company purchases
the materials to produce goods.
Business to Consumer (B2C)
Let us consider that Alice, a consumer, is looking to have an opera weekend in Mi-
lan. After checking on Internet, she finds a suitable offer for each service needed,
from different providers: a two-way plane ticket from Barcelona to Milan (trans-
portation), two nights in a hotel (accommodation) and two tickets to an opera play
in La Scala (leisure activities). But Alice wants all services or none. It does not make
sense to purchase the transportation and accommodation if she is not able to get
the opera tickets, or to have the opera tickets without the transportation (she does
not know if she will be able to find another offer). Since the services are booked
from different providers, Alice cannot be sure she will get all of them, unless she
uses an AM2P protocol.
This AM2P protocol could be implemented as a plug-in, specific service from
a website, etc., where Alice would add her choices (plane ticket, accommodation,
etc.), and click a “book" button. As a result, Alice would receive the corresponding
evidence of signature from all services chosen. Thewhole protocol executionwould
remain transparent to the end-user, in this case, Alice.
Business to Business (B2B)
Let us consider that Acme is a company thatmanufactures products under demand,
i.e., they do not have a stock of manufactured products neither raw materials. To
plan the next quarter’s production, Acme needs to assure the raw materials’ sup-
ply. Therefore, she will contact each provider to gather information on costs and
delivery time. Once she has found a set of providers that can supply her with the
rawmaterials needed, satisfying her needs in terms of costs and delivery time (and
any other criterion), she will place an order. But to assure the production, Acme
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needs to be sure that all providers will comply with their agreement, otherwise the
production may be delayed or the costs increased (the provider substitute may not
agree with Acme’s conditions).
In this case, the AM2P protocol could be a B2B utility for contracting. Providers
would offer their services (products, digital goods, etc.) along with its conditions,
and the clients could use it to locate the services they need, add them to a sort of
shopping chart and sign the contracts, atomically. Again, the protocol execution
would be transparent to the user, in this case, Acme.
2.1.2 Security Requirements
The requirements (core and additional) for optimistic fair exchange are defined in
section 1.2. The solution presented in this section meets all the core requirements
(effectiveness, fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation) and two additional ones,
verifiability of TTP and confidentiality. Following wewill detail the requirements for
optimistic AM2P contract signing protocols, starting with the core requirements:
Definition 2.1 (AM2P Effectiveness) If every participant involved behaves correctly,
the consumer will receive her expected items (signatures) from the providers, and the
providerswill receive their expected item (signature) from the consumer, without TTP
intervention.
Definition 2.2 (AM2PWeak Fairness) Upon finalization of an AM2P signature, an
honest consumer will have the signature of all the providers, and all honest providers
will have their corresponding signature from the consumer, or all honest parties will
have enough evidence to prove they have behaved correctly in front of an arbiter.
Definition 2.3 (AM2P Timeliness) Any party involved in an AM2P signature can be
sure that the protocol execution will be finished at a certain finite point of time. Once
the protocol execution is finished, the level of fairness achieved by all honest partici-
pants cannot be degraded whatever the other participants do.
Definition 2.4 (AM2PNon-repudiation) In an AM2P signature that has involved a
consumer and N −1 providers, neither the consumer nor the providers will be able to
deny their involvement. In particular, given a signed contract Mi , neither consumer
C nor provider Pi can deny having signed it.
Finally, our optimistic AM2P contract signing protocol alsomeets two additional
requirements:
Definition 2.5 (AM2P Verifiability of TTP) If the trusted third party (TTP) misbe-
haves resulting in the loss of fairness for an honest party (consumer or provider), this
party can prove the fact in front of an external arbiter.
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Definition 2.6 (AM2P Confidentiality) Only the parties involved in a signature, con-
sumer C and provider Pi , are allowed to know the content of the contract Mi . Not
even the TTP can have access to the plain contract.
Therefore, our asynchronous optimistic protocol must meet the following se-
curity requirements: AM2P Effectiveness, AM2P Weak Fairness, AM2P Timeliness,
AM2P Non-Repudiation, AM2P Verifiability of the TTP and AM2P Confidentiality.
2.1.3 Previous Work
In an AM2P scenario the consumerC wants to sign N−1 contracts with N−1 provi-
ders pairwise, but the providers do not know each other: only C has a relationship
with each Pi . Therefore we cannot use a ring architecture, where each participant
Xi knows at least his neighbours X(i−1) and X(i+1) . Instead of a ring architecture, our
protocol uses a star architecture (figure 2.1), where the consumer contacts directly
to each provider.
We canfindother proposals for asynchronousmulti-party signature of contracts
[18, 19, 27, 20, 28], but none of them is addressed to AM2P scenarios. The objec-
tive of these multi-party proposals is to allow a group of N (N ≥ 2) parties to fairly
exchange their signatures on a pre-agreed contract M , being the contract M the
same for each participant; meanwhile we need to exchange a set of (N −1) different
contracts {M1,M2, ...,M(N−1)}, pairwise, between a consumer C and a provider Pi ,
where 1≤ i ≤ (N −1). Moreover, the consumer needs to acquire all N −1 signatures
for the exchange to be considered fair. Therefore, we cannot apply these solutions
to our scenario: AM2P.
Despite the great efforts dedicated to the study of Fair Exchange and contract
signing, there are no solutions addressing signature of contracts in AM2P scenarios.
But we can find a few proposals [29, 30, 31] that try to address a similar problem
(AM2P), but in other scenarios.
In [29] Liu proposes an AM2P optimistic protocol for the exchange of payment
for digital goods, composed of an exchange sub-protocol with 2 phases: negotiation
and payment, and 3 resolve sub-protocols. The negotiation phase is a 4 steps cycle
where the consumer and the providers agree on the terms of the exchange (price
and product). If consumer and providers behave correctly, the payment phase re-
quires the exchange of 5 messages between the consumer and each provider with-
out TTP intervention. Even though the protocol achieves atomicity in the multi-
two party exchange of payment tokens for digital goods, the problem solved differs
from ours. We aim to the AM2P signature of contracts, therefore wewant to achieve
atomicity in the multi-two party exchange of digital signatures. Moreover, the pro-
posal meets the non-repudiation and fairness requirements, but fails to meet veri-
fiability of TTP and timeliness.
In [31] Onieva et al. present an extension of a multi-party non-repudiation pro-
tocol with online Trusted Third Party (TTP), which allows one originator (“Simple
Origin") to send different messages to multiple recipients. In their paper, Onieva et
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Our proposal Liu [29] Onieva [31] Yanping [30]
Scenario contract signing payment for goods non-repudiation non-repudiation
Atomicity X X – –
Effectiveness X X – X
Fairness weak weak strong strong
Timeliness X – X X
Non-repudiation X X X X
Verifiability TTP X – – –
Confidentiality X – X X
XYES –NO
Table 2.1: Multi-Two Party Solutions - A Comparative Analysis
al. classify the multi-party scenarios into two types: Simple Origin with Many Re-
cipients for the exchange of the sameMessage (SOMR−M), and Simple Origin with
Many Recipients for different Messages (SOMR −Mi ). This second scenario type,
SOMR −Mi , is similar to our AM2P scenario, though they aim to the exchange of
messages meanwhile we aim to the signature of contracts. Moreover, atomicity is
not addressed in Onieva et al. paper. Therefore their proposal cannot be applied to
AM2P scenarios for signature of contracts.
Yanping and Liaojun [30] propose an optimistic multi-party non-repudiation
protocol, which allows an originator to send different messages to multiple recip-
ients, i.e., a multi-two party scenario. But again, their solution does not address
atomicity, and their objective, non-repudiation, differs from ours, signature of con-
tracts. Therefore, we cannot apply their proposal to AM2P scenarios for signature
of contracts.
To the best of our knowledge, these references [29, 30, 31] are the only ones we
can find in the literature related to the AM2P scenario, and as we can see in table 2.1
they do not solve our problem: signature of contracts in AM2P scenarios.
2.1.4 Overview and Notation
In this section we present an asynchronous optimistic protocol for AM2P contract
signing. The protocol follows a star architecture (see figure 2.1), where the con-
sumer C contacts all the providers Pi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ (N −1)) at the “same time", and
awaits for their response to continue with the protocol, i.e., she sends all N−1mes-
sages at once, and awaits for theN−1 responses before continuingwith the protocol
execution. If the consumer fails to receive one or more responses she will stop the
protocol execution and she will contact the TTP. All participants must agree to use
the same TTP, e.g., they may accept it implicitly when agreeing to participate in the
signature.
The messages sent from the consumer C to the providers Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ N −1) are
called commitments (COM), and the corresponding responses from the providers
to the consumer, are called acceptances (ACC ). A round k is the exchange of a set of
(N−1) commitments for the corresponding set of (N−1) acceptances. TheCOM(k ,i)
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P1
P2
P3
C
P4
P5
COMi
ACCi
Figure 2.1: Star Architecture with N = 6, 1 Consumer and 5 Providers
and ACC(k ,i) (k = round number, i = provider number) are the evidence that provi-
der Pi and consumer C must receive, respectively. Commitments and acceptances
are linked through the round number k.
Following we have the general notation we will use along the protocol descrip-
tion:
• NNumber of participants: 1 Consumer and N −1 Providers.
• XiZ = {x1,x2, ...,xZ} Vector with Z elements, where 1≤ i ≤ Z .
• C Consumer (in B2C is the end-user while in the B2B is another company).
• Pi Provider i , 1≤ i ≤ (N −1).
• Mi Message (contract) exchanged between the consumer C and the provider
Pi . This contract must include the necessary information to execute the pro-
tocol. Some of these values are: the identities of participants C and Pi , the
identity of the TTP, the number of rounds needed to finish the exchange with-
out the intervention of the TTP, etc.
• CID unique Contract IDentifier. A random number used to uniquely identify
a protocol execution. It is generated by C when initiates the protocol execu-
tion.
• h(Mi) Hash Function of message Mi .
• Sj[Mi]= SKj[h(Mi)] j ’s Digital Signature onMi (where SK j is j ’s private key).
The TTP uses a set of rules to resolve the resolution sub-protocol requests fairly.
These rules are based on a group of variables the TTP updates on every request
received, indicating the state of a protocol execution identified by its CID. Following
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we have these group of variables, its definition, and some notation used along the
rules definition (see section 2.1.5).
• XN = {C ,P1, ...,P(N−1)} set of participants in an AM2P exchange.
• XC set of participantswho already requested resolution for theAM2P exchange
with contract identifier “CID", and the contractMi : {Xi ,CID,h(Mi )}.
• XA set of participants who have received a canceled token from the TTP, along
with the CID and round value ({Xi ,CID,k}).
• canceled boolean value stating that the exchange execution has been can-
celed if its value is true.
• signed boolean value stating that the contract has been signed if its value is
true.
We can find different types of communication channels in the literature. Asokan
et al. [32] defines three different channels: operational, reliable and resilient; and
Ferrer-Gomila et al. [33] classifies them in operational, resilient and unreliable. In
our protocol, we will assume that the communications between consumer C and
providers Pi are executed through unreliable channels (messages can be lost), but
messages between the TTP and the protocol participants are exchanged through a
resilient channel (messages can be delayed but not lost).
2.1.5 Protocol for Fair Exchange in AtomicMulti-Two Party Scenarios
The asynchronous optimistic AM2P protocol is composed of two sub-protocols, ex-
change and resolution. If every party involved behaves honestly, the exchange sub-
protocol will finish without TTP intervention.
Exchange sub-protocol
Table 2.2 shows the exchange sub-protocol execution flow and the corresponding
values exchanged. Each sub-protocol complete execution is composed ofN rounds,
and each round requires the exchange of N − 1 pairs of messages {COMmitment,
ACCeptance} and thus 2N (N −1) messages are necessary. The reason why we need
N rounds is explained later in this section. The evidence of signature is the corre-
sponding to the round N , COM(N ,i) and ACC(N ,i) (1≤ i ≤ N −1), i.e., after the N th
round execution, every party involved will have the corresponding signed contract
(the consumer requires the set of all N −1 contracts, Si gnedContracti (N−1)):
SignedContracti {CID, Mi , COM(N ,i) , ACC(N ,i)}
Each round starts when the consumer sends to each provider the correspond-
ing commitment, COM(k ,i) . The commitments are the consumer signature on the
contract identifierCID, the hash of the contract to be signed h(Mi ) (wedo not want
the TTP to have access to the contract data), and the round number k. This round
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Exchange Sub-Protocol
Round
1 C → Pi CID,Eki (Mi ),PKPi (ki ),1,COM(1,i)
1 C ← Pi CID,1,ACC(1,i)
...
...
...
k C → Pi CID,k,COM(k ,i)
k C ← Pi CID,k,ACC(k ,i)
...
...
...
N C → Pi CID,N ,COM(N ,i)
N C ← Pi CID,N ,ACC(N ,i)
N = number of participants and total rounds
k = round number
Eki (Mi ) : Mi encrypted with symmetric key ki
PKPi (ki ) : ki encrypted with Pi ’s public key
COM(k ,i) : SC [CID,h(Mi ),k]
ACC(k ,i) : SPi [CID,h(Mi ),k]
Table 2.2: Asynchronous Optimistic AtomicMulti-Two Party (AM2P) Exchange Sub-
Protocol
number is the link between the commitment and the acceptance. Note that in the
first message (see table 2.2), the consumer also sends the contract Mi encrypted
with the symmetric key ki , Eki (Mi ), and the key ki encrypted with the provider Pi ’s
public key, PKPi (ki ), so Pi is the only one who can decrypt the content.
After sending the commitments, the consumer awaits to receive the answers,
the acceptances, from the N − 1 providers. The acceptance is equivalent to the
commitment, but signed by the corresponding provider (see table 2.2). Once the
consumer receives all N − 1 acceptances, she will continue the execution starting
the next round.
If the consumer fails to receive one, or more than one, of the provider’s accep-
tances during round k > 1, she will execute the resolution sub-protocol before send-
ing further commitments; otherwise shemay lose atomicity on the entire AM2P sig-
nature.
Resolution sub-protocol
At any time, consumer (from round k > 1) and providers can contact the TTP to
solve the protocol execution. The TTP uses a set of rules to solve the resolution
requests fairly (table 2.3). During the first round (k = 1), any provider can contact
the TTP to cancel the execution, while if k > 1 any party can contact the TTP to
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Resolution Sub-Protocol (k = round number 1≤ k ≤N )
Xi −→ TTP RES(k ,i), EV RES(k ,i)
If ( {Xi ,CID,h(Mi )}∈ XC )
reject request
else
XC = {Xi ,CID,h(Mi )}∪XC
If ( k==1 and signed == false )
canceled = true;
X A = {Xi ,CID,1}∪X A;
TTP −→ Xi CanceledTK
else If( k == 1 and signed == true )
TTP −→ Xi Si gnedTK
else If( k > 1 and canceled == false )
signed = true;
TTP −→ Xi Si gnedTK
else If( k > 1 and signed == true )
TTP −→ Xi Si gnedTK
else If( k > 1 and canceled == true )
If ( ∀{Xi ,r } ∈ X A→ r < k−1 )
canceled = false; signed = true;
TTP −→ Xi Si gnedTK
else
X A = {Xi ,CID,k}∪X A;
TTP −→ Xi CanceledTK
end If
end If
end If
when Xi =Consumer,C
RES(k ,i) =CID,h(Mi )(N−1),k
(COM(k ,i))(N−1), (ACC((k−1),i))(N−1)
EV RES(k ,i) = SC [RES(k ,i)]
Si gnedTK = STTP [CID,h(Mi ),k,COM(k ,i)](N−1)
CanceledTK = STTP [CID,h(Mi ),k,canceled](N−1)
When Xi =Provideri,Pi
RES(k ,i) =CID,h(Mi ),k
COM((k−1),i),ACC((k−1),i)
EV RES(k ,i) = SPi [RES(k ,i)]
Si gnedTK = STTP [CID,h(Mi ),k,ACC((k−1),i)]
CanceledTK = STTP [CID,h(Mi ),k,canceled]
Table 2.3: Asynchronous Optimistic Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) Resolution
Sub-Protocol
23
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF CONTRACTS
finish it. It does not make sense for the consumer to send a cancel request during
round k = 1 because if she fails to receive the ACC(1,i) from any provider, she will
just stop the protocol execution. During round k = 1 the providers can only cancel
the signature, therefore the consumer cannot lose fairness. In table 2.3 we can see
the resolution sub-protocol requests and execution flow.
The consumer can contact the TTP to claim she has not received the accep-
tance corresponding to round k > 1, from one or more providers. The resolution
request message, {RES(k ,i), EV RES(k ,i)} (see table 2.3), has to include the contract
identifierCID, a vector with the hash of the (N−1) contracts h(Mi )(N−1) (we do not
want the TTP to have access to the contracts’ content), the round number k, and
the last commitments sent and acceptances received (from each provider i ), i.e.,
{(COM(k ,i))(N−1), (ACC((k−1),i))(N−1)}. Alongwith these valuesC will sendEV RES(k ,i),
the consumer’s digital signature on the whole message RES(k ,i), as evidence that C
has contacted the TTP. After executing the resolution sub-protocol, the consumer
will receive either a vector of (N −1) cancel tokens or a vector of (N −1) signed to-
kens, one for each contract. Therefore, a signed or canceled contract for a consumer
will be as follows:
SignedContracti CID, Mi , k, COM(k ,i), Si gnedTK
CanceledContracti CID, Mi , k, CanceledTK
The provider Pi can contact the TTP to claim he has not received the commit-
ment corresponding to round k,COM(k ,i). The resolution requestmessage, {RES(k ,i),
EV RES(k ,i)} (see table 2.3), has to include the contract identifier CID, the hash of
the contract h(Mi ), the round number k, and the last commitment received and
acceptance sent, i.e.,COM((k−1),i) and ACC((k−1),i). Along with these values the pro-
vider will send EV RES(k ,i), Pi ’s digital signature on the whole message RES(k ,i), as
evidence that Pi has contacted the TTP. After executing the resolution sub-protocol,
a provider will either receive a cancel token or a signed token, therefore a signed or
canceled contract for a provider will be as follows:
SignedContracti CID, Mi , k, ACC((k−1),i), Si gnedTK
CanceledContracti CID, Mi , k, CanceledTK
TTP rules
In order to solve the resolution requests fairly, the TTP has to apply the following
rules:
RULE 0
The TTP will only accept one resolution request per participant and CID.
In order to provide timeliness, the participants can contact the TTP anytime (the
consumer can contact anytime after round k = 1). If they are honest, the response
given by the TTP (supposed that this one acts properly) will bemaintained whatever
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happens with any other participant of the contract signing protocol. So, if a partic-
ipant decides that he wants to finish (either stop or sign the contract) the protocol
run, he has to contact the TTP and stop sending any additionalmessage to the other
parties (even if he receives a message from them). This way, knowing that the deci-
sion of the TTP guarantees fairness for him, he cannot contact the TTP anymore (it
could lead to confusing situations).
RULE 1
If the TTP receives a request from Pi during round k = 1, and the execution has
not been previously finished (signed=true) by other party, the TTP will cancel it and
send a canceled token to Pi .
If an honest party contacts the TTP during the first round (k = 1) and nobody
has contacted the TTP to finish the exchange previously, the TTP cannot know if
all parties are compromised to sign the contract (perhaps P
i
′ does not know that
the contract signing protocol has been initiated). But we want an atomic solution,
whichmeans, everybody or nobodymust have enough evidence of the signed or not
signed contract. This way, and with only this information, the TTP has to provide
a cancel token related to the signature of this contract. Perhaps this party is not
honest, but following rules guarantee that honest parties will not be in an unfair
situation (they can contact the TTP in order to solve possible unfair situations).
On the other hand, it is possible that the protocol run has been finished (without
TTP’s intervention) and some party cancels with the TTP (this situation will always
be possible in an asynchronous optimistic solution: parties can contact anytime
with the TTP), but the evidence provided by the TTP will not be useful for him in
order to prove the cancelation, because any other party has enough evidence (the
signature of the contract provided directly by him) to prove that he is a cheating
party.
RULE 2
If the TTP receives a request from Xi during round k > 1, and the execution has
not been previously canceled by other party, the TTP will finish it (signed=true) and
send a signed token to Xi .
If some party (honest or not honest) contacts the TTP after the first round (k >
1), it means that this party provides to the TTP enough evidence that all parties
know that the contract signing protocol among them has been initiated, and in fact
all of them have compromised to sign the contract (all of them have sent, at least,
the message of first round). If no party has contacted the TTP previously to can-
cel the exchange, the TTP has to send a signed token to that party: this evidence
will prove that the contract is signed. Perhaps some other party has not received
the necessary evidence to prove that the contract is signed (an unfair situation), but
they can contact the TTP, and the TTP will apply this same Rule 2 (R2): it will give a
signed token to that party. So, fairness is guaranteed in this situation.
RULE 3
If the TTP receives a request from Xi during round k ≥ 1, and the execution has been
25
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF CONTRACTS
previously finished (signed=true) by other party, the TTP will send a signed token to
Xi .
This rule is complementary to R1. If some party (honest or not honest) tries to
cancel the exchange (it means that he provides evidence related only to first round),
but the TTP has finished the exchange with some other party (which means that
other party had provided enough evidence that all parties agreed to sign the con-
tract, see R2), the TTP will send a signed token to the requesting party in order to
maintain fairness for him and previous contacting parties. If some party lacks any
evidence, he has to contact the TTP, with evidence of first round (TTP will apply
Rule 3, R3) or a posterior round (TTP will apply R2).
RULE 4
If the TTP receives a request from Xi during round k > 1, and the execution has been
previously canceled (canceled=true) by other party (or parties), the TTP will check
the previously received requests to see if they have cheated. If ∀{Xi ,r } ∈ X A→ r <
k − 1 (r = round number of previous requests, k = round number of current re-
quest), it means that all the previous requesters have cheated, therefore, the TTP
will change the execution state to signed and send the corresponding token to Xi ,
otherwise the state will remain canceled and the TTP will send the corresponding
canceled token.
This rule is related to the abort chaining problem explained in [28, 34] and it
makes this rule a little bitmore complex than the previous ones. The problem arises
when someparty, Pi , has canceled theprotocol execution (hehas contacted theTTP
in first position and the TTP applying R1 has given a cancel token to that party), and
later some other party, Pi ′ or C (hence for Pi ′ ), tries to finish the exchange with the
TTP. If Pi ′ provides evidence of round k ≥ 3 ({RES(≥3,i ′ ),EV RES(≥3,i ′ )}) to the TTP
then it will be obvious for the TTP that Pi has cheated: either the protocol execution
was not at round k = 1 or he continued with the protocol after contacting with the
TTP. But if Pi ′ provides evidence of round k = 2, it can be coherent with the petition
of Pi . In the next paragraph we present an example to clarify this situation.
Suppose Pi sends a request during round k = 1. He will send the commitment
and acceptance from round k = 1, claiming he has not received the commitment
from round k = 2: either the message has been lost or the consumer, C , has never
sent it. If later P
i
′ sends a request during round k = 2, within this request he will
include the corresponding commitment, COM(2,i ′ ). Therefore, it is clear to the TTP
that C started the round k = 2, but it cannot prove yet that Pi has misbehaved, the
message (COM(2,i)) can have been delayed or lost. But if Pi ′ sends a request during
round k = 3, it means that the consumer sent the commitments from round k = 3,
and this can only happen if she received all the acceptances from round k = 2, in-
cluding the acceptance from Pi . Therefore the TTP will be able to prove Pi ’s mis-
behaviour: either he has continued with the protocol execution after receiving a
resolution response from the TTP, or the protocol execution was not at round k = 1.
26
2.1. Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) Scenarios
About the need of N rounds
In this section we have stated that our protocol requires N rounds, but we have not
explained why N in particular. In the following paragraphs we will prove it.
Theorem1. For an asynchronous optimistic multi-two party signing protocol (one
consumer and N −1 providers, where N > 2), meeting the timeliness and atomicity
requirements, more than N −1 rounds are necessary to achieve fairness.
Proof. Assume that N −1 rounds are enough. Therefore, the evidence of signature
are the COM((N−1),i) and ACC((N−1),i) .
Let us imagine that the exchange has been finished for some honest Pi (let’s
call him P(N−1)), and some dishonest party contacts the TTP but continues with the
protocol execution, let’s say P1 sends a resolution request pretending to be at round
k = 1. The TTP, without more information, will cancel the exchange.
Following, a second dishonest party, P2, contacts the TTP pretending to be at
round k = 2. This situation is compatible with the previous one, and therefore the
TTP has to maintain the cancel state. In particular, the TTP will apply Rule 4.
Next, a third dishonest participant, P3, contacts the TTP pretending to be at
round k = 3. This situation is compatible with the previous one, but not with the
first one (now it is clear that P1 is a cheating party: Rule 4) and therefore, to be
respectful with P2 (maintain fairness) the TTP has to maintain the cancel state.
We can follow the same reasoning for Pi . Pi contacts the TTP to finish the ex-
change, pretending to be at round k = i . This situation is compatible with P(i−1)
contacting the TTP pretending to be at round k = (i − 1), but not with the P(i−2)
(P(i−2) is a cheating party) and therefore, to be respectful with P(i−1) the TTP has to
maintain the cancel state. And so on, until we reach round k = (N −2). After receiv-
ing all the acceptances, the consumer C sends her evidence of signature to each
provider, COM((N−1),i) , and awaits for the acceptances. But the COM((N−1),(N−2))
never reaches its destination, thus P(N−2) contacts the TTP and obtains a cancel
token. This kind of attack is known as abort-chaining [28, 34].
Wehave assumed thatP(N−1) has evidence of the signed contract (COM((N−1),i ) ),
and the TTP has given a cancel token to an honest party P(N−2): he can be at round
k = (N −1). Therefore the protocol would not be fair. And this contradiction proves
that more than (N −1) rounds are necessary.
2.1.6 Security Analysis
In this section we will review if our protocol proposal (section 2.1.5) accomplishes
the requirements we have established for an asynchronous optimistic AM2P con-
tract signing protocol, presented in section 2.1.2: AM2P effectiveness, AM2P weak
fairness, AM2P timeliness, AM2P non-repudiation, AM2P verifiability of TTP and
AM2P confidentiality.
CLAIM 2.1: AM2P Effectiveness: The TTP only intervenes in case of dispute.
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PROOF. The executionof the exchange sub-protocol (table 2.2) assures that, if ev-
ery party involved behaves correctly (and there are no communication problems),
the consumer will receive the signature of the N − 1 providers, and each provider
Pi will receive its corresponding signature from the consumer after N rounds and
without TTP intervention. Therefore our protocol meets the effectiveness require-
ment.
CLAIM 2.2: AM2PWeak Fairness: Upon a finalization of an AM2P protocol exe-
cution, either the consumer receives the signature of all providers and each provider
receives the corresponding signature from the consumer, or none of the participants
receive information that allow him to be at an advantage over the honest ones.
PROOF. If we assume the consumer is honest, whatever the behaviour of the pro-
viders, we have to prove the consumer maintains fairness. There are two possibili-
ties in which a provider Pi (with 1≤ i ≤ (N −1)) can obtain proof of the consumer’s
signature:
• After receiving the consumer’s N th commitment COM(N ,i) , (1 < i < (N −1))
which means the consumer has N − 1 provider’s acceptances, thus she can
contact the TTP and obtain a token of signature.
• After contacting theTTP,whichmeans theTTPhas the value signed set to true,
therefore the consumer can obtain the signature evidence from the providers
or from the TTP, if any provider decides to discontinue the sequence of N
rounds.
In all situations, the consumer maintains fairness.
If we assume an honest provider Pi (1≤ i ≤ (N −1)), whatever the behaviour of
the consumer, we have to prove that fairness is maintained for the provider. The
consumer can obtain proof of the provider’s signature by twomeans:
• After receiving the provider’sN th acceptance ACC(N ,i) , whichmeans the pro-
vider already has the consumer’s proof of signature COM(N ,i) .
• Contacting the TTP at round k > 1, whichmeans the TTP has the value signed
set to true, therefore, the provider can obtain the signature proof from the
consumer, or from the TTP, if the consumer decides to discontinue the se-
quence of N rounds.
In all situations, the provider maintains fairness. Therefore our protocol proposal
meets the AM2P weak fairness requirement.
CLAIM 2.3: AM2P Timeliness: The duration of a protocol execution will always
be finite, without any honest participant losing fairness.
PROOF. At any time during the protocol execution, any party involved can ex-
ecute the resolution sub-protocol and finish its execution obtaining a canceled or
signed token from the TTP. If every party involved behaves correctly, our protocol
proposal requires N rounds and 2N (N −1) messages, being N a finite and known
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number. Therefore we can affirm that the protocol execution will end in a finite
amount of time, whether by intervention of the TTP or the normal protocol flow.
Moreover, once the protocol execution has ended, its final state cannot be changed.
If the protocol ended by intervention of the TTP, this one will ensure coherence
within the different requests received (following the TTP rules, section 2.1.5), mean-
while if the exchange ended with the N th round, the evidence obtained by con-
sumer and providers will prove its ending state. Therefore, we can affirm that our
protocol proposal meets the timeliness requirement.
CLAIM 2.4: AM2PNon-repudiation: Neither the consumer nor the providers can
deny having participated in a contract signature, or being excluded from it.
PROOF. In an AM2P signature, evidence of participation of consumer and provi-
ders are generated in every round. The COM(k ,i) and ACC(k ,i) relate the consumer
and providers to the protocol execution. In particular, the N th commitment and
acceptance, are considered the signature of the contract itself. If a consumer tries
to deny her involvement in the signature of a contract Mi , the provider Pi could
prove it using the consumer’s signature or the TTP’s token of signed. In the same
way, the consumer can prove the provider’s involvement using his signature or the
TTP’s token of signed.
CLAIM 2.5: AM2P Verifiability of TTP: If the TTP fails to generate a correct re-
sponse (due to amisbehaviour or a system failure), the honest participants can prove
it.
PROOF. Assuming an honest consumer and a malicious TTP, the possible situa-
tions are described in the following paragraphs.
If the consumer receives a cancel token (a vector with (N − 1) cancel tokens,
one for each contract) without the TTP having received any cancel request, as the
consumer is honest, she will stop the protocol execution. Therefore the providers
will have to contact the TTP. If the TTP sends them a cancel token, fairness will
be maintained (all participants will have evidence of cancelation). And if the TTP
sends evidence of signature to any provider, the consumer and some providers will
have different evidence, but when confronted, the consumer and/or provider will
be able to prove the TTP’s misbehaviour by presenting their evidence (the cancel
token and the signed token contain the round number k) and demanding evidence
of the decision taken, i.e., the previous resolution requests.
If the consumer receives a cancel token, but the provider Pi has already ob-
tained a signed token, C and Pi will have contradictory evidence. But when con-
fronted, they will be able to prove that the TTPmisbehaved by presenting their cor-
responding evidence and demanding evidence of the decision taken.
If the consumer receives a signed token during round k, but the provider Pi has
already canceled it, C and Pi will have contradictory evidence. Again, when con-
fronted, they will be able to prove that the TTPmisbehaved by presenting their cor-
responding evidence and demanding evidence of the decision taken. In particular,
assuming that Pi contacted the TTP during round k
′
(notice that the honest party is
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the consumer, therefore the provider may have misbehaved), we have the following
situations:
• k
′
≤ k: There is only one possibility for this combination (C signed token, Pi
cancel token) to happen without the TTP being dishonest. Therefore, unless
the TTP can present the following evidence (proving Pi ’s misbehaviour), C
will be able to prove its misbehaviour. In order to maintain fairness, if the
TTP detects that a participant has misbehaved, it can change the state of the
protocol execution. In particular, if k > k
′
+1 and k
′
= 1, applying Rule 4, the
TTP will change the state of the protocol execution from canceled to signed
and will issue the corresponding signed evidence to the participant who sent
the request.
• k
′
> k: In this situation, whatever evidence the TTP presents, the consumer
will be able to prove it has misbehaved. If the TTP received Pi ’s request first,
it should have issued him a signed token (Rule 2), instead of a cancel token.
To prove the contrary, the TTP should provide evidence of a previous request
sent during round k
′′
= 1, but then it would mean that the evidence issued to
the consumer, a signed token, waswrong: it should be a cancel token (Rule 4).
And if it was the consumer’s request the first to arrive, her evidence would be
coherent with the protocol situation (Rule 2). But the cancel token received
by Pi would prove the TTP’s misbehaviour, he should have received a signed
token (Rule 3).
Assuming an honest provider Pi and a malicious TTP, we can have the following
situation. The provider sends a resolution request during round k because he has
failed to receive the commitment, and the TTP answers with a cancelation (after
issuing a signed token or without previous cancelation when k > 1) or a finalization
(after issuing a cancel token). Both resultswould be coherentwith theTTP rules, but
in any case, the provider and the consumer will have contradictory evidence sent
from the TTP, which will prove its misbehaviour, as we have seen in the previous
paragraphs.
As a conclusion, the protocol proposalmeets the TTP’s verifiability requirement.
CLAIM 2.6: AM2P Confidentiality: The content of the contract Mi is only avail-
able to the consumer and the corresponding provider Pi .
PROOF. The contract Mi is sent from the consumer C to the provider Pi en-
crypted with a symmetric key, and this symmetric key is encrypted with Pi ’s public
key. Therefore, only Pi is able to read its content. Moreover, the resolution sub-
protocol does not include the plain contract Mi , only its hash value, so the TTP
does not have access to it. Therefore, we can affirm that only C and Pi have ac-
cess to the plain contract Mi , and the protocol proposal meets the confidentiality
requirement.
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2.2 AgentMediated Scenarios (AMS)
The Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) scenario focus on the consumers, but if we
switch the attention from consumers to providers, we find another new scenario,
the Agent Mediated Scenario (AMS). Thanks to the development of communica-
tions, and in particular of Internet, consumers and providers are closer than ever.
Consumers are few clicks away from any service or provider they could need. This
ease of communication between consumers and providers could lead us to the con-
clusion that intermediaries are not needed anymore, however, the truth is that the
existence of intermediary agents (intermediaries) in electronic commerce is not un-
usual, in fact, in some cases is even desirable [17]. These intermediaries act as inde-
pendent business entities, not as mere transport agents, hence the name of active
intermediaries.
In this section we present the first solution for fair exchange of values in a sce-
nario with active intermediaries in between the consumer and the providers. The
solution meets the core security requirements (section 1.2.1) for optimistic fair ex-
change protocols (effectiveness, fairness, non-repudiation and timeliness). It also
achieves two additional requirements (section 1.2.2), verifiability of the TTP, and
one requirement specific for optimistic fair exchange in scenarios with active inter-
mediaries, traceability, that will be further defined. Finally, a performance analysis
is sketched, and although it cannot be compared with previous solutions because
we have not found any, this analysis suggests that it is a viable scheme.
2.2.1 Motivating Example
Online tourism industry is a good example where complex business transactions
happen [17]. Travel agents are business entities that act as intermediaries between
consumers and providers of services like transportation or accommodation. More-
over, those transportation or accommodation providers fromwhich travel agencies
obtain their offer of services (Tour Operators, Global Distribution Systems GDS,...),
may also rely on other providers (Airlines, Hotel chains, primary suppliers like ho-
tels, theme parks, etc.). In figure 2.2 we can see some different entities that can be
involved in a transaction, and the relation between them.
The complexity of this transactions is not only due to the existence of interme-
diaries, it is also because of the bundled nature of the products offered. Tourism
products are usually comprised by different kind of services: transportation, ac-
commodation, leisure activities, etc., from different providers. Some of these ser-
vices may only be available from one specific provider (either the service supplier
itself or an intermediary), others may be available frommore than one source (dif-
ferent Tour Operatorsmay offer the sameHotel destination), but the travel agencies
sell these multi-service products as one. Furthermore these services are dynamic
(planes have finite number of seats, hotels have finite capacity, etc.), and have ex-
piration date (events like concerts, flights, etc., have date and time), thus they are
bought as they are needed. The next paragraphs will show this complexity with an
example.
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Figure 2.2: An AMS Application Example
Let us suppose Alice enters Bob’s online travel agency and adds to her shopping-
cart a two-way plane ticket from Barcelona to Milan, two nights in a hotel and two
tickets for an opera in La Scala. From Alice’s point of view she’s buying one prod-
uct: an opera weekend in Milan, thus she wants all services or none. But from
Bob’s point of view, Alice is purchasing 3 different services from 3 different provi-
ders: transportation, accommodation and leisure activities. When Alice sends the
purchase request, a chain of exchanges is generated: {Alice↔ Bob}, {Bob↔ plane
ticket’s provider}, {Bob ↔ Hotel provider}, etc. These Exchanges are executed as
independent transactions, leaving the intermediary (Bob) in an unfair situation: if
during the execution of the online purchase Alice or any provider decides to quit the
transaction, since Bob has executed the exchanges independently, hemay be forced
to fulfil a service agreement with Alice without having the resources, or a purchase
agreement with the provider without having a client.
Bob will process Alice’s request and will send requests to the transportation, ac-
commodation and the leisure activities providers. Alice expects two possible re-
sponses: Ok (all services are booked) or nOk (one or more of the services are not
available), meanwhile Bob may receive two responses from each provider, which
leads to 8 different combinations ({Ok,Ok,Ok},..., {nOk, Ok, nOk}, {nOk, nOk, nOk}).
The possible results are (ordered by time of arrival):
• (Ok,Ok,Ok): Bob will send an Ok response to Alice.
• (nOk,-,-): Bob will send a nOk response to Alice.
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• (Ok,nOk,-) and (Ok,Ok,nOk): Unfair situation, disadvantage for Bob. He does
not have confirmation for all services, thus it will answerwith a nOk response.
But the first and maybe second services are already closed/sold, that means
that Bob will have to cancel them and bear the possible costs. Cancelations
can bear a cancelation fee.
In a real scenario, travel agencies minimize the risk of cancelation fees by exe-
cuting the requests sequentially, closing first the services that can be canceled with-
out fee, whichmay decrease the system performance, and negotiating the “cancela-
tion without fee" policy, whichmay require human intervention. In such a scenario
a fair exchange protocol would eliminate the unfair situations. Moreover, allowing
the parallel execution of requests may increase the system performance.
2.2.2 Model and Requirements
To begin with the model description we will define the participating entities: con-
sumer, providers and active intermediaries; and the roles they can adopt: originator
and recipient.
• Originator: An agent that initiates an exchange, by sending a request to nK
recipients (nK ≥ 1).
• Recipient: An agent that receives a request, processes it, and sends the corre-
sponding response to the originator.
• Consumer: The entity that initiates a transaction. The consumer entity will
act as an originator.
• Provider: The entity who hosts the service or product requested by the con-
sumer. The provider entity will act as a recipient.
• Active Intermediary: As part of a chain, the active intermediary entity is con-
nected to originators and recipients. To the originators, the active intermedi-
ary will act as a recipient, receiving requests. To the recipients, it will act as an
originator sending the requests devised from the previous requests received
as recipient. The objective of the so-called agent intermediaries is to provide
a service to their clients, the originators.
The main difference between a transport agent and an active intermediary is
its objective. The transport agents deliver messages received from an origina-
tor to the recipient chosen by the originator. Whereas an active intermediary
receives a service request from an originator, and to fulfil it, the active inter-
mediary contacts to one or more recipients that it chooses. To simplify the
nomenclature, we will refer to active intermediaries as intermediaries.
Wewill refer to these entities (consumer, intermediaries and providers) as nodes
Ni , where i indicates its position within the transaction (1 < i < N , N = number of
participants). A node Ni can be a consumer, an intermediary or a provider. If we
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use Ni to refer to an originator, N(i+1)k (1 ≤ k ≤ nK ) will be its recipient, with nK
= number of recipients contacted. And if Ni refers to a recipient, N(i−1) will be its
originator. As example of the use of this nomenclature, suppose that Ni is N2 (figure
2.3), then we have N(i+1)k , 1< k < 2. As originator, N2 contacts 2 recipients, N3 and
N4, therefore N(i+1)1 = N3 and N(i+1)2 = N4. And as a recipient, N2 is contacted by
the originator N(i−1) = N1.
In a transaction there are, at least, three entities involved: a consumer, an inter-
mediary and a provider. A transaction is built from exchanges and an exchange is
built on sub-exchanges (see figure 2.3).
• Transaction: The entire process in which a consumer and one or more provi-
ders, without knowing each other, exchange their parts using intermediaries.
• Exchange: A set of processes executed between one originator Ni and nK re-
cipients {N(i+1)1 , ..., N(i+1)nK }, (nK ≥ 1) in which originator and recipients ex-
change their parts.
• Sub-Exchange: A process where only one originator Ni and one recipient
N(i+1)k (k ǫ [1, ..,nK ]) exchange their items.
A Transaction starts when a consumer, acting as originator, sends a request to
an intermediary, acting as recipient, and endswhen the consumer and providers in-
volved have received their desired items. When an intermediary receives a request,
it may need to contact nK different providers/intermediaries in order to acquire the
resources needed to fulfil the request. This fulfilment may require the acquisition
of all resources or just some of them, depending on the request received by the in-
termediary. Thus we will define two different situations:
• Partial Response Scenario (PRS): The intermediary has to contact nK dif-
ferent recipients to obtain nR different resources (nK ≤ nR , the intermediary
may request more than one resource to the same provider), but the request
can be considered fulfilled with the obtention of n
′
R ≤nR resources.
As an example of this scenario, imagine we are planning a holidays trip us-
ing an online travel agency. We choose a plane ticket, a hotel reservation,
excursions, car rental, etc. Once we have chosen all we want, we proceed to
the booking step (the purchase). When planning holidays, we usually have
some flexibility on departure and arrival timing and dates, accommodation,
etc. Thus if one or two of the products we have requested in the booking step
are not available, wemay still want to book the others and find an alternative.
• Full Response Scenario (FRS): The intermediary has to contact nK different
recipients to obtain nR different resources (nK ≤nR ). To fulfil the request, the
intermediary has to obtain all nR resources.
An example of this scenario could be a request to an online travel agency,
where we ask for plane tickets and a hotel reservation for a business trip.
When planning business trips, we do not usually have the flexibility we have
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Figure 2.3: Agent Mediated Model
on holidays; we have to choose the flight departure times and dates accord-
ing to our meeting schedule, even the accommodation can be restricted due
to budget or agreements between companies. Therefore, in this case, when
we send the booking request, we want to book all products or none.
From a security point of view, the transaction from a consumer (N1) to a Provi-
der (NN ) is a particular case of Fair Exchange even though they do not have direct
contact. N1 has an element “A" that wants to exchange for an element “B" that NN
has, but none of them is willing to deliver his element until have some kind of assur-
ance that will receive the other expected element, furthermore, none of them knows
each other. The only thing N1 knows is that an intermediary N2 can deliver “B" to
her, either because he has it or because he knows where to find it. And NN knows
that N(N−1) can deliver “A" to him. At the same time, these intermediaries N2 and
N(N−1), may contact other intermediaries to obtain “A" and “B". Thus, we end up
creating a chain where the links should be fair exchanges.
Requirements
In section 1.2 we have defined the core and additional requirements for fair ex-
change protocols. The proposal presented in this sectionmeets all the core require-
ments (effectiveness, fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation) and two additional
ones, verifiability of TTP and confidentiality. These requirements were defined for
2-party scenarios, where we only have one consumer and one provider, without in-
termediaries. But in our transaction model we can have many intermediaries and
many providers, therefore we have to adapt the requirements to this new scenario.
What is left of this section is to define the requirements according to our scenario,
and to define a new requirement, specific to this scenario, traceability.
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Definition 2.7 (AMS Effectiveness) If every party involved in a transaction behaves
correctly, the consumer will receive her expected item from the intermediary, the pro-
viders will receive their expected items from the intermediaries, and the intermedi-
aries Ni will receive their expected items, as a recipients from N(i−1) and as origi-
nators from N(i+1)k , without TTP intervention. This is a requirement for optimistic
protocols, where the Trusted Third Party (TTP) only intervenes in case of problems
arise.
Definition 2.8 (AMS Fairness) Asokan et al. [9] defines two different kind of fairness
(strong andweak),whereas Zhou et al. [10] presents only one definition, equivalent to
the strong fairness definition from Asokan et al. [9]. Both fairness definitions where
made in a scenariowhere we have only twoparticipants,A and B. But in our scenario,
a transaction has N participants, with N ≥ 3 (at least 1 consumer, 1 intermediary
and 1 provider); an exchange has 1 originator and nK recipients, nK ≥ 1; and a sub-
exchange has only two participants (originator and recipient). Therefore, we need to
adapt the fairness definition to our scenario.
exchange fairness: Upon finalization of an exchange execution, every honest party
involved receives their expected item or none receive any valuable information
enabling them to be at an advantage.
transaction fairness: After a transaction execution every honest client and provider
receives what they expected, either the agreement of his/her intermediary or an
affidavit from the TTP, or either none of the participants (including intermedi-
aries) receives any valuable information enabling them to be at an advantage,
or all honest participants receive enough evidence to demonstrate who acted
honestly and who did not.
Definition 2.9 (AMS Timeliness) Any party involved in a transaction canbe sure that
the protocol execution will be finished at a certain finite point of time, whether by
contacting the TTP or following the protocol execution.
Definition 2.10 (AMSNon-Repudiation) In an AMS transaction that has involved
a consumer and nK providers, the consumer will not be able to deny the origin of
it, and the providers will not be able to deny its involvement. Moreover, none of the
intermediaries participants in the transactionwill be able to deny their involvement.
Besides the core fair exchange requirements, our protocol meets with two addi-
tional ones: verifiability of TTP and confidentiality.
Definition 2.11 (AMS Verifiability of the TTP) If the Trusted Third Party (TTP)mis-
behaves resulting in the loss of fairness for a party, this party can prove the fact in a
dispute resolution.
In fair exchange protocols, confidentiality is usually applied between the partic-
ipants and the TTP. The TTPmust not have access to the plainmessage ormessages
that the participants are exchanging, even when resolving disputes. But in our sce-
nario, we also apply confidentiality between participants.
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Definition 2.12 (AMS Confidentiality) The node Ni will only have information on
the exchanges in which he participates, as a recipient {Ni−1,Ni } and/or originator
{Ni ,Ni+1} (consumer and providers do not know each other).
The rationale behind this requirement is the consideration of the intermediary
as a business entity. In the intermediaries business model, the knowledge of which
providers or intermediaries are available is an asset, thus, if consumers have access
to this information, they may try to skip the intermediary and contact the provider
directly. The same can happen with providers: if they know the consumer, they may
contact directly and try to make a better offer than the intermediary.
Finally, our protocol meets a requirement specific for optimistic fair exchange pro-
tocols in scenarios with active intermediaries, the traceability requirement:
Definition 2.13 (AMS Traceability) In ourmodel, a transaction is a set of exchanges.
In case of a problem arises, the TTPmay need to be able to reconstruct the transaction
in order to solve it, therefore the protocolmust allow the TTP to reconstruct a transac-
tion and identify all its participants, using as a source the information retrieved from
an exchange.
In [35] Garay et al. introduced a new property, abuse-freeness, which states that
none of the participants is able to prove in front of an external party that he has
the power to terminate (cancel the signature) or successfully complete the protocol
(sign the contract). In our case, we have not considered it necessary, in fact, the
lack of abuse-freeness could be interesting. An intermediary could use the protocol
to improve its response time by sending the same request to many providers and
accepting the first as response (canceling the others). On the other hand, it can
be used to get the best fare, by sending a request to many providers, accepting as
a response the one with better price or conditions. Therefore, even though abuse-
freeness can be a desirable property for some contract signing scenarios, it is not
included in this protocol.
Communication Channel
Aswe did in the AM2P protocol (see section 2.1.4), we will assume that the commu-
nication channels between participants, originators and recipients, are executed
through unreliable channels (messages can be lost), and the messages exchanged
between the TTP and the protocol participants use a resilient channel (messages
can be delayed but not lost).
2.2.3 Previous Work
The vast scientific literature about the fair exchange fails to solve the problem of fair
exchange in transactions with active intermediaries. The proposed solutions are
focused on scenarios with 2 parties involved, or scenarios where N known parties
have to exchange some items. However, in real electronic commerce transactions
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we may have active intermediaries involved in a transaction, therefore we cannot
apply any of the proposed solutions to ensure fairness from consumer to provider.
An example where we have active intermediaries involved in business transactions
are travel agencies [17]. Travel agencies typically rely on intermediaries to acquire
the services that sell on demand to their customers, moreover, these external pro-
viders can also rely on other external sources to provide services to travel agencies
(see example in section 2.2.1).
The use of agents or intermediaries in a transaction model is not entirely new.
Franklin andTsudik [36] proposed aMulti-party Fair Exchangeprotocol for e-barter,
later reviewed by Mukhamedov et al. [37]. This proposal assumes that, at some
point (after the preliminary phase), the identity of all participants is known, which
we do not consider in our model. Moreover, in our model, the lack of knowledge
among participants is a requirement (see Confidentiality in section 2.2.2). Another
Multi-party Fair Exchange protocol, targeting e-commerce transactions, was pro-
posed by Khill et al. [38]. These proposals use a ring architecture, which cannot
be applied in our model as consumer and provider do not have direct contact (see
example in section 2.2.1).
In [39] Yichun Liu proposes an optimistic Fair Exchange protocol for atomic ex-
changes between 1 to N parties, but without the presence of intermediaries. In
[40] Onieva et al. presented a non-repudiation protocol for an AMS, where only
one intermediary was involved in a transaction, communicating the consumer and
providers; therefore it does not cover the problem outlined in this dissertation (sec-
tion 2.2.2). We extend this scenario allowing the participation of more than 1 active
intermediary and propose a Fair Exchange protocol for scenarios where intermedi-
aries are independent business entities (see a comparison in section 2.2.4).
2.2.4 Protocol for Fair Exchange in AgentMediated Scenarios
Our proposal uses as a building block the 2-party Fair Optimistic protocol proposed
by Ferrer-Gomila et al. [41] (FPH2001, see figure 2.4). On the other hand the sce-
nario considered in this dissertation is an extension of that presented by Onieva et
al. [40], where only an intermediary intervenes and acting as a transport agent. The
FPH2001 optimistic protocol is divided in 3 sub-protocols: exchange, cancel and
finish. If both participants behave correctly, only the exchange sub-protocol will be
executed and the Trusted Third Party (TTP) will not intervene.
Protocol for agent-mediated scenarios
The protocol uses a set of parameters and a specific protocol execution flow to pro-
vide the TTP with enough evidence to be able to correctly solve the problems that
may arise during the execution of a transaction, allow traceability, fulfil the confi-
dentiality requirement, and maintain fairness throughout the execution of a trans-
action. Next we describe these parameters and the protocol execution flow:
• To individually identify every sub-Exchange, the protocol uses random Uni-
versally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) [42].
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t Ali ce Bob
0
1
2
3
4
SKBob[H(hAlice )] SKAlice [H(M)]
SKAlice [H(hBob)]
M ,SKAlice [H(M)]
SKBob[H(hAlice )]
SKAlice [H(hBob)]
Evidences collected by every node
Figure 2.4: FPH2001 Protocol
• Tomaintain fairness, the protocol introduces a time restriction (t0i ) in atomic
1 to N exchanges, in FRS scenarios.
• To allow traceability and maintain confidentiality, the protocol uses an en-
crypted parameter Evik , referred as previous evidence.
The protocol execution flow is as follows (see example in figure 2.5):
• As a recipient, an intermediaryNi receives a request froman originatorN(i−1)
(a consumer or other intermediary), and in order to be able to fulfil N(i−1)’s
requirements he sends a request to up to nK recipients N(i+1)k (k ∈ [1, ...,nK ],
providers or other intermediaries). Before answering the originator’s request,
the intermediary needs to be sure he can fulfil the originator’s demands. Thus,
the intermediary will wait until he gets the nK recipients’ ACCeptances (evi-
dence of the recipients’ agreements), then he will send his ACCeptance to the
originator N(i−1).
• As an originator, the intermediary needs to ensure that N(i−1) will carry on
with his commitment before sending the ACKnowledgement (evidence of the
originator’s agreement) to the recipients N(i+1)k . Therefore, the intermediary
must wait until he receives the ACKnowledgement from the originator N(i−1),
before sending his ACKnowledgements to the recipients N(i+1)k .
In figure 2.5 we have a simple example where we have: one consumer (N1), two
intermediaries (N2 and N3), and one provider (N4). The protocol starts when the
consumer, N1 sends a request to his provider N2, who is an intermediary. In other
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t N1 N2 N3 N4
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ACK1 ACK2 ACK3
M1,2, IDT ,COM1
M2,3, IDT ,Ev2,COM2
M3,4, IDT ,Ev3,COM3
ACC4
ACC3
ACC2
ACK1
ACK2
ACK3
Evidences collected by every node
Figure 2.5: Execution Example with N=4
words, the intermediary Ni receives a request from an originator N(i−1), with i =
2. Then, the intermediary N2 sends a request to his recipient N3, and awaits his
answer (ACCeptance) before sending a response to N1’s previous request. Using
the nomenclature of our protocol, the intermediary Ni , acting as originator, sends
a request to nK recipients N(i+1)k , with i = 2 and nK = 1. But since N3 is also an
intermediary, we can also say that, the intermediary Ni has received a request from
an originator N(i−1), with i = 3.
In figure 2.3 we can see another example, where an intermediary has to contact
more than one recipient. In particular (1≤ k ≤nK ):
• N2, acting as originator, sends a request to nK recipients N(i+1)k with nK = 2.
• N3, acting as originator, sends a request to nK recipients N(i+1)k with nK = 2.
• N4, acting as originator, sends a request to nK recipients N(i+1)k with nK = 1.
In tables 2.4 and 2.5we have the notation and the description of the 3 sub-protocols.
The general nomenclature used along this section is:
• ViK = {Vi1 , ...,ViK } Vector with K elements.
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COMik = SNik
[H(M(i,(i+1)k)),ID,t0i ,Evik ]
Evidence of Ni ’s COMmitment onM(i ,(i+1)k ) (as Originator).
ACC(i+1)k = SN(i+1)k
[H(M(i,(i+1)k)),ID,t0i ,Evik ]
Evidence of node N(i+1)k ’s ACCeptance onM(i ,(i+1)k ) (as Recipient).
ACKik = SNik
[ACC(i+1)k]
Evidence of node Ni ’s ACKnowledgement of receipt.
Evik =ETTP[H(M((i−1),i)k ), ID, t0i ,Ev(i−1)k , COM(i−1)k ,ACCik]
Chain of evidences of all Exchanges ( j , ( j +1))|( j +1)≤ i .
ACKTTPk = STTP[ACC(i+1)k]
Recipient’s evidence that the sub-exchange k has been finished.
Cik = STTP(canceled,COMik)
Originator’s evidence that the sub-exchange k has been canceled.
C(i+1)k = STTP(canceled,ACC(i+1)k)
Recipient’s evidence that the sub-exchange k has been canceled.
ECRi = SNi [H(M(i,(i+1)k)),ID,t0i ,COMik]
Evidence of Cancel Request
Evidence that Ni has executed the cancel sub-protocol (as Originator).
EFR(i+1) = SN(i+1) [H(M(i,(i+1)k)),ID,t0i ,Evik ,COMik ,ACC(i+1)k]
Evidence of Finish Request
Evidence that N(i+1) has executed the finish sub-protocol (as Recipient).
Table 2.4: Notation and Elements Used in the Protocol
• NNumber of participants.
• H(M) One way Hash function of messageM.
• Sz[M]= SKz[H(M)] z’s Digital Signature onM, where SKz , is z’s private key.
• M(i,(i+1)k) Message from the participant Ni to N(i+1)k , with i ∈ (1, ..,N ] and
N > 2 (there is, at least, one intermediary) and k ∈ [1, ..,nK ]
• Ez[M]= {PKz(a),Enca(M)} Encryption of messageM using the symmetric key
a, which is sent encrypted using z’s public key PKz .
• IDx Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) [42]. Identifies a transaction IDT ,
and each sub-Exchange IDk in it.
As we have seen in section 2.2.2, we have two different scenarios:
Partial Response Scenario (PRS): In a PRS the originator requests nR different ser-
vices (or products), and accepts as a valid response the ACCeptance of n
′
R
≤ nR
services from the recipient. Therefore, the originator will send a request vector,
composed of the nR different services MnR = {M1, ...,MnR } and the evidence related
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Exchange Sub-Protocol
Ni → N(i+1)k Commitment: M(i ,(i+1)k ), ID , t0i ,Evik ,COMik
Ni ← N(i+1)k Acceptance: ACC(i+1)k
Ni → N(i+1)k Acknowledgement: ACKik
Cancel Sub-Protocol
Ni → TTP H(M(i ,(i+1)k )), ID , t0i ,COMik ,ECRi
If (finished = true)
Ni ← TTP ACC(i+1)k ,ACKTTPk
Else
Ni ← TTP Cik ; TTP: stores cancelled = true
Finish Sub-Protocol
N(i+1)k → TTP H(M(i ,(i+1)k )), ID , t0i ,Evik ,COMik ,ACC(i+1)k ,EFR(i+1)
If (cancelled = true)
N(i+1)k ← TTP C(i+1)k
Else
N(i+1)k ← TTP ACKTTPk ; TTP: stores finished = true
Table 2.5: Agent Mediated Scenarios (AMSs) Protocol
to each service COMinR = {COMi1 , ...,COMinR }, in order to receive proof of accep-
tance ACC
(i+1)n
′
R
= {ACC(i+1)1 , ...,ACC(i+1)
n
′
R
} for each service. In addition, the orig-
inator will generate a vector IDnR = {{IDT , ID1}, ..., {IDT , IDnR }} of IDs that will be
assigned to each service, thus the ID of the service r and its related exchanges along
the transaction will be {IDT , IDr } (1≤ r ≤nR ).
Full Response Scenario (FRS): In a FRS the originator requests nK different ser-
vices (or products), and he only accepts as a valid response the acceptance of all
nK services. If the recipient is an intermediary, he will need to contact up to nK
different recipients (intermediaries or providers) to acquire all the resources. When
nK > 1, the intermediary will generate a vector IDnK of IDs that will be assigned to
each sub-exchange k (k ∈ [1, ..,nK ]). In addition to the new IDs the intermediary
Ni will introduce another parameter, t0i , the resolution time (when nK > 1). When
the intermediary Ni sends t0i to the recipient N(i+1)k , he accepts not to enforce the
agreement until t > t0i , and the recipient knows he cannot contact the TTP until
t > t0i .
Transaction Identifiers
When a consumer initiates a transaction, she assigns a random UUID (IDT ) to it.
In addition, originators initiating a PRS request must assign an extra IDr to each
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message r (with r ∈ [1, ..,nR ], number of services/products requested). In the same
way, originators receiving an FRS request must assign an extra IDk to each sub-
exchange k (with 1 ≤ k ≤ nK , number of recipients contacted) they need to exe-
cute, so the TTP can identify the different sub-exchanges in order to be able to solve
the potential cancel and finish requests. This sequence of IDs along with the hash
H(Mi ), allows the TTP to determine if a cancel or finish request received is part of
an already finished or canceled exchange or sub-exchange.
Note that we used two different indexes: r,nR and k,nK ; when referring to the
services and providers contacted in the PRS and FRS scenarios. This differentia-
tion is done to stress the different way in which transaction identifers are created,
depending on the scenario. In the PRS scenario, the number of identifiers created
depends on which results are accepted by the originator (minimum number of ser-
vices), independently of how many providers are contacted. Whereas in the FRS
scenario, the number of identifiers depend on the number of providers contacted
instead on the minimum number of services accepted. As example of how trans-
action identifiers are generated, following we will describe the example from figure
2.3:
• The consumer N1 wants to acquire 3 different services: sa , sb and sc . But she
wants either sa and sb , or just sc , or all of them. Therefore she initiates a PRS
request, sending a vector comprised of 2 requests. She generates two addi-
tional identifiers (besides IDT ): ID1 and ID2. The identifier of request one
(sa and sb) will be {IDT , ID1} and the identifier of request two (sc ) {IDT , ID2}.
• The intermediary N2 receives a PRS request vector of size 2, and in order to
fulfil it, he contacts two providers N3 (sa and sb) and N4 (sc ). Both requests
are FRS with nK = 1 (independent one from each other), therefore N2 does
not need to generate extra identifiers neither to add t0i .
• The intermediary N3 receives a request from N2 requesting two services, sa
and sb . In order to fulfill it, N3 contacts two providers N5 (sa) and N6 (sb).We
are in a FRS situation with nK = 2 > 1. Therefore, N3 will add a t0i and will
create an extra identifier per request: the request to N5 will have the identifier
{IDT , ID1 , ID3} and the request to N6 the identifier {IDT , ID1 , ID4}.
• The intermediary N4 receives an FRS request from N2 and in order to fulfil
it he contacts one provider, N7. Since he only needs to contact one provider
(nK = 1), he does not need to generate extra identifiers nor to add a resolution
time (t0i ).
When the TTP receives a request with a sequence of identifiers ID ID and the
message hash H(Mi ), it checks this sequence with the values stored in its database.
The TTP knows that all sequences IDa ⊂ ID ID belong to the same transaction, and
are part of a previous exchange, meanwhile all sequences IDb ⊃ ID ID belong to the
same transaction and are part of a posterior exchange.
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Exchange sub-protocol
The exchange sub-protocol has 3 steps (see table 2.5): COMmitment, where the
originator sends her commitment to fulfil the agreement she is sending; ACCep-
tance, where the recipient agrees to fulfil the agreement; and ACKnowledgement,
where the originator sends proof that the agreement has been accepted by both
parts. If it is completely executed, without incidences, there is no need to con-
tact the TTP, originator (Ni ) and recipients (N(i+1)nK ) will hold non-repudiation evi-
dence that the agreement has been accepted: the originator will have the recipients
ACCeptances (ACC(i+1)nK ), and each recipient will have the originator’s ACKnowl-
edgement (ACKik ). Even though the agreement may have been redirected to many
intermediaries, until it reached its final destination, Ni must not have any knowl-
edge about nodes Nn , with n > (i + 1) or n < (i − 1), therefore, evidence of previ-
ous exchanges (Evi ) will be encrypted. Following we describe the exchange sub-
protocol for each scenario, PRS and FRS
PRS scenario
The Exchange between Ni and N(i+1)nR can be interpreted as nR independent sub-
Exchanges: the originator wants to obtain nK services/products (resources) and
contacts nK recipients (nK ≤ nR , Ni may request more than one resource to the
same recipient).
Commitment: M(i ,(i+1))nR , IDnR ,Evi ,COMinR
Acceptance: ACC(i+1)
n
′
R
(n
′
R
≤nR )
Acknowledgement: ACKi n′
R
FRS scenario
The intermediary Ni must send the resolution time, t0i , to maintain fairness, when
nK > 1. In the commitment step Ni will send the resolution time t0i to each N(i+1)k
(1 ≤ k ≤ nK , nK > 1 ). If by t = t0i Ni has not received the acceptance ACCik from
all N(i+1)nK , she must execute the cancel sub-protocol. To execute the exchange
sub-protocol correctly, the intermediary will also have to follow a specific execu-
tion flow: The intermediary must cancel the exchange if after t0i he has not received
a response from each intermediary/provider contacted. Otherwise the intermediary
may find himself in a disadvantage; any N(i+1)k will be able to contact the TTP re-
questing finalization, which would also finish the exchange between N(i−1) and the
intermediary Ni , forcing the intermediary to fulfil the N(i−1)’s request. It is a situ-
ation of disadvantage, the intermediary may find himself in a situation where the
{N(i−1),Ni }’s exchange has been finished, but he lacks all the necessary resources to
fulfil it.
Commitment: M(i ,(i+1)k ), {IDT , ID
∗
k
}, t∗0i ,Evi ,COMik
Acceptance: ACC(i+1)k
Acknowledgement: ACKik
∗ IDk and t0i are only mandatory when nK > 1
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Cancel sub-protocol
If an originator node Ni claims she has not received the evidence (ACC(i+1)k ) from
the recipient N(i+1)k (1≤ k ≤nK ), she may initiate the cancel sub-protocol, sending
Ni ’s evidence of commitment. The TTP will check the status of the sub-Exchange
and will send the corresponding response:
• If the sub-Exchange has been finished, the TTP will send to Ni the evidence
of finalization: ACC(i+1)k , ACKTTPk .
• If no other nodeN j with j > (i+1) has contacted the TTP or the sub-Exchange
has been canceled, the TTP will send the cancelation evidence Cik .
Finish sub-protocol
If a recipient N(i+1)k claims he has not received the ACKnowledgement from the
originator, hemay initiate the finish sub-protocol sending Ni ’s evidence of commit-
ment, N(i+1)k ’s evidence of signature, and Evi evidence for all exchanges M( j ,( j+1))
with ( j +1)≤ i (note that if N2 is initiating the finish sub-protocol, he does not need
to send Evi , since there are no previous exchanges). N(i+1)k can contact the TTP
and request the finalization of the sub-exchange {M(i ,(i+1)k ), IDT , IDk } at any time
(assuming he has received Ni ’s commitment). The TTP may respond in 2 different
ways:
• If the sub-exchange has been canceled, the TTP will send the corresponding
evidence of cancelation: C(i+1)k .
• If no other node N j with j < i has contacted the TTP previously, the TTP will
send to N(i+1)k the finalization evidence: ACKTTPk .
TTP resolution
In our proposal, even though not all parties involved in a protocol execution know
each other, all of them must trust the same third party, the TTP. In this dissertation
wewill assume that all parties agree to use the sameTTP, e.g., the consumer and first
intermediary agree on using a TTP during the negotiation phase and as the trans-
action is being executed, all parties involved agree on using it, otherwise they reject
the transaction (the TTP’s identity may be included in the contract). Moreover, we
assume that the TTP will always send a valid response to any request received. Even
though it may seem a strong assumption, when we think on real scenarios it is fea-
sible. By definition a TTP is an external entity on which users rely to solve their
disputes, if the TTP begins to fail to answer the requests received, it will result in an
immediate loss of trust.
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Figure 2.6: Cancelation and Finalization Propagation
Achieving timeliness in an asynchronous protocol may require a stateful TTP,
i.e., the TTP needs to keep information on the transaction for an undefined amount
of time. In a real scenario, the TTPmay be compelled to keep the evidence acquired
due to the legal framework related to the application of the protocol (even in syn-
chronous scenarios).
In our model, a transaction from node N1 to node NN generates a chain of
requests/responses. The optimistic fair exchange protocol proposed generates a
chain of 2-party fair exchanges following the requests, propagating fromnode Ni to
N(i+1). The whole chain of fair exchanges is linked, from N1 to NN , meaning that
the cancelation or finalization of an exchange by a node Ni will have effects on the
other exchanges (see figure 2.6).
The propagation of a cancelation or finalization is done at a TTP level. This
means that the TTP knows that a chain of exchanges identified by its ID vector
{IDT , IDK1 , ..., IDKK } has been canceled or finalized, but it does not contact the
nodes involved. The TTP plays a passive role, the nodes involved in transactions
and exchanges are the ones who contact the TTP when needed. If node Ni can-
cels an exchange with N(i+1), she will not send the ACKi finishing the exchange
sub-protocol. Thus, N(i+1) will be forced to execute the finish sub-protocol to know
whether Ni has canceled the exchange or the ACKi message has been delayed or
lost.
The cancelation of an exchange by node Ni will affect the nodes N j with j ≥
i (see figure 2.6). When a node Ni executes the cancel sub-protocol on a sub-
Exchange with a set of identifiers IDi , all the exchanges with j ≥ i and identifier
set ID j | ID j ⊇ IDi will be canceled. Thus, if a node N j executes the finish sub-
protocol on a sub-Exchangewith j ≥ i and identifier ID j ⊇ IDi , the TTPwill answer
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that the exchange has already been canceled. But if the node N j executes the finish
sub-protocol on a sub-Exchange with j < i , or ID j + IDi the TTP will answer with
the corresponding ACKTTP , meaning that the exchange has been finished.
The finalization of an exchange by node Ni will affect the nodes N j with j ≤
i (see figure 2.6). This means that if a node Ni executes the finish sub-protocol
on the sub-Exchange with a set of identifiers IDi , all the exchanges with j ≤ i and
identifier ID j | ID j ⊆ IDi will be finished. Therefore, if a node N j tries to execute
the cancel sub-protocol on a sub-Exchange with j ≤ i and identifier ID j | ID j ⊆
IDi , the TTP will answer with a proof of finalization. But if the node N j executes
the cancel sub-protocol on a sub-Exchange with j > i , or ID j * IDi the TTP will
cancel the exchange and will send the corresponding cancelation evidence.
In figure 2.6 we have three simple examples of TTP intervention and cancela-
tion/finalization propagation:
1. In the first example, N3 executes the finish sub-protocol. Later, N2 executes
the cancel sub-protocol. Due to the propagation, we can see how the ex-
changeM(2,3) becomes affected by both sub-protocols. But, sinceN3 has con-
tacted the TTP first, requesting finalization, whenN2 executes the cancel sub-
protocol, the TTP will detect that the exchange M(2,3) has been finished and
will answer with the corresponding finalization evidence.
2. In the second example, we have the opposite case, the first to contact the TTP
is N2 requesting cancelation. After that, N3 contacts the TTP to execute the
finish sub-protocol. In this situation, the TTP will detect that the exchange
M(2,3) has been canceled, therefore it will send the corresponding cancelation
evidence to N3.
3. In the third example, N2 executes the finish sub-protocol on M(1,2) and N4
the cancel sub-protocol on M(4,5). Since there is no intersection in the prop-
agation, the order in which the sub-protocols are executed is irrelevant. Both
nodes will receive their corresponding evidence from the TTP: N2 will have
its finalization evidence and N4 will receive the cancelation evidence. As a
result of these executions, the exchange {N1,N2} will be finished, while the
exchange {N4,N5} will be canceled.
Comparisonwith previous solutions
In section 2.2.3 we have explained the lack of fair exchange solutions for scenarios
with active intermediaries, reviewing the existent proposals. However, one of these
proposals can be compared with our solution when we have only one intermediary
and we are in a PRS scenario: [40] Onieva et al.’s proposal.
These authors present a non-repudiation protocol with online TTP for scenarios
with one intermediary agent. It is a synchronous protocol, meeting the fairness,
non-repudiation, timeliness, and confidentiality requirements, but not addressing
the verifiability of TTP. Our solution for PRS scenarios is asynchronous, optimistic
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and meets the verifiability of TTP requirement. In addition, our proposal allows
originators to cancel and recipients to finish a transaction, without losing fairness.
Moreover, the objective of their proposal differs from ours: they focus on deliv-
ering messages from an originator to a set of recipients, meanwhile we intend to
sign contracts between a consumer and the intermediary, and between the inter-
mediary and many providers. In practice, in Onieva et al.’s proposal, when the re-
cipient generates the non-repudiation of receipt evidence he is acknowledging the
reception of the message encrypted. But he did not have access to its content yet,
therefore we cannot consider it a contract signature. And we can apply the same
reasoning with the intermediary. On the other hand, in our protocol proposal, the
consumer signs a contract with the intermediary, and the intermediary signs a con-
tract with the provider. Therefore, even though both proposals present some simi-
larities, Onieva et al.’s proposal cannot be applied to solve the problem outlined in
this section.
2.2.5 Security Analysis
In this section we will review if our protocol proposal for AMS (section 2.2) meets
the requirements we have presented in section 2.2.2: effectiveness, fairness, timeli-
ness, non-repudiation, verifiability of the TTP, confidentiality and traceability.
CLAIM 2.7: AMSEffectiveness: If every party involved behaves correctly, theywill
receive their expected items without participation of the TTP.
PROOF. In the case of our protocol, it means that originators Ni will receive
the acceptances ACC(i+1)k and recipients N(i+1)k will receive the corresponding ac-
knowledgement ACKik . The execution of the exchange sub-protocol (table 2.5) en-
sures the reception of the expected evidence, thereforewe can assure that the proto-
col meets the effectiveness requirement at a sub-exchange (or exchange with nK =1)
level where only one originator and one recipient are involved.
In exchanges with nK > 1 (PRS and FRS situations) if every party involved be-
haves correctly, and follows the protocol execution flow (section 2.5), the exchange
sub-protocol, again, assures the reception of the expected evidence without TTP in-
tervention. Thus, the protocol meets the effectiveness requirement.
CLAIM 2.8: AMS Fairness: After an AMS protocol execution, the consumer, pro-
viders and intermediaries receive the corresponding signatures from the other partic-
ipants, or none of them receives any information to allow him to be at an advantage
over an honest participant.
PROOF. To illustrate that our protocol proposal meets the fairness requirement,
in the following paragraphs we explain the possible outcomes of the protocol, ac-
cording to each participant’s behaviour, and for each scenario (PRS and FRS, when
necessary we will particularly refer to one scenario). Each part is devoted to one of
the participant’s behaviour, and the adjacent nodes are described as neighbours:
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• To the nodes N j with j < i within Ni ’s branch, we will refer as previous par-
ticipant.
• To the nodes N j with j > i within Ni ’s branch, we will refer as posterior par-
ticipant.
• To the nodes N(i−1) and N(i+1) we will refer as neighbours of Ni .
CONSUMER
Before sending her COM , the consumer can cancel the transaction, but it is a
nonsense because she is not achieving any advantage.
After sending her COM , and before receiving the ACC , the following can hap-
pen:
• If the consumer does not receive the ACC and does not contact the TTP, she
is assuming the risk that some posterior participant finishes the exchange,
leaving her in an unfair situation (she does not have proof of the ending state,
her fault).
• If the consumer contacts the TTP (to cancel the exchange, she cannot finish)
and nobody has contacted the TTP before her, the TTP will cancel the ex-
change and she will be in a fair condition: she has no ACC and the exchange
is canceled.
• If the consumer contacts the TTP but somebody has finished the exchange
(her neighbour or some posterior participant), the TTP will give her an affi-
davit, ACKTTP , and again she is in a fair condition.
After receiving her neighbour’s ACC and before sending her ACK , she has the
evidence that this particular exchange has been finished. Now, if she is honest she
should not contact the TTP, but she can try to cheat:
• If somebody has finished the exchange (her neighbour or some posterior par-
ticipant), the TTP will give her an affidavit, ACKTTP . She has not achieved an
unfair condition for her neighbour: the affidavit is equivalent to the ACC that
she already had.
• If nobody has contacted the TTP before her, the TTP will cancel the exchange
and initially it seems that she has cheated: she has an ACC and the exchange
is canceled (she has a double evidence). If she does not send the ACK , her
neighbour will contact the TTP to finish the exchange and he will receive a
cancel message from the TTP, therefore both honest participants are in a fair
situation. If, later, the consumer misbehaves and tries to use the ACC , her
neighbour can use the cancel token received from the TTP to prove it.
After sending her ACK , it is a nonsense to contact the TTP (no one except the
consumer can cancel her exchange). The TTP will act as in the previous case, but in
49
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF CONTRACTS
this case it can be even worse for her because she has sent her ACK , and if the recip-
ient has received it, this will clearly prove that she was cheating when she contacted
the TTP.
Notice that these cases canbe applied to bothPRS andFRS (section 2.2.2). When
a consumer initiates a transaction she only contacts with one intermediary, this ini-
tial transaction determines if we work in a PRS or in a FRS scenario. In a FRS sce-
nario the consumer will send one COM to his intermediary, meanwhile in the PRS
she will send a vector of COMs.
INTERMEDIARY
Before receiving aCOM from a neighbour (the consumer or another intermedi-
ary), the intermediary can do nothing; he is not even aware that a signature protocol
is being executed.
After receiving a COM from a neighbour (and before sending his COMs), the
intermediary can do the following:
• Stop, assumingno risk (his neighbour canonly cancel the exchangewithhim),
and the intermediary has not sent any compromising evidence.
• If the intermediary contacts the TTP (to finish the exchange with his previ-
ous neighbour) and nobody has previously contacted the TTP, he will receive
a finish token from the TTP. If afterwards a previous party in his branch con-
tacts the TTP, he will receive a finish token. Observe that the intermediary
will remain in an unfair situation (his fault): the previous parties have a fin-
ish token (and so do him with them), but he has no agreement with posterior
parties.
• If the intermediary contacts theTTP, but someprevious party (in his branches)
has canceled his exchange, the TTP will send a cancel token for him.
After receiving aCOM from a neighbour, sending his COMs, and before receiv-
ing the corresponding ACCs, the intermediary can do the following:
• If the intermediary does not receive the ACCs from his neighbours (recipi-
ents), neither contacts the TTP, he is assuming the risk that some posterior
party had finished the exchange, leaving him in an unfair situation: he does
not have proof of the ending state, his fault. Moreover, in a FRS scenario the
intermediary may have lost atomicity.
• In a FRS scenario, if the intermediary contacts the TTP before t0i to cancel
the exchange with his posterior neighbours, the TTP will cancel the exchange
and send him a cancel token. Notice that it is not possible that any party had
finished the exchange; posterior parties can only contact the TTP after t0i .
• If the intermediary contacts the TTP to cancel the exchange with posterior
participants (PRS or FRS with t > t0i ) we can have the following situations:
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– no posterior party has contacted the TTP and finished the exchange, the
TTP will cancel it. In a PRS scenario the intermediary will be in a fair
condition: he has not sent his ACC and the exchange is canceled. Pre-
vious participants cannot finish the exchange with him, neither they do
have his ACC . But in a FRS scenario the intermediary will need to can-
cel the exchanges with all his neighbours tomaintain fairness, and since
t > t0i , any of them may have finished his exchange, therefore he may
be in an unfair situation (his fault).
– if some posterior party has finished the exchange, the TTP will give him
an affidavit, ACKTTP . If we are in a PRS scenario, the intermediary will
be in a fair situation. But in a FRS scenario the intermediary will need
to finish the exchanges with all his neighbours tomaintain fairness, and
since t > t0i , any of themmay have canceled his exchange (by discontin-
uing the protocol), therefore he may be in an unfair situation (his fault).
– if some previous party has canceled the exchange, the TTPwill send him
a cancel token, and again he is in a fair situation. The cancelation of
{N(i−1), Ni } will cancel all {N j ,N( j+1)} ( j ≥ i ) within the same transac-
tion.
• The intermediary can contact the TTP to finish the exchange (with his previ-
ous neighbour):
– if some previous party (in his branches) has canceled the exchange, the
TTP will send him a cancel token.
– if some posterior party (in his branches) has finished the exchange, the
TTP will send him a finish token. In a PRS scenario the intermediary
will be in a fair condition. But in a FRS scenario he may be in an un-
fair situation (his fault), he does not have evidence of all his posterior
neighbour’s signature (he has not received their ACCs), and t > t0i (oth-
erwise the posterior parties cannot finish), therefore it is possible that
some posterior party had decided not to sign his contract (he discontin-
ues the protocol execution).
– if nobody has contacted the TTP previously, the TTP will send a finish
token to the intermediary. If afterwards a previous party in his branch
contacts the TTP, she will receive a finish token. Observe that the inter-
mediary can remain in a unfair situation (his fault): the previous parties
can obtain evidence of finalization with him, but he has not necessarily
an agreement with posterior parties.
After receiving the ACCs from his neighbours (posterior) and before sending
his ACC (this means that he has proof with posterior neighbours but not with his
previous one), the intermediary can do the following:
• If the intermediary does not receive the ACK from his neighbour (previous),
neither contacts the TTP, he is assuming the risk that some posterior party
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finishes the exchange (in a FRS scenario t > t0i ), leaving him in an unfair sit-
uation: he does not have evidence of the ending state regarding his previous
neighbour, but it is his fault.
• The intermediary can contact the TTP to cancel the exchange (with the pos-
terior neighbours):
– if a posterior participant has contacted the TTP and finished the ex-
change, the TTP will send an affidavit, ACKTTP , to the intermediary as
evidence of contract signed. In a FRS scenario this situation is possible
only if t > t0i . In both scenarios, PRS and FRS, the intermediary is in a
fair situation (he has all his neighbour’s ACCs).
– if some previous party has canceled the exchange, the TTP will send him
a cancel token, and again the situation is fair. The intermediary does not
have the ACK but the exchange is canceled.
– if nobody has contacted the TTP before him (PRS and FRS), or t < t0i
in a FRS scenario, the TTP will cancel the exchange and the intermedi-
ary may have cheated. He has the ACCs and the exchange is canceled.
The correct course of action after receiving the ACCs would be to send
the corresponding ACC , but the intermediary may decide to dismiss the
ACC and request cancelation. As long as he does not use the ACCs, he
will remain honest, and in a fair situation; and whatever his decision, his
posterior neighbours will be in a fair situation, they can obtain evidence
of the intermediary’s cancelation by contacting the TTP. The interme-
diary cannot use the ACCs and the cancel tokens. If posterior parties
do not try to finish it would be their fault. So the situation is fair. This
situation is equivalent to the fact that the ACC has been lost or not sent.
• The intermediary can contact the TTP to finish the exchange (with the previ-
ous parties):
– if some previous party (in his branches) has canceled the exchange, the
TTP will send a cancel message for him.
– if some posterior party (in his branches) has finished the exchange, the
TTP will send a finish message for him. Again, this is only possible if
t > t0i if we are in a FRS scenario, but in this case we maintain fairness
(the intermediary already has all his neighbour’s ACCs).
– if nobody has contacted previously with the TTP, this one will send a fin-
ish message to the intermediary. If afterwards a previous party in his
branch contacts the TTP, he will receive a finish message. Now the ex-
change is completed for intermediary, he has the finish token regarding
his previous neighbour, and the ACCs from posterior neighbours.
After his neighbour (previous) receives his ACC andbefore he receives his neigh-
bour’s (posterior) ACK (this means that he has evidence with posterior neighbours
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but not with previous neighbours), the outcome is analogous to the previous case,
except for one situation:
• The intermediary contacts the TTP to cancel the exchange (with the poste-
rior neighbours). If nobody has contacted the TTP before him (or t < t0i in
a FRS scenario), the TTP will cancel the exchange and the intermediary may
have cheated: he has the ACCs and the exchange is canceled. The correct
course of action after sending the ACC would be to wait for the correspond-
ing ACK or requesting finalization, but the intermediary can decide to dis-
miss the ACC and request cancelation. This will leave him in an unfair sit-
uation (his fault), he has compromised himself with his previous neighbour
by sending his ACC , and he has canceled the agreement with the posterior
neighbours.
After receiving the ACK from his neighbour (previous), and before sending his
ACK s (thismeans that hehas proofwith posterior neighbours andwith his previous
neighbour), the intermediary can do the following:
• The natural situation is that the intermediary does not contact the TTP: he
has all the necessary evidence (from previous and posterior neighbours).
• The intermediary can contact the TTP to cancel the exchange (with the pos-
terior neighbours):
– if some posterior party has finished the exchange, the TTP will give him
an affidavit, ACKTTP , and again he has tried to cheat but he has not
achieved it. In a FRS scenario this situation is possible only if t > t0i .
– if nobody has contacted the TTP before him (or t < t0i in a FRS sce-
nario), the TTP will cancel the exchange and the intermediary may have
cheated: he has the ACK from the previous neighbour, the ACCs from
the posterior neighbours, but the exchange is canceled. The correct
course of action after receiving the ACK would be to send the corre-
sponding ACK s, but the intermediary can decide to dismiss the ACCs
and request cancelation. This will leave him in an unfair situation (his
fault), he has compromised himselfwithhis previousneighbours by send-
ing the ACC , and hehas canceled the agreementwith theposterior neigh-
bours. If any posterior party contacts the TTP, they will receive evidence
of cancelation.
• The intermediary can contact the TTP to finish the exchange, which is a non-
sense because he has the ACK (the exchange is finished between him and his
previous neighbour):
– if some previous party (in his branches) has canceled the exchange, the
TTP will send a cancel message for him. In a dispute resolution it would
be clear that a previous party has cheated: he has an ACK and a cancel
token.
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– if some posterior party (in his branches) has finished the exchange, the
TTP will send a finish message for him (nothing new for him). In a FRS
scenario this situation is possible only if t > t0i .
– if nobody has contacted previously with the TTP, he will receive a signed
token (the same that he has). If afterwards a previous party in his branch
contacts the TTP, she will receive a signed token. The exchange is com-
pleted for the intermediary, he has the evidence of signature from both
previous and posterior neighbours.
After his neighbours receive his ACK s (it is a nonsense to contact the TTP: pre-
vious and posterior neighbours have their evidence), the outcome is analogous to
the previous case, except for one situation:
• The intermediary can contact the TTP to cancel the exchange. If nobody has
previously contacted the TTP (or t < t0i in a FRS scenario), the intermediary
will receive a cancel token. It is a clear situation where the intermediary is
cheating, he has evidence of signature with his previous neighbour, and both
proof of cancel and finish with posterior neighbours. The posterior neigh-
bours do not need to contact the TTP, because they have the intermediary’s
evidence of signature, thus, if the intermediary tries to use the cancel evi-
dence, they can proof he is cheating by using his ACK . And if a posterior
party contacts the TTP, he will receive a cancel message from the TTP, but the
intermediary’s ACK will prove he cheated.
PROVIDER
Before receiving a COM from his neighbour, the provider can do nothing, he is
not even aware of the transaction.
After receiving a COM from his neighbour, and before sending his ACC , the
provider can do the following:
• He can stop, assuming no risk. His neighbour can only cancel the exchange
with him, and the provider has not sent any compromising evidence.
• He can contact the TTP (to finish the exchange) and if nobody has previously
contacted, the TTP will send a finish token to the provider. If afterwards a
previous party in his branch contacts the TTP, this party will receive a finish
token.
• He can contact the TTP, but if some previous participant (within his branch)
has canceled the exchange, the TTP will send a cancel token to him.
After sending his ACC and before receiving his neighbour’s ACK , the following
may occur:
• If the provider does not receive the ACK neither contacts the TTP, he is as-
suming a risk: his neighbour has evidence of his signature but he does not
have evidence of the ending state. He is in an unfair situation (his fault).
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• He can contact the TTP to finish the exchange and if nobody has contacted
previously with the TTP, this one will send a finish token to the provider. If
afterwards a previous party in his branch contacts the TTP, he will receive a
finish token. Now the exchange is completed for the provider: he has the
finish token of his neighbour.
• If he contacts the TTP but some previous party (in his branches) has canceled
the exchange, the TTP will send a cancel token for him.
After receiving the ACK from his neighbour, these are the possible outcomes:
• The natural situation is that the provider does not contact the TTP: he has all
the necessary evidence (from his neighbour).
• The provider can contact the TTP to finish the exchange, which is a nonsense
becausehehas the ACK (the exchange is finished betweenhimandhis neigh-
bour):
– if some previous party (in his branches) has canceled the exchange, the
TTP will send a cancel message for him. In a dispute resolution it would
be clear that a previous party has cheated (he has an ACK ).
– if nobody has contacted previously with the TTP, this one will send a
finish token to the provider. If afterwards a previous party in his branch
contacts the TTP, shewill receive a finishmessage. The exchange is com-
pleted for the provider: he has his neighbour’s ACK .
Notice that these cases can be applied to both PRS and FRS (section 2.2.2). The
only difference between the two scenarios is that in a FRS the provider cannot con-
tact the TTP until t > t0i .
Evidence Forgery to Break Fairness
The TTP relies on the evidence sent by the parties involved in a transaction to re-
solve the problems arisen. During the execution of a transaction, originators Ni
have to send the evidence of the previous exchanges, Evik , to the recipients N(i+1)k .
These evidence are encrypted using the TTP’s public key (see section 2.2.4), thus,
recipients cannot verify its value. Therefore, a malicious originator can take advan-
tage of that situation and send forged or incorrect evidence, trying to break fairness.
When the TTP receives a finish or cancel request, the first thing it does is to vali-
date the evidence Ev using its signatures. Then it has to ensure that all the evidence
received are part of the same transaction, checking the identifiers received (see sec-
tion 2.2.4). If the TTP finds that the IDs of the evidence received do not match, it
has to find out who has sent the wrong evidence. Since all evidence messages are
digitally signed by their generators, the TTP will be able to identify them. The diffi-
cult task is to tell who among all the parties involved is cheating and who is not. We
will show it with an example.
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Figure 2.7 depicts a transaction configurationwith 1 consumer, 4 intermediaries
and 4 providers. Suppose the consumer sends a FRS commitment requesting 4 dif-
ferent resources to the intermediary I1.
Client−→ I1
M(cl ient ,I1 ), {IDT },COMcl ient
The intermediary I1 decides he needs to contact 2 different intermediaries/pro-
viders (he does not know, necessarily, if he’s contacting an intermediary or a final
provider).
I1 −→ I2
M(I1 ,I2), {IDT , IDa }, t0I1 ,Ev I1 ,COM(I1 ,I2)
I1 −→ I3
M(I1 ,I3), {IDT , IDb }, t0I1 ,Ev I1 ,COM(I1 ,I3)
Ev I1 = ETTP [H(Mcl ient ,I1 ), {IDT },COMcl ient ,ACCI1 ]
At this point, amalicious Intermediary I3 decides to forge the evidence he sends
to his intermediaries/providers (t0I3 ≤ t0I1 ).
I3 −→P2
M(I3 ,P2), {IDT , IDb , IDc }, t0I3 ,Ev
∗
I3
,COM(I3 ,P2)
I3 −→ I4
M(I3 ,I4), {IDT , IDb , IDd }, t0I3 ,Ev
∗
I3
,COM(I3 ,I4)
I3 −→P4
M(I3 ,P4), {IDT , IDb , IDe }, t0I3 ,Ev
∗
I3
,COM(I3 ,P4)
Ev∗I3 = E
∗
TTP [H(MI1 ,I3 ), {ID
∗
T , ID
∗
b
}, t∗0I3
,Ev∗I1 , COM
∗
(I1 ,I3)
,ACC∗I3 ]
There are 3 ways in which I3 can forge the evidence:
1. Sending a random value: none of the recipients contacted by I3 will be able
to detect the forgery, but if any of them contact the TTP, this one will detect it
(the TTPwill not be able to decrypt Ev∗
I3
). To determinewho is responsible for
the forgery, the TTP will contact I3 and the entities involved. Those entities
will be able to provide proof that they received Evi from the intermediary Ii
using the evidence received COMi , therefore, the TTP will conclude that I3
generated the forgery.
2. Using previous values fromother transactions: I3 cannot create theCOM(I1 ,I3)
value, since he does not have I1’s private key. But he can use a COM value
from a previous transaction (COM
′
). Now I3 has 2 possibilities, either use
only the COM
′
or use the COM
′
and its associated values (H(M)
′
, ID ′ , t
′
0i
,
Ev
′
). In the first case, the TTP will detect the forgery because it will not be
able to validate the signature. In the second situation, the TTP will be able to
validate the signature, but the ID sequence will be different than the rest (see
section 2.2.4). The problem to detect who introduced the forged values can
be resolved as in the previous situation.
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3. Using previous values from the same transaction: if I3 has access to the mes-
sage sent between I1 and I2, he can use the information to forge the Ev∗I3 . If
I3 copies the values from the message sent from I1 to I2, the TTP will be able
to validate the signature, but as in the previous case the IDs sequence will not
match (see section 2.2.4). The problem to detect who introduced the forged
values can be resolved as in the first situation.
CLAIM 2.9: AMS Timeliness: Each protocol execution has a finite duration, and
once it finishes, all honest participants maintain the level of fairness acquired.
PROOF. When only one originator and one recipient are involved (sub-exchange
or exchange with nK = 1), the originator is able to cancel the transaction any time
after sending the COMmitment (executing the cancel sub-protocol), or to finish it
after receiving the ACCeptance (sending the ACKnowledgement message). The re-
cipient is able to finish the transaction (executing the finish sub-protocol) or to can-
cel it (not sending the ACCeptance message nor contacting the TTP) at any time af-
ter receiving the originator’s COMmitment. Therefore the timeliness requirement
is met at sub-exchange or exchange with nK = 1.
At an exchange level with nK > 1 we have two possible scenarios, PRS and FRS.
In a PRS situation, an exchange between an originator Ni and nK different recipi-
ents N(i+1)k (1 ≤ k ≤ nK ) is a set of nR independent sub-exchanges, and every sub-
exchange meets timeliness, then timeliness is met. In a FRS situation we have a
time restriction, originators cannot enforce the contract and recipients cannot con-
tact the TTP to finish the transaction before t0i . But since fairness is maintained
before t0i , even though recipients cannot execute the finish sub-protocol, t0i is a
finite value and after t0i both originators and providers are allowed to terminate the
execution without losing fairness, therefore we can affirm that our protocol meets
the timeliness requirement at exchange level.
At transaction level, consumers act as originators and providers as recipients.
Thus, as originators, consumers can cancel the transaction by contacting the TTP,
and finish it by sending the ACKnowledgement. The providers, as recipients, can
finish the transaction by sending the ACCeptance or contacting the TTP, therefore,
we can affirm that the protocol meets the timeliness requirement.
CLAIM 2.10: AMSNon-repudiation:Originators cannot deny having sent aCOM-
mitment, ACKnowledgement or a request to the TTP, and recipients cannot deny hav-
ing send an ACCeptance or a request to the TTP. Moreover, none of them can be ex-
cluded from having sent one of these messages.
PROOF. Non-repudiation evidence are generated during the executionof a trans-
action, linking originators and recipients throughdigital signatures on themessages
exchanged (see table 2.4). Originators and recipients can try to deny their involve-
ment in a transaction, to avoid fulfilling an agreement or to change the conditions in
which a transaction has been executed (agreement’s conditions, timing, price, etc.),
but the evidence they generate along the transaction can prove their involvement.
An originator Ni can prove the involvement of a recipient N(i+1) using the ac-
ceptance ACC(i+1)k or the TTP’s proof of finalization ACKTTP . In the same way, a
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recipient N(i+1) can prove the involvement of an originator Ni using her acknowl-
edgement of receipt ACKi (if the exchange sub-protocol has been finished) or her
commitment COMi and the TTP’s proof of finalization ACKTTP (see table 2.5).
Moreover, using the transaction identifiers ID an intermediary Ni is able to prove
that N(i−1) is involved as originator and N(i+1) as recipient of the same transaction.
Therefore, non-repudiation is achieved.
CLAIM 2.11: AMS Verifiability of the TTP: All users involved in a transaction are
able to prove a possible TTP’s misbehaviour.
PROOF. The TTP is contacted to solve possible conflicts, but, the TTP could send
wrong answers to the cancel and finish sub-protocols requests. In particular, the
TTP has two possibilities of misbehave:
1. In a response to a cancel request:
• Sending cancelation evidence, Ci , when a transaction has been previ-
ously finished by another party.
• Sending finalization evidence, ACKTTP , when a transactionhasnot been
previously finished by another party.
In the first case, originator and recipient will have contradictory evidence
from the TTP. If the recipient tries to enforce the agreement using the TTP’s
evidence ACKTTP , the originator will be able to prove the TTP’smisbehaviour
withCi , evidence of cancelation from the TTP. The same goes if the originator
tries to prove the cancelation using Ci , the recipient will be able to prove the
TTP’s misbehaviour using ACKTTP .
In the second case, if the originator tries to enforce the agreement using the
TTP’s evidence ACKTTP , the recipient will be able to prove the TTP’s misbe-
haviour by asking the TTP to present evidence that the recipient has executed
the finish sub-protocol, i.e., Pi ’s signature on the request, EFR(i+1) (see tables
2.4 and 2.5).
2. In a response to a finish request:
• Sending finalization evidence, ACKTTP , when a transaction has been
previously canceled by another party.
• Sending cancelation evidence,C(i+1), when the transaction has not been
previously canceled by another party.
Both cases are analogous to the previous examples of misbehaviour, as a re-
sponse of a cancel request, where we have seen that the verifiability property
is maintained. In particular in the second case, the originator will be able to
prove the TTP’s misbehaviour asking evidence of her execution of the cancel
sub-protocol.
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Therefore, the verifiability requirement is met.
CLAIM 2.12: Confidentiality: A user Ni only has access to the content of the ex-
changes in which he is directly involved: {N(i−1),Ni } as a recipient, and {Ni ,N(i+1)} as
originator.
PROOF. Following the sub-exchange protocol (see table 2.5), the information ex-
changed between originator and recipient belongs to both of them, except for the
evidence of previous exchanges Evi . But as we show in table 2.4, these evidence are
encrypted with a symmetric key, and the key value is encrypted using TTP’s public
key (only the TTP can decrypt it). Moreover, not even the TTP has information on
the messages exchanged between originators and recipients. The evidence are sig-
natures over the hash of this message (H(M), see section 2.2.4), therefore the TTP
only needs this H(M) to validate the evidence. Then, we can assure that confiden-
tiality is maintained along the transaction.
CLAIM 2.13: AMSTraceability: The TTP is able to trace a transaction to its origin,
the consumer, and its ending, the providers.
PROOF. Starting from an intermediary Ni , the TTP can trace the previous and
posterior nodes using the evidence received Ev(i−1) from N(i−1), and the ACCep-
tance ACC(i+1) from N(i+1).
Backwards traceability, i.e., finding the parties involved from the intermediary
Ni to the consumer N1 is immediate, using the previous evidence Ev(i−1), which
includes:
H(M(i−2),(i−1)), ID , Ev(i−2), COM(i−2),ACCi−1
H(M(i−3),(i−2)), ID , Ev(i−3), COM(i−3),ACCi−2
...
H(M(1,2)), ID , COM1,ACC2
Forward traceability, i.e., finding the parties involved from the intermediariesNi
to the providers N(N)nK (nK ≥ 1), requires the cooperation of the N j with j > i par-
ties involved. Using ACC(i+1) the TTP can identify the participantN(i+1) and ask this
N(i+1) to provide the evidence to identify N(i+2), the ACC(i+2). If every party acts to
its best benefit, we can affirm that the protocol meets the traceability requirement.
Evidence Forgery to Avoid Traceability
Backwards traceability relies on the evidence within the value Ev(i−1) to trace a
transaction from Ni to N1, thus, a malicious user could try to tamper this value
in order to prevent a transaction to be traced. But as we have seen in section 2.2.5,
the TTP would be able to detect this malicious user.
Forward traceability relies on the user cooperation and the evidence of accep-
tance, ACC. Again, a user may try to tamper the acceptance value in order to avoid
the traceability of the transaction. The participant Ni can try to forge ACC(i+1), evi-
dence of acceptance, in two ways:
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I2 Provider1
Client I1 Provder2
I3 I4 Provider3
Provider4
Figure 2.7: Complex Transaction Example
1. Providing a valid evidence ACC
′
(i+1) from a previous transaction or recipient.
In this case, the TTP will be able to validate the signature, but the set of ID
will not match the current transaction. Thus, the TTP will detect the attempt
of forgery.
2. Providing an invalid value. In this case the TTP will not be able to validate the
signature, detecting the forgery attempt.
In any case if the user tries to forge evidence to avoid traceability or denies to
cooperate, the TTPwill be able to detect it. Moreover, the TTPwill be able to identify
the malicious user. In these cases, the resolution of the dispute can be brought to
the pertinent authority.
2.2.6 Protocol Efficiency Analysis
In section 2.2.1 we have presented a use case that could benefit from our protocol
proposal, the online tourism industry, where communications among agents are
usually carried out using XML (eXtensive Markup Language [43]) messages. There-
fore we will use XML and its associated security standards, XMLdsig for digital sig-
nature [44], and XMLenc for encryption [45], to review the protocol performance in
terms of message and computational overhead, added by the extra message infor-
mation and cryptographic operations needed. The performance review has been
done on the optimistic scenario, i.e., the case in which all the participants behave
correctly; because it is the most probable and desirable scenario. Even so, in table
2.6 we have the TTP’s computational overhead for each sub-protocol resolution.
Due to the lack of equivalent proposals in the literature, to the best of our knowl-
edge, we cannot provide a comparison with other solutions. However, in the case of
message overhead, we will compare our solution with a transaction executed with-
out any security protocol, where the originator sends a request and the recipient
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answers with a response. We will refer to this kind of transaction as plain transac-
tion.
MessageOverhead
A plain transaction exchanges 2 messages between originator and recipient, re-
quest and response. But in our protocol proposal we need to exchange 3 messages:
COMmitment, ACCeptance, and ACKnowledgement (section 2.2.4 and table 2.5).
Moreover, the messages exchanged in plain transactions are composed only of data
related to the purpose of the transaction, e.g. when we want to purchase a plane
ticket, the request (plain request) message contains the information related to the
plane ticket, consumer, payment method, etc. Meanwhile messages exchanged
during an execution of the exchange sub-protocol include the plain request, and
other data like digital signatures, evidence of previous exchanges, identifiers, etc.
Therefore, the protocol adds message overhead in terms of number of messages
exchanged and message size.
To measure the overhead in terms of number of messages, we will calculate
the number of messages exchanged during the execution of a transaction. The to-
tal number of messages exchanged during a transaction is 3(nI +nP ), with nI ≥ 1
and nP ≥ 1 number of intermediaries and providers respectively. But, our trans-
action model has a tree structure where the branches can be executed in parallel,
thus, another interesting value is the number of messages exchanged by the largest
branch, which will give us an idea of the protocol response time, i.e., the number of
messages we need to exchange before the client receives a response. This value is
3(n
′
I +1), where n
′
I ≥ 1 is the number of intermediaries in the largest branch.
In table 2.5 we have the composition of the messages exchanged during the ex-
ecution of the exchange sub-protocol: plain message, identifiers, digital signatures
and encrypted values.
1. Plain Message/s: M(i ,(i+1)) the request (plain message), which size is variable.
2. Identifiers: {ID , t0i }, a set of randomUUIDs and an optional time value. Each
UUID is 16 byte long [42], and the time value is represented as a dateTime
value (see [46], 3.2.7), e.g., 2011-04-26T11:38:57.106+02:00, is 29 bytes long.
3. Digital Signatures: COMi ,ACCi ,ACKi , etc. whichhave a size thatwill depend
on the XMLdsig configuration [44] (≃ 1,8KB using DSA with SHA1, detached
mode).
4. Encrypted Data: Evi the evidence of previous exchanges. Its size will depend
on the number of them.
Tomeasure the overhead, in terms ofmessage size, wewill calculate the relation
between the plain message, the request message, and the commitment message
generated by the exchange sub-protocol. To build the protocol messages, we have
created an XML data structure following the protocol specifications (see table 2.4).
61
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF CONTRACTS
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
Message Size KB
0 nex
+
+
+ + +
+
1 nex
×
×
×
× ×
×
2 nex
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
3 nex
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
4 nex
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
5 nex
△
△
△
△
△
△
Figure 2.8: Plain Request vs. Commitment Message Protocol (nex number of previ-
ous exchanges)
The plain message will be represented as a string with random values and variable
size (1KB, 5KB, 10KB, ..., 100KB). The results can be seen in figure 2.8.
As we can see in figure 2.8, the efficiency increases with the plain message size,
but decreases quickly with the number of previous exchanges. This decrease of per-
formance is due to the previous evidence Evi element, which includes the informa-
tion of the previous exchanges. The increase of performance with the plain mes-
sage size seems obvious; the extra elements needed to build a commitment mes-
sage have a fixed size (ID , digital signatures, etc...). The client and providers will
not be affected by the decrease of performance, because the client commitment is
the firstmessage and does not have the Evi element, and the provider acts only as a
recipient, receiving the commitment message and sending the acceptance. The in-
termediaries are the most affected by this performance decrease, however, they are
also the most benefited from the use of the protocol (see example in section 2.2.1).
Computational Overhead
In the following paragraphswewill analyze the overhead addedby the cryptographic
operations, i.e. digital signatures (signature and validation) and encryption (en-
cryption and decryption) operations. In table 2.6 we have the number of crypto-
graphic operations that each party executes during the exchange, cancel and finish
sub-protocols, for each situation (PRS and FRS).
The total number of operations executed during a transaction is the TOTAL value,
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PRS Signature Validation Encryption Decryption
Client 2nR nR 0 0
Provider nPreq 2nPreq 0 0
Intermediary 3nIreq 3nIreq nIreq 0
TOTAL 3nR (1+nI ) 3nR (1+nI )
nI∑
i=1
nIreqi 0
TTP Cancel nTTPreq nTTPreq 0 0
TTP Finish nTTPreq 2(nTTPreq +nex ) 0 nTTPreq ∗nex
FRS Signature Validation Encryption Decryption
Client 2 1 0 0
Provider 1 2 0 0
Intermediary 1+2nK 2+nK 1 0
TOTAL nP +3nI 3nP +3nI nI 0
TTP Cancel 1 1 0 0
TTP Finish 1 2(nex +1) 0 nex
nR services/goods requested
nP number of providers
nI number of intermediaries
nK recipients contacted by the intermediary
nPreq requests received by the provider
nIreq requests received by the intermediary
nTTPreq requests received by the TTP
nex number of previous exchanges
Table 2.6: Number of Cryptographic Operations for Each Kind of Participant
the system load. In table 2.7 we have calculated the total number of operations, an
optimistic approximation, and amore realistic approximation, using as example the
figure 2.7. The approximations assume that the different branches of our tree struc-
ture are executed in parallel. In our configuration example (figure 2.7), the longest
branch is the one formed by the nodes: client, I1, I3, I4 and Provider3.
The optimistic approximation assumes that, within a node, the operations re-
lated to different branches are executed in parallel. If an intermediary receives a
PRS with nIreq , when calculating the number of operations as response time, in-
stead of counting 3nIreq validations (see table 2.6), we count 3. On the other hand,
a more realistic approximation assumes that operations within a node are executed
sequentially, therefore we have to count 3nIreq , to get an idea of the response time.
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PRS Signature Validation Encryption Decryption
TOTAL 75 75 12 0
Optimistic approx. 12 12 3 0
Realistic approx. 45 42 11 0
FRS Signature Validation Encryption Decryption
TOTAL 24 24 4 0
Optimistic approx. 12 12 3 0
Realistic approx. 18 15 3 0
configuration example figure 2.7
nR = 5,nI = 4,nP = 4
nIreq1 = 5,nIreq2 = 1,nIreq3 = 4,nIreq4 = 2
nK1 = 2,nK2 = 1,nK3 = 3,nK4 = 1
Table 2.7: Example of Total Number of Operations (related to figure 2.7)
2.3 Optimal Solutions for Asynchronous Multi-Party Contract
Signing in Different Topologies
The objective of a Multi-Party Contract Signing (MPCS) protocol is to allow a set of
participants Pi (1 < i < N ) to exchange a valid signature on a contract C , without
any of them gaining advantage over the others. We can describe the protocol as an
application of fair exchange as: N parties want to sign a contract C , but none of the
participants is willing to give his signature away unless he has an assurance that he
will receive the other participant’s signature.
We can find some proposals for MPCS in the scientific literature [18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23]. Even though there is a consensus about some of the requirements all MPCS
must meet, like fairness, authors impose a set of of different requirements. More-
over, sometimes they do no agree on the definition of these requirements. Within
these proposals, we can find some that claim to propose optimal solutions or de-
fine lower-bounds to design MPCS protocols [18, 22, 23], but the different criteria
applied to define requirements like fairness, or terms like round, step, etc., makes
it difficult to assert the validity of such optimal solutions. Moreover, even though
we can use different topologies to design MPCS protocols, none of these solutions
contemplates the influence of the topology on the overall result.
The contribution of this section is twofold. Firstly, we review some common
terms and notions used in previous works as the meaning of round or message. We
define these terms according to the topology they are applied, and we discuss their
suitability, proposing the use of the concept of transmissions to measure the effi-
ciency of protocols. Secondly, we present asynchronous MPCS protocols for a set
of common topologies (ring, star, sequential and mesh), meeting all the core secu-
rity requirements, and we prove our solutions are optimal, improving the existent
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proposals of lower-bounds for fair protocols.
2.3.1 Related Work
Garay et al. present in [18] the first abuse-freeMPCS protocol, withO(N3) messages
and O(N2) rounds, using private contract signatures (PCS). Unfortunately, it has
been proved that the protocol is flawed. A very important conclusion of this paper
is their theorem 3: “any complete and fair optimistic contract-signing protocol with
N participants requires at least N rounds in an optimistic run".
Baum-Waidner et al. propose in [19] a protocol with N +3 rounds in the worst
case and N +1 in the optimistic case, and a variant with 2(N −1)+6 rounds. They
are the first to compare two topologies: mesh and star topologies. They present
the number of rounds and messages required for each protocol as a function of
the number of dishonest parties t . But we cannot know the number of dishonest
participants beforehand, therefore we will assume t = (N −1). In this case, a mesh
topology requires (N + 1) rounds and (N + 1)N (N − 1) messages in the optimistic
case. In the star topology, the protocol requires 2(N −1)+6 rounds, and (2(N −1)+
6)2(N−1)messages. In [47] Baum-Waidner presents anoptimizationof theprevious
proposal [19] where they assume a number of dishonest participants t < (N − 1),
but it is difficult to see the utility of this enhancement because, as we have said, we
cannot predict the number of dishonest parties.
Khill et al. [38] propose a protocol for multi-party fair exchange using a ring
topology. They affirm (without any proof) that the ringmodel is more efficient than
the full mesh model (asserting that the latter is very complex). Their protocol con-
sists on 3 rounds and 3N messages (in the optimistic case; 7N messages in the worst
case). A serious drawback of the protocol is that it is supposed that the TTP broad-
casts its decision to all parties. This assumption is dangerous, because the channels
can be resilient, but some party can be unreachable for other reasons.
Chadha et al. [20] analyze formally two previous works: Garay et al. [18] and
Baum et al. [19]. They focus on three properties: fairness, timeliness and abuse-
freeness. They conclude that the proposal of Baum-Waidner et al. [19], a protocol
withN+1 rounds, has no security problems. On the other hand, they prove that the
proposal of Garay et al. [18] presents a security flaw when N = 4: it is not fair. They
try o fix the problem, but a posterior security analysis reveals that the proposal fix is
also flawed.
Mukhamedov et al. [48] prove that Chadha et al.’s [20] proposal (a fix to [18]),
is also flawed. They assume that parties are ordered and cite the following require-
ments: fairness, timeliness and abuse-freeness. An interesting issue discussed in
this paper is the abort chaining problem (or resolve impossibility): non-honest par-
ties can group together to propagate a TTP’s abort decision. In fact, this is a way to
prove the necessity of more than (N −1) rounds for N users (in order to avoid the
abort chaining attack). The abort chaining attack is a sequence of requests made
by dishonest participants to force the TTP to deliver cancel evidence, even though
some other honest participant may have already signed the contract.
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Ferrer et al. present in [49] an optimal solution for asynchronous optimistic
MPCS in a ring topology, with quasi N rounds (more than N − 1 but less than N )
for N parties. Their solution meets the following requirements: effectiveness, weak
fairness, timeliness, non-repudiation and verifiability of TTP. The proposal takes
into account the abort chaining problem.
Onieva et al. [50] summarizes some properties of previous works: effectiveness,
fairness, timeliness, non-repudiation, verifiability of TTP, transparency of TTP and
abuse-freeness. In their paper they analyze a previous work of Ferrer et al. [41],
proving that the protocol is flawed; it does not meet fairness requirement.
In [21] Mukhamedov and Ryan criticize the work of Baum et al. [19] alleging
that they use a non-standard notion of signed contract and they need (N +1)N (N−
1) messages, more than in the solution provided in [21], N (N − 1)(⌈N/2⌉+ 1). In
[21] fairness, abuse-freeness and timeliness are considered. They assume that par-
ties are ordered and a sequential topology is used. The protocol needs (⌈N/2⌉+1)
rounds, and authors observe that it is not coherentwithGaray’s Theoremof [35], but
they argue that the concept of round, used in different papers, is not clear. Later, in
[28], Mukhamedov et al. analyze the protocol using the NuSMV model checker for
the cases where N = 4 and N = 5. Even though the analysis does not find any flaw
in the protocol, their definition of fairness corresponds to Asokan et al.’s strong fair-
ness, but only weak fairness can be achieved in an asynchronous optimistic MPCS
protocol (see section 1.2.1).
Onieva et al. present an interesting survey on non-repudiation in [51]. Although
most of the paper is devoted to non-repudiation and certified electronic mail, a
small part is devoted to MPCS. They present a solution for the MPCS problem, but
they assume a synchronous model.
Mauw et al. [22] use the concept of abort chaining of Mukhamedov et al. [48] to
derive a lower bound on the number of messages in MPCS protocols. The authors
model contract signing protocols as sequences of numbers. They consider three se-
curity requirements: fairness, timeliness and abuse-freeness (but they affirm that
the latter “will not play a role in our observations on message minimality"). Their
definition of fairnessmatches that of Asokan et al.’s [9] strong fairness. They conjec-
ture that for N ≥ 3, all MPCS protocols with fewer than N2+1 messages are unfair.
They provide a protocol for N = 3 with 10messages. In fact, instead of messages we
should talk about transmissions, because some transmissions contain more than
one message (see definitions in section 2.3.2). In section 2.3.4 we will prove, de-
pending on the topology, that (N +1)(N −1)< (N2+1) transmissions are enough to
achieve fairness.
Zhang et al. propose in [52] a game-based verification of MPCS protocols. They
assume that MPCS protocols have to satisfy three properties: fairness, timeliness
and abuse-freeness. They analyze the protocols provided in [28] and [22], proving
the latter to be flawed for 3 signers and proposing a fix. Authors assume that “once
having contacted TTP by initiating a sub-protocol, the signers would never be al-
lowed to proceed the main protocol any more", but we cannot forbid a dishonest
party to contact the TTP and proceed with the main protocol.
Following a similar reasoning than [22], Kordy et al. [23] propose protocols de-
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rived from sequences of numbers. They consider the following requirements: fair-
ness, timeliness and abuse-freeness. An example with N = 3 results in a protocol
(sequential topology) with 18messages, that can be converted to 12messages. They
talk aboutmessage complexity (the total number of messages sent in the optimistic
case), bandwidth complexity (the total number of send instructions produced by
their protocol compiler) and round complexity. The latter is not considered be-
cause it does not fit well in their topology (“that measure assumes the existence of a
repeating structure in the protocols"). They cannot provide closed expressions for
all values of N , and only provide upper bounds.
2.3.2 Topologies
Throughout the solutions found in the literature, authors use the terms ’round’ and
’step’ without clearly defining them, which often brings on confusion with respect
to the metric to be used for its efficiency evaluation.
In our opinion, the term round should not be used for measure the efficiency
of a protocol, but to help in its description. The problem is that rounds in different
topologies are not equal, e.g., in a ring topology a round requires N transmissions,
while in a mesh topology a round requires N (N − 1) transmissions. Moreover, in
a ring topology the protocol execution must follow a certain order, and this infor-
mation can be used by the TTP to detect malicious users (see TTP rules for ring
topology, in section 2.3.4), meanwhile in a mesh topology there is no execution or-
der among participants.
Anothermeasure typically provided is the number ofmessages required to com-
plete a protocol execution, but instead of messages we should talk about transmis-
sions, because some transmissions contain more than one message. Therefore, to
measure the efficiency of a protocol we will use the number of transmissions re-
quired. Following, we will give a definition of message, transmission, and a defini-
tion of round for each topology, that we will use later to describe each protocol.
Definition 2.14 (Message) A “logical" set of information sent froman originator A to
B, where B can be a set of recipients {B1, ...,BN }.
Definition 2.15 (Transmission) The action of transmitting a set of information M
from an originator A to Bi , where M can be a set of messages {m1, ...,mM ′ }.
Ring
In a ring topology the message transmissions occur between two adjacent nodes
Pi and P(i+1), until the execution flow reaches PN , whose transmission recipient is
P1, the initiator node. The ring architecture executes the transmissions on a serial
basis. In figure 2.9a we have depicted a complete round of a ring topology.
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Figure 2.9: Multi-Party Contract Signature Topologies
Definition 2.16 (Ring-Round.) A round begins when Pi (lets say P1) sends a trans-
mission to P2 (P(i+1)), then P2 transmits to P3, ..., and ends when P1 receives the
transmission from PN , closing the ring.
A complete ring-round requiresN transmissions, and generates information on
the execution order that can be used by the TTP to detect attempts ofmisbehaviour.
Sequential
In a sequential topology the transmissions are executed on a serial basis. The pro-
tocol execution flows from P1 to PN , and back to P1, going through all the partici-
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pants in between. In figure 2.9b wehave a complete round execution of a sequential
topology depicted.
Definition 2.17 (Sequential-Round.) A round begins when the participant Pi (typ-
ically P1) transmits one or more messages to the participant P(i+1), and ends when
the same Pi who initiated the round receives a transmission from P(i+1).
A complete sequential-round requires 2(N −1) transmissions. It also generates
information of execution order.
Star
In a star topology the transmissions between participants are routed through a cen-
tral node/participant. The central node Pi receives all the transmissions from the
participants P j ( j ∈ [1..N ], j 6= i ), and then returns to each P j the corresponding
messages. In figure 2.9c we have a complete round execution of star topology de-
picted.
Definition 2.18 (Star-Round.) A star-round begins when the initiator Pi (lets say
P1) transmits some message or messages to all P j ( j ∈ [2..N ]), and ends when Pi has
received the corresponding transmission from each P j . Alternatively, the round can
be started by P j ( j ∈ [2..N ]) transmitting to P1, and finish when each P j has received
P1’s transmission.
The star topology only generates information aboutwho initiated the star-round.
It has a cost of 2(N −1) transmissions.
Mesh
In amesh topology the transmissions are executed on a parallel basis. Each Pi , with
1≤ i ≤N will send a transmission to each P j , with j ∈ [1..N ], j 6= i . In figure 2.9d we
have a complete round execution of mesh topology.
Definition 2.19 (Mesh-Round.) A round begins when, each Pi , with 1≤ i ≤N sends
a transmission to each P j , with j ∈ [1..N ], j 6= i . The round will end when every
participant has received a transmission from the other N −1 participants.
A completemesh-round requires N (N−1) transmissions, and it does not gener-
ate additional information: the participants are not ordered.
2.3.3 Overview of the Protocols
In this section we will give an overall description of the protocols we will define in
section 2.3.4. The objective is to design asynchronous optimistic MPCS protocols
in which N participants sign the same contract C . All protocols follow the same
principle: in turns, the participants exchange a series of commitments to sign the
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contract C , until they have enough evidence to consider the contract signed. What
is a “turn" or what is “enough evidence" will be determined by the topology.
Each protocol is composed of two sub-protocols: the exchange sub-protocol
and the resolution sub-protocol. All protocols are optimistic, therefore if every par-
ticipant behaves correctly and there are no network errors, only the exchange sub-
protocol will be executed and the TTP will not intervene. Each of the proposals
comply with the core security requirements: effectiveness, weak fairness, non-re-
pudiation and timeliness (see section 1.2.1). We will use the following notation:
• NNumber of participants.
• XiZ = {x1,x2, ...,xZ} Vector with Z elements.
• Pi Participant i , 1≤ i ≤N .
• M(k,i) A set of messages transmitted during round k, generated by the partici-
pant i (see definition in section 2.3.2).
• C contract to be signed.
• CID unique Contract IDentifier. A random number used to uniquely identify
a protocol execution.
• h(Mi) Hash Function of message Mi .
• Sj[Mi]= SKj[h(Mi)] j ’s Digital Signature onMi (where SK j is j ’s private key).
• m(k,i) = Si [CID,C ,k].
We assume that the contract C includes the necessary information, as the iden-
tity of the participants, the TTP, the number N of participants, etc.
As regards the communications channels wemake some usual assumptions:
• channels among participants Pi are unreliable, the messages can be delayed
or lost.
• channels among participants Pi and the TTP are resilient, the messages can
be delayed but not lost.
The TTP
To solve the resolution requests (table 2.8) the TTP follows a set of rules. These rules
are based on a group of variables the TTP updates on every request received, indi-
cating the state of a protocol execution. Following we have these group of variables,
their definition, and some notation used along the rules definition.
• X N = {P1, ...,PN } set of participants in a MPCS.
• XR set of participants who already requested resolution.
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MPCS resolution sub-protocol
Pi → TTP: CID,C ,k,M(k ,i) ,SPi [CID,C ,k,M(k ,i) ]
if the TTP decides canceled
Pi ← TTP: Cancel Token
else
Pi ← TTP: Signed Token
Cancel Token: STTP [CID,C ,k,′CANCELED ′]
Signed Token: STTP [CID,C ,m(k ,i)N ]
∀m(k ′ ,i) ∈MR / k ≥ k
′
, i.e., the last signature
available from each participant
Table 2.8: Resolution Sub-Protocol for All Topologies
• XC set of participants who have received a canceled token from the TTP.
• XS set of participants who have received a signature token from the TTP.
• MR set of messagesM(k ′ ,i ′ ) received by the TTP.
• PC set of participants that are allowed to cancel the contract signature.
• canceled boolean value stating that the contracting protocol has been can-
celed if its value is true.
• signed boolean value stating that the contracting protocol has been finished
(signed) if its value is true.
The rules are the same for all the protocols we present, but there are some par-
ticularizations depending on the topology, that will be explained along each pro-
tocol. Following we have the common set of rules that the TTP will follow to solve
the resolution requests received (the term x-round refers to the particular round of
each topology):
RULE 0
The TTP will only accept one resolution request per participant Pi : if Pi ∈ XR , the
TTP will dismiss the request.
RULE 1
If the TTP receives a request from Pi ∈ PC during x-round k = 1, and the execution
has not been previously finished (signed=true) by other party, the TTP will cancel it
and send a canceled token to Pi .
RULE 2
If the TTP receives a request from Pi during x-round k > 1, and the execution has
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not been previously canceled by other party, the TTP will finish it (signed=true) and
send a signed token to Pi .
RULE 3
If the TTP receives a request from Pi during x-round k ≥ 1, and the execution has
been previously finished (signed=true) by other party, the TTP will send a signed to-
ken to Pi .
RULE 4
If the TTP receives a request from Pi during x-round k > 1, and the execution has
been previously canceled (canceled=true) by other party, the TTP will check the pre-
viously received requests to see if they have cheated. If the TTP can prove that all
previous requestors cheated, it will change the protocol status from canceled to fin-
ished, and deliver the signed token to Pi . Otherwise the TTP will send a cancel
token to Pi . In the following sections, we will explain the process of detecting pre-
vious cheating requests, adapting it to each topology.
2.3.4 Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS Protocols
In this sectionwepresent an asynchronous optimisticMPCSprotocol for each topol-
ogy (ring, sequential, star and mesh). All protocols meet the core requirements de-
fined in section 1.2.1: effectiveness, weak fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation.
An AsynchronousOptimistic MPCS protocol using Ring Topology
This protocol can be found in Ferrer-Gomila et al. [49], table 2.9 shows the exchange
sub-protocol.
In this protocol all participants except PN can cancel the protocol, therefore we
have that in TTP’s R1 PC = {P1, ...,P(N−1)}. When PN receives the first message he
already has evidence that proves that all other participants are willing to sign the
contract. Therefore, if he does not want to sign the contract, he only needs to dis-
continue the protocol execution. In a protocol with ring topology, TTP’s R4 states:
• if ∃M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / (k
′
= k) or (k
′
= k−1 and i
′
> i ), the TTP will send a cancel
token to Pi to maintain fairness for the previous honest requests.
• if ∀M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
< k−1, then P
i
′ cheated.
• if ∀M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
= k−1 and i
′
< i , then P
i
′ cheated.
Notice that the TTP’s rule R4 for a ring topology uses the information generated
by the protocol flow (when comparing the index i with i
′
), the execution order to
detect cheating participants.
Lemma 2.1 An asynchronous optimistic MPCS protocol with ring topology, meeting
timeliness, requires (N +1)(N −1) transmissions to be fair.
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MPCS protocol with Ring topology
1.1 P1 → P2: m(1,1) M(1,1)
1.2 P2 → P3: m(1,1),m(1,2) M(1,2)
. . .
1.(N −1) P(N−1) → PN : m(1,1),m(1,2), ...,m(1,(N−1)) M(1,(N−1))
1.N PN → P1: m(1,2),m(1,3), ...,m(1,N) M(1,N)
. . .
(N −1).1 P1 → P2: m((N−1),1) M((N−1),1)
(N −1).2 P2 → P3: m((N−1),1) ,m((N−1),2) M((N−1),2)
. . .
(N −1).(N −1) P(N−1) → PN : m((N−1),1) ,m((N−1),2) , ... M((N−1),(N−1))
...,m((N−1),(N−1))
(N −1).N PN → P1: m((N−1),2) ,m((N−1),3) , ... M((N−1),N)
...,m((N−1),N)
N .1 P1 → P2: m(N ,1) M(N ,1)
N .2 P2 → P3: m(N ,1) ,m(N ,2) M(N ,2)
. . .
N .(N −1) P(N−1) → PN : m(N ,1) ,m(N ,2), ...,m(N ,(N−1)) M(N ,(N−1))
N = number of participants
i 6= j ; i , j ∈ [1..N ])
Table 2.9: Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS Protocol with Ring Topology
Proof Wewill prove it by contradiction. Assume that (N+1)(N−1)−1 transmissions
are enough (we eliminate the last transmission: M(N ,(N−1))). It means that PN has
all the evidence when he receives M(N−1),(N−1) . Now we will construct the abort-
chaining attack.
P(N−1) sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(1,(N−1)) but he has not
received M(2,(N−2)) . He is the first to contact the TTP, therefore the TTP will apply
rule R1: cancel the protocol and deliver a cancel token to P(N−1).
Next, P(N−2) sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(2,(N−2)) but he has
not receivedM(3,(N−3)) . The TTP will apply R4 (k
′
= k−1 and i
′
> i ) and it will send
a cancel token to P(N−2).
Following, P(N−3) sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(3,(N−3)) but he
has not received M(4,(N−4)) . The TTP will apply R4. This time, the TTP will detect
that P(N−1) ((k
′
= 1) < (k −1 = 2)) cheated, but to maintain fairness for P(N−2) (1 =
2−1 and (N −1) > (N −2)), it will send a cancel token to P(N−3).
We can continue this abort-chaining attack, until P2 sends a resolution request
claiming he has sent M((N−2),2) but he has not receivedM((N−1),1) . Applying R4, the
TTP detects that P4 cheated, but to maintain fairness for P3 it sends a cancel token
to P2.
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Finally, P1 sends a resolution request claiming he has sentM((N−1),1) but he has not
received M((N−1),N) . Again, the TTP will apply R4, and deliver a cancel token to P1
to maintain fairness for P2 (the TTP can prove that {P3,P4, ...,P(N−2) ,P(N−1)} have
cheated). In this scenario, an honest PN may have received all evidence, but an
honest P1 has a cancel token from the TTP (M((N−1),N) may be lost due to a network
error), therefore fairness is broken. But if we add another transmission: M(N ,(N−1)) ,
we can avoid the abort chaining attack.
Continuing the previous execution, with the additional transmissions, we have two
possibilities:
• If P1 is honest, he will not continue with the protocol execution, therefore PN
will send a resolution request to the TTP claiming the missing evidence. The
TTP will be able to prove that P2 cheated, but again, to maintain fairness for
the honest participants it will send a cancel token to PN .
• If P1 is dishonest, and all other dishonest participants continue with the pro-
tocol execution, PN will receive M(N ,(N−1)) , therefore he will have evidence
the contract has been signed.
In both cases weak fairness is met. Therefore we can affirm that, the minimum
number of transmissions that an asynchronous optimistic MPCS protocol with ring
topology needs to be fair is (N +1)(N −1).
An AsynchronousOptimistic MPCS protocol using Star Topology
In table 2.10 we have the exchange sub-protocol. Note that the protocol initiates
when all Pi (i ∈ [2..N ]) send to P1 the first commitment message M(1,i), and ends
when each Pi sends their N th commitment, the signature. Therefore, to P1, evi-
dence of signature is the N th commitment, while for Pi (i ∈ [2..N ]), the evidence of
signature is the (N −1)th commitment. If the protocol was initiated by P1 broad-
casting his first commitment m(1,1), the protocol would need (N −1) transmissions
more.
In our solution with star topology, all participants except P1 can cancel the pro-
tocol: PC = {P2, ...,PN }, TTP’s R1. When P1 receivesM(1,i) (i ∈ [2..N ]) he has enough
evidence to prove that all participants are committed to the signature of the con-
tract. If he does not want to sign the contract, he only need to discontinue the pro-
tocol execution. To apply R4 the TTP follows the next assertions:
• if ∃M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
≥ k−1, the TTPwill send a cancel token toPi tomaintain
fairness for the previous honest requesters.
• if ∀M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
< k−1, then P
i
′ cheated.
Notice that since the protocol flow of a star topology does not follow a sequence,
the TTP’s rule R4 can only use information on the star-round to detect cheating
participants.
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MPCS protocol with Star topology
1.1 Pi → P1: m(1,i) M(1,i)
1.2 Pi ← P1: m(1,1),m(1, j ) M(1,1)
2.1 Pi → P1: m(2,i) M(2,i)
2.2 Pi ← P1: m(2,1),m(2, j ) M(2,1)
. . .
(N −1).1 Pi → P1: m((N−1),i) M((N−1),i)
(N −1).2 Pi ← P1: m((N−1),1) ,m((N−1), j ) M((N−1),1)
N .1 Pi → P1: m(N ,i) , M(N ,i)
N = number of participants; i , j ∈ [2..N ]upslope j 6= i
Table 2.10: Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS Protocol with Star Topology
Lemma 2.2 An asynchronous optimistic MPCS protocol with star topology, meeting
the timeliness requirement, requires (2N −1)(N −1) transmissions to be fair.
Proof We will prove it by contradiction. Assume that (2N − 1)(N − 1)− 1 trans-
missions are enough, we eliminate M(N ,N) . It means that P1 has all the evidence
when he receives {m(N ,2),m(N ,3) , ...,m(N ,(N−1)) ,m((N−1),N)}. Now we will construct
the abort-chaining attack.
P2 sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(1,2) but he has not received
M(1,1). He is the first to contact the TTP, therefore applying R1, the TTP will cancel
the protocol and deliver a cancel token to P2.
Next, P3 sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(2,3) but he has not re-
ceivedM(2,1). The TTP will apply R4, k
′
≥ k−1, therefore the TTP will send a cancel
token.
Following, P4 sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(3,4) but he has not
received M(3,1). Again, the TTP will apply R4. This time, the TTP will detect that P2
cheated ((k
′
= 1) < (k−1= 2)), but to maintain fairness for P3, it will send a cancel
token to P4.
We continue the abort-chaining attack until, P(N−1) contacts the TTP claiming he
has sent M((N−2),(N−1)) but he has not received M((N−2),1) . Applying R4, the TTP
will detect the malicious behaviour of {P2,P3, ...,P(N−3)}, but to maintain fairness
for P(N−2) it will deliver a cancel token to P(N−1). Now, PN , who is honest, contacts
the TTP claiming he has sent M((N−1),N) (his evidence of signature) but he has not
received M((N−1),1) (the message maybe lost due to a network error). Again, apply-
ing R4, the TTP will detect that P(N−2) cheated, but the TTP cannot prove P(N−1)
cheated, therefore it will send a cancel token to PN . In this situation we can have
two honest participants with contradictory evidence, PN has a cancel token from
the TTP, and P1 has the signature from all participants, therefore the protocol is
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not fair. But we can avoid the abort chaining attack if we add another transmission
M(N ,N) to the protocol.
Continuing the abort chaining attack, with the additional transmissions, wehave
two possibilities:
• PN is honest, therefore he will not send M(N ,N) because he already has evi-
dence the protocol is canceled. Therefore P1 will contact the TTP claiming he
has not receivedM(N ,N) and the TTP will send him a cancel token.
• PN is dishonest and delivers M(N ,N) to P1. P1 will have evidence of signature
from all the participants. If any of them tries to deny having signed the con-
tract, P1 can prove it showing the correspondingM(N ,i) .
In both situations fairness is maintained, therefore we can affirm that the mini-
mum number of transmissions required in a star topology is (2N −1)(N −1).
An AsynchronousOptimistic MPCS protocol using Sequential Topology
The table 2.11 shows the exchange sub-protocol. References to k or k
′
in the se-
quential topology rules for the TTP are not references to a sequential-round, but to
half-sequential-round. Each block in table 2.11 corresponds to a sequential-round
(P1 → PN → P1), and is composed of two half-sequential-rounds (P1 → PN , PN →
P1). The sub-indexes k of messages M(k ,i), indicate the number of half-sequential-
round.
In a protocol with sequential topology we have: PC = {P1, ...,P(N−1)}, i.e. all par-
ticipants except PN can cancel the protocol. When PN receives M(1,(N−1)) he has
enough evidence to prove that all participants are willing to sign the contract C . If
he does not want to sign the contract, he only has to discontinue the protocol exe-
cution. To apply R4, the TTP follows these statements:
• if ∃M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / (k
′
= k) or (k
′
= k−1 and i
′
< i ), the TTP will send a cancel
token to Pi to maintain fairness for the previous honest requesters.
• if ∀M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
< k−1, then P
i
′ cheated.
• if ∀M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
= k−1 and i
′
> i , then P
i
′ cheated.
Lemma 2.3 An asynchronous optimistic MPCS protocol, meeting the timeliness re-
quirement and using sequential topology, requires (N +1)(N −1) transmissions to be
fair.
Proof We have to distinguish situations with N even and N odd. We will start with
N even. Assume that (N + 1)(N − 1)− 1 messages are enough. We eliminate the
last transmission: M((N+1),(N−1)) , which means that PN has all evidence when he
receivesM((N−1),(N−1)) . With this assumption wewill start the abort chaining attack.
76
2.3. Optimal Solutions for Asynchronous Multi-Party Contract Signing in Different
Topologies
MPCS protocol with Sequential topology
1.1 P1 → P2: m(1,1) M(1,1)
1.2 P2 → P3: m(1,1),m(1,2) M(1,2)
. . .
1.(N −1) P(N−1) → PN : m(1,1),m(1,2), ...,m(1,(N−1)) M(1,(N−1))
1.(N −1)+1 PN → PN−1: m(1,N) M(2,N)
1.(N −1)+2 PN−1 → PN−2: m(1,N) ,m(1,(N−1)) M(2,(N−1))
. . .
1.2(N −1) P2 → P1: m(1,2),m(1,3), ...,m(1,N) M(2,2)
...
...
...
...
If N is EVEN
K .1 P1 → P2: m(K ,1) M((N+1),1)
K .2 P2 → P3: m(K ,1),m(K ,2) M((N+1),2)
. . .
K .(N −1) P(N−1) → PN : m(K ,1),m(K ,2), ...,m(K ,(N−1)) M((N+1),(N−1))
If N is ODD
K .1 P1 → P2: m(K ,1) M((N),1)
K .2 P2 → P3: m(K ,1),m(K ,2) M((N),2)
. . .
K .(N −1) P(N−1) → PN : m(K ,1),m(K ,2), ...,m(K ,(N−1)) M((N),(N−1))
K .(N −1)+1 PN → PN−1: m(K ,N) M((N+1),N)
K .(N −1)+2 PN−1 → PN−2: m(K ,N) ,m(K ,(N−1)) M((N+1),(N−1))
. . .
K .2(N −1) P2 → P1: m(K ,2),m(K ,3), ...,m(K ,N) M((N+1),2)
N = number of participants
K = ⌈(N +1)/2⌉
Table 2.11: Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS Protocol with Sequential Topology
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P2 sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(1,2) but he has not received
M(2,3). He is the first to contact the TTP, and therefore the TTP will apply R1: it will
cancel the protocol and deliver a cancel token to P2.
Next, P(N−1) sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(2,(N−1)) but he has
not received M(3,(N−2)). The TTP will apply R4 (k
′
= k −1 and i
′
< i ), therefore the
TTP will send a cancel token.
Following, P3 sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(3,3) but he has not
received M(4,4). Again, the TTP will apply R4. This time, the TTP will detect that P2
cheated (k
′
< k −1), but to maintain fairness for P(N−1), it will send a cancel token
to P3.
To build an abort-chaining attack, the cheating parties must contact the TTP in a
certain order. In particular: P2, P(N−1), P3, P(N−2), ..., P(N/2), P((N/2)+1).
Finally, P1 (honest participant) contacts the TTP claiming he has sentM((N−1),1) but
he has not received M(N ,2). Applying R4, the TTP will detect P(N/2) has cheated,
but to maintain fairness for P((N/2)+1) it will send a cancel token to P1. This situ-
ation is consistent with the fact that PN and P1 are honest, if we assume all other
participants cheated and continued the protocol execution, we have that an hon-
est participant, P1 has received cancel evidence from the TTP, and another hon-
est participant PN has received evidence that the contract has been signed by all
parties M((N−1),(N−1)) . The protocol is not fair. But if we add the last transmission,
M((N+1),(N−1)) , we can avoid the abort-chaining attack.
Continuing the previous execution, with the additional transmissions, we have two
possibilities:
• If P1 is honest, he will not send M((N+1),1) , therefore PN will send a resolution
request to the TTP claiming the missing evidence. The TTP will be able to
prove that P((N/2)+1) cheated, but again, to maintain fairness for the honest
participants (P1) it will send a cancel token to PN .
• If P1 is dishonest, and all other dishonest participants continue with the pro-
tocol execution, PN will receiveM((N+1),(N−1)) , therefore hewill have evidence
the contract has been signed.
Nowwewill prove the case with N odd. Assume that (N+1)(N −1)−1messages
are enough, we eliminate the last transmission: M((N+1),2) , which means that P1
has all evidence when he receivesM((N−1),2) . With this assumption we will start the
abort chaining attack.
P(N−1) sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(1,(N−1)) but he has not
receivedM(2,N) . He is the first to contact the TTP, therefore the TTP will apply R1: it
will cancel the protocol and deliver a cancel token to P(N−1).
Next, PN sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(2,N) but he has not re-
ceived M(3,(N−1)) . The TTP will apply R4, (k
′
= k −1 and i
′
< i ), therefore the TTP
will send a cancel token.
Following, P(N−3) sends a resolution request claiming he has sent M(3,(N−3)) but he
has not received M(4,(N−2)) . Again, the TTP will apply R4. This time, the TTP will
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detect that P(N−1) cheated (k
′
< k−1), but to maintain fairness for PN , it will send a
cancel token to P(N−3).
We continue the abort chaining attack in the following order: {P(N−1), PN , P(N−3),
P(N−2), ..., P2, P3}.
Finally, P3 contacts the TTP claiming he has sent M((N−1),3) but he has not received
M(N ,2). Applying R4, the TTP will detect P4 has cheated, but tomaintain fairness for
P2 it will send a cancel token to P3. This situation is consistent with the fact that P3
and P1 are honest, we have that an honest participant, P3 has received cancel evi-
dence from the TTP, and another honest participant P1 has received evidence that
the contract has been signed by all parties,M((N−1),2). The protocol is not fair. But if
we add the last transmission, M((N+1),1), we can avoid the abort-chaining attack.
Continuing the previous execution, with the additional transmissions, we have two
possibilities:
• If P3 is honest, he will not send M((N+1),3) , therefore P1 will send a resolution
request to the TTP claiming the missing evidence. The TTP will be able to
prove that P2 cheated, but again, to maintain fairness for the honest partici-
pants (P3) it will send a cancel token to P1.
• If P3 is dishonest, and all other dishonest participants continue with the pro-
tocol execution, P1 will receiveM((N+1),2), therefore he will have evidence the
contract has been signed.
In both situations, with N even and N odd, the protocol meets the weak fair-
ness requirement. Thereforewe can affirm that a sequential protocol requires (2N−
1)(N −1) transmissions to be fair.
An Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS protocol usingMesh Topology
The table 2.13 shows the exchange sub-protocol. In the mesh topology, all partici-
pants can cancel the protocol: PC = {P1, ...,PN }, in TTP’s R1. Regarding the detec-
tion of cheating users, R4 for a mesh topology states:
• if ∃M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
≥ k−1, the TTPwill send a cancel token to Pi tomaintain
fairness for the previous honest requests.
• if ∀M(k ′ ,i ′ ) ∈MR / k
′
< k−1, then P
i
′ cheated.
Lemma 2.4 An asynchronous optimistic MPCS protocol with mesh topology, meet-
ing the timeliness requirement, requires N2(N −1) transmissions to be fair.
Proof We will prove it by contradiction. Assume that N2(N −1)−1 transmissions
are enough, PN does not send m(N ,N) to P(N−1). Which means that P(N−1) has all
the evidence when he receives {m(N ,1), m(N ,2) , ...,m(N ,(N−1)) , m((N−1),N)}. Now we
will construct the abort-chaining attack.
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Protocol Topology Transmissions∗ N=3 4 5 6 7 8
⋆ ring (N +1)(N −1) 8 15 24 35 48 63
⋆ star (2N −1)(N −1) 10 21 36 55 78 105
[19] star 4(N −1)(N +2) 40 72 112 160 216 280
⋆ sequential (N +1)(N −1) 8 15 24 35 48 63
[21] sequential (⌈N/2⌉+1)2(N −1) 12 18 32 40 60 70
⋆ mesh N2(N −1) 18 48 100 180 294 448
[19] mesh N (N +1)(N −1) 24 60 120 210 336 504
⋆Our proposal.
N, number of participants.
∗ optimistic case, the TTP does not intervene in the protocol execution, and
N −1malicious participants assumed.
Table 2.12: Efficiency of Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS Protocols
MPCS protocol withMesh topology
1 Pi → P j (N−1): m(1,i)
2 Pi → P j (N−1): m(2,i)
. . .
(N −1) Pi → P j (N−1): m((N−1),i)
N Pi → P j (N−1): m(N ,i)
N = number of participants and rounds; i , j ∈ [1..N ]; j 6= i
Table 2.13: Asynchronous Optimistic MPCS Protocol with Mesh Topology
P1 sends a resolution request to the TTP, claiming he has sent m(1,1) to all parties
but he is missing some m(1,i) (i ∈ [1..N ], i 6= 1). He is the first to contact the TTP,
therefore according to rule R1, the TTP will send a cancel token to P1.
Next, P2 sends a resolution request to the TTP, claiming he has sent m(2,2) to all
parties but he is missing some m(2,i) (i ∈ [1..N ], i 6= 2). The protocol execution has
already been canceled, therefore the TTP applies R4, k
′
≥ k −1 , and it will send a
cancel token to P2.
Following, P3 sends a resolution request to the TTP, claiming he has sentm(3,3) to all
parties but he is missing somem(3,i) (i ∈ [1..N ], i 6= 3). Applying R4, the TTP detects
that P1 cheated: (k
′
= 1) < (k−1 = 2). But P3’s claim is coherent with the one from
P2. Therefore, to guarantee fairness for P2 the TTP will deliver a cancel token to P3.
We can continue the abort-chaining until P(N−2) sends a resolution request to the
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TTP, claiming hehas sentm((N−2),(N−2)) to all parties but he ismissing somem((N−2),i )
(i ∈ [1..N ], i 6= (N −2)). Applying rule R4, the TTP detects that PN−4 cheated, but to
maintain fairness for PN−3, the TTP sends a cancel token to P(N−2).
Finally, PN sends a resolution request to the TTP, claiming he has sent m((N−1),N)
(evidence ofPN ’s signature for P(N−1)) to all parties but he ismissing somem((N−1),i)
(i ∈ [1..N ], i 6= (N−1),N ). Again, the TTP applies R4 and detects that P(N−3) cheated,
but to maintain fairness for P(N−2) it will send a cancel token to PN . If the protocol
ends here, we have that PN , honest participant, has evidence that the contract sig-
nature has been canceled, but P(N−1), also honest, has evidence proving the con-
tract has been signed, {m(N ,1) ,m(N ,2), ...,m(N ,(N−1)) ,m((N−1),N)} (the cheating partic-
ipants continue the protocol execution), therefore the protocol is not fair. But if we
restore PN ’s last transmission to P(N−1), we can avoid the abort-chaining attack.
Continuing the previous chain, with the additional transmissions, we have two pos-
sibilities:
• If PN is honest, he will not send m(N ,N) , therefore P(N−1) will send a resolu-
tion request to the TTP claiming the missing evidence. The TTP will be able
to prove that P(N−2) cheated, but again, to maintain fairness for the honest
participants (PN ) it will send a cancel token to P(N−1).
• If PN is dishonest, and all other dishonest participants continue with the pro-
tocol execution, P(N−1) will receive allm(N ,i) , therefore he will have evidence
the contract has been signed.
In both cases the weak fairness is met. Therefore we can affirm that the minimum
number of transmissions a mesh protocol needs to be fair is N2(N −1).
2.3.5 Protocol Comparison
In table 2.12 we can compare the efficiency of our proposals and some of the most
relevant presented in the related work (we eluded proposals that have been proved
flawed). In section 2.3.2 we have given a definition of message and transmission to
avoid confusions (a transmission can include several messages). From the results
we can affirm that, regarding the number of transmissions needed, the ring and
sequential topologies aremore efficient than star andmesh topologies. Within each
topology, our proposals are the most efficient, in particular, the solutions with ring
and sequential topology. They only require (N +1)(N −1) transmissions.
Following we will explain how we have calculated the number of transmissions
for the proposals from Baum-Waidner et al.’s [19] and Mukhamedov et al. [21].
Baum-Waidner et al.’s [19] describes the cost of their proposal in number of mes-
sages. Their use of the term message matches our definition of transmission (see
section 2.3.2). We calculated the number of transmissions from their description of
the cost of each protocol:
• mesh topology: (N − 1)+ 2 rounds, N (N − 1) transmissions each round →
N (N −1)(N +1)
81
2. DIGITAL SIGNATURE OF CONTRACTS
• star topology: 2(N−1)+6 rounds, 2(N−1) transmissions each round→ 4(N−
1)(N +2)
In its paper, Mukhamedov et al. [21] present a formula to calculate the number of
messages. They use the term message as we have defined it in section 2.3.2. Since
we are comparing the number of transmissions, we have calculated this number
from their description of the protocol: (⌈N/2⌉+1) rounds, 2(N −1) transmissions
each round.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter of the dissertation, some contributions related to digital signature
of contracts as a fair exchange application have been presented. On one hand this
chapter presents two asynchronous optimistic protocols for new digital signature
scenarios, the Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) scenario (section 2.1) and the Agent
Mediated Scenario (AMS) (section 2.2). In an AM2P scenario, we have N parties (1
consumer, C , and N − 1 providers, Pi ) distributed as a set of (N − 1) pairs of par-
ties {C ,P1}, {C ,P2}..., {C ,P(N−1)}, that want to sign a set of (N − 1) contracts {M1,
M2,...,M(N−1)} pairwise, i.e., C and P1 want to sign the contract M1, C and P2 the
contract M2, etc. But C does not want to send her signature unless she has as-
surance she will receive all signatures from P1, ...,P(N−1) , neither Pi wants to send
his signature unless he receives C ′s signature on the contract Mi . Whereas in an
AMS scenario we have a consumer that initiates a transaction contacting a provi-
der, but to fulfil the consumer’s request, this provider may need contact nK differ-
ent providers, and in turn, each of these providers may need to contact another
set of providers. Thus, we end up creating a chain of exchanges where the links
should be fair exchanges. Despite there aremany researchworks related to fair pro-
tocols for digital signature of contracts, these two scenarioswere not solved yet. The
presented AM2P and AMS protocols are the first of their kind to meet all the core
requirements defined in section 1.2 (effectiveness, weak fairness, timeliness, and
non-repudiation) and two additional requirements, confidentiality and verifiability
of the TTP. Moreover, the AMS protocol also meets a specific security requirement;
traceability.
On the other hand, this chapter of the dissertation reviews some common terms
and definitions used in previous works about MPCS protocols and defines a com-
mon ground, clarifying some differences. In particular, it describes the four most
commonly used topologies (ring, star, sequential and mesh), and for each one it
clearly defines the terms message and round, typically used to measure efficiency,
and introduces the term transmission, which we suggest should be used for effi-
ciency measures instead of the term round or message. Using a common approach
for the design of optimistic asynchronous MPCS protocols (the exchange of sev-
eral commitments/promises of signature among the participants in order to gen-
erate enough evidence to ensure fairness), we propose an optimistic asynchronous
MPCS protocol for each topology. Each proposal meets with the core security re-
quirements for optimistic asynchronousMPCS protocols (as defined in section 1.2).
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Moreover, we prove that these proposals are optimal: the number of transmissions
required by each protocol is the minimum needed to maintain fairness, therefore
we also define a new set of lower-bounds, minimum number of transmissions, for
each topology.
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CERTIFIED ELECTRONICMAIL (CEM)
This chapter is dedicated to the application of fair exchange to Certified Electronic
Mail (CEM) protocols. In particular, the work presented here focuses on the inte-
gration of CEM protocols into the existent Internet e-mail infrastructure. Section
3.1 presents the security requirements for optimistic CEM protocols with multiple
MTAs, which includes the core fair exchange requirements, some additional ones
and an specific one for CEM protocols. In Section 3.2 we review the previous work
on CEMprotocols. Following, two optimistic protocols withmultiple MTAs are pre-
sented, sections 3.4 and 3.5. In one case, it is assumed that all MTAs are untrusted,
the first proposal of this kind, while in the second protocol, it is assumed that each
user trusts his own MTA. Moreover, the protocol flow follows a similar approach
than traditional e-mail when delivering (SMTP) and retrieving (Post Office Protocol
- Version 3 (POP3) or Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP)) messages.
3.1 Requirements
CEM services and security requirements found in the literature are reviewed by
Ferrer-Gomila et al. [33]. The list of these requirements depends on the definition
of the CEM service, which is clear, from Ferrer-Gomila et al. [33] and Tauber [53],
that there is no general consensus on this definition. However, a CEM protocol is a
subset of the fair exchange protocols family. Therefore, an optimistic CEM protocol
must comply with the fair exchange requirements, defined in section 1.2. Moreover,
as in our protocol architecture we have MTAs between a sender and a recipient, we
require the following non-repudiation services: origin, submission, delivery and re-
ceipt (as stated by Onieva et al. [54]).
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Kremer and Markowitch [55] added a new requirement specific to CEM pro-
tocols, no author based selective receipt, which states that once the recipient knows
the identity of the sender, he cannot prevent the delivery of the CEM, i.e., the sender
will receive the non-repudiation of receipt evidence. This requirement is an exten-
sion from the nomessage based selective receipt, which states that once the recipient
knows the message content, he cannot prevent its delivery. Consider the situation
where a person is in debt and receives a certifiedmail. He may guess the content of
the delivery beforehand and thus refuse its acceptance. In our case, we will take a
more certified-mail-like approach, adding the non-selective receipt as requirement.
The certified mail focus on the no message based selective receipt requirement, if a
recipient asks the identity of the sender, the postmanwill tell himwho is the sender,
but not the content of the message. Considering the particularization of core and
additional requirements, and the necessity of an specific one, next we list and de-
fine the security requirements for optimistic CEM protocols with multiple MTAs:
Definition 3.1 (CEM Effectiveness) If every party behaves correctly, the CEM will be
delivered without TTP’s intervention: the recipient will be able to read the message
received, and the sender will have proof of it.
Definition 3.2 (CEM Fairness) At the end of aCEMexchange, every honest partywill
have their expected items. The honest recipient will have the means to obtain the
plainmessage, and proof of its origin, while the honest sender will have proof of hav-
ing submitted the message, and proof that the recipient has received it. Otherwise no
one will have advantage over the other party, i.e., the sender cannot prove the recipi-
ent has received the CEM, and the recipient cannot access the plain message.
Definition 3.3 (CEM Timeliness) Every party involved in a CEM exchange can be
sure that this exchange will end in a finite amount of time and, once the protocol
has finished, fairness will be maintained.
Definition 3.4 (CEMNon-Repudiation) In a CEM delivery involving a sender, her
mail transfer agent, a recipient and his mail transfer agent, no one can deny being
involved or can be excluded from having participated. In particular, we have the
following non-repudiation services:
Origin (NRO) The sender cannot deny having originated a CEM.
Submission (NRS) The sender’s MTA cannot deny having received a CEM from the
sender.
Delivery (NRD) The recipient’s MTA cannot deny having received a CEM.
Receipt (NRR) A recipient cannot deny having received a CEM.
Additional requirements met by our CEM protocols:
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Definition 3.5 (CEM Verifiability of TTP) If the TTP misbehaves resulting in a pos-
sible loss of fairness for an honest participant, this participant can prove the TTP’s
misbehaviour.
Definition 3.6 (CEMConfidentiality) The content of a CEM is available only to the
sender and the recipient.
Finally, we have one specific requirement for our CEM protocols:
Definition 3.7 (Non-Selective Receipt) Once the recipient knows he has received a
CEM, he cannot prevent its delivery.
3.2 RelatedWork
Even though OpenPGP (Pretty Good Privacy [56]) and S/MIME (Secure Multipur-
pose InternetMail Extensions [57]) provide confidentiality, integrity and authentic-
ity to Internet e-mail, the lack of a fair exchange standard proposal still remains.
The Internet community has tried to fill this gap with the receipting mechanisms of
Delivery Status Notifications (DSN [58]), Message Disposition Notifications (MDN
[59, 60]), SMTP service extensions [61] as well as S/MIME receipts [62]. However,
none of these mechanisms makes use of a TTP and thus each one relies on fairly
acting recipients. Therefore, dispute resolutions are hard to carry out since each
party can deny having participated in the communication.
Since a decade, governments, postal services and private companies are thus
putting custom certified mail systems into operation on the Internet. Tauber [53]
has assessed and evaluated dominant certifiedmail systems and standards with re-
spect to their security properties. Interestingly, all systems in operation are using
inline TTPs, whereas the research community is focusing on optimistic approaches.
There is a simple reason for that: even though optimistic approaches are more ef-
ficient and require less trust in TTPs, high interactivity between the sender and re-
cipient, as well as changes in the sending and receiving environment (e.g. e-mail
client plug-ins) make them harder to deploy in practice.
The scientific community is working since the late 1980s on secure protocols for
the Fair Exchange family, including protocols for CEM applications. The vastmajor-
ity of proposals for CEM protocols assume that senders and recipients can commu-
nicate directly, without intermediaries. Among them we find proposals with online
TTP [63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68], and optimistic ones [69, 70, 71, 72, 55, 68, 73, 74, 40, 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86]. Butmost of themdonotmeet the TTP’s verifi-
ability requirement. Moreover, the assumption of a direct communication between
sender and receiver does not fit with the general e-mail architecture, where senders
and recipients communicate through intermediaries asynchronously. Therefore,
we cannot consider them as useful solutions for CEM. Following, we briefly review
some of these protocols.
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Schenier and Riordan [64] proposed a protocol where the keys to decipher the
messages are published in publicly available forums, which requires them to be to-
tally trusted. Abadi et al. [65] approach does not require a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI), and no software installation is required on the recipient’s side. Permpoon-
tanalarp and Kanokkanjanapong [66] solution is based on Abadi et al. [65] proto-
col, and they further enhance it adding protection to Denial of Service attacks, and
measures to penalize the selective receipt ofmessages, to the point where recipients
cannot receivemessages anymore. The authors refer to this property as undeniable
fairness.
Ferrer-Gomila et al. [69] presented an efficient certified e-mail protocol requir-
ing only three steps to deliver a certified e-mail. Their proposal was reviewed by
Monteiro and Dahab [70], who proposed a fix. But in a later paper, Wang et al. [71]
exposed some weaknesses and security flaws that could affect both proposals ([69]
and [70]). Mut and Ferrer-Gomila [72] presented an optimistic protocol which uses
a group of TTPs, where the resolution decisions are made by majority vote of the
TTPs. Kremer and Markowitch [55] major contribution is the definition of a new
property for certified e-mail: no-author based selective receipt. In order to meet
this new property, their proposal requires a TTP to provide anonymity to the sender,
thus it is not entirely optimistic. Imamoto an Sakurai [68] solution with online TTP
has the particularity that is the receiver who chooses the TTP.
Ateniese andNita-Rotaru [74] andNenadic et al. [75] proposed optimistic proto-
cols with transparent TTP. Their solutions are based on different forms of Verifiable
and Recoverable Encrypted Signatures (VRES) [87, 88]. Ma et al. [77] showed that
Nenadic et al. [75] protocol does not meet fairness, and proposed a fix. But later,
Hwang and Lai [82] reviewed Ma et al. [77] protocol, exposing some weaknesses,
and presented a solution. Wang et al. [79] use Convertible Signatures to obtain TTP
transparency in their optimistic certified e-mail protocol.
Ferrer-Gomila et al. [73], Onieva et al. [89] and Zhou [76] proposed optimistic
multi-party protocols. In a multi-party CEM protocol, we have a sender and a set
of recipients. Ferrer-Gomila et al. [73] proposed a protocol where the sender could
notify a set of recipients (the same message to each recipient), but only those who
acknowledged the receptionof themessage could have access to its content. Onieva
et al. [89] proposal is an extension of Micali’s [90] two-party fair exchange protocol,
allowing a sender to deliver the same certified message to several recipients. Zhou
[76] exposed some security flaws in Ferrer-Gomila et al.’s [73] multi-party certified
e-mail protocol, and proposed an improved version fixing the weaknesses detected.
Oppliger and Stadlin [78] proposed a certifiedmail system for the Internet based
on an online TTP, which uses dual signatures to cryptographically link keys to the
corresponding certified mail messages. Cao et al. [80] based their optimistic pro-
tocol in the use of bilinear pairing [91]. Cederquist et al. [81] proposed a certified
e-mail protocol using key-chains [92]. A key-chain is a sequence of keys, where
these keys are the result of executing a hash function on the previous key. Later, Liu
et al. [67] presented an enhanced version of Cederquist et al. [81] protocol, which
solves a security flaw and adds TTP transparency using a VRES scheme [93]. Wang
et al. [83, 85] proposals are based on signcryption [94].
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Blundo et al. [86] present a certified e-mail protocol with an offline trusted TTP
and a Time Stamp Server (TSS). Their proposal meets the fairness, non-repudiation
and timeliness requirements, but fails to address the verifiability of the TTP and the
non-selective receipt (a description of the message content is included in the initial
protocol steps).
There are, though, some proposals for CEM that assume sender and recipient
communicate through some kind of intermediary [95, 96, 97, 98, 99], either a TTP,
a trusted agent or a semi-trusted one. The term semi-trusted was first introduced
by Franklin and Reiter [100], referring to a TTP that can misbehave but not collude
with other entities. These solutions [95, 96, 97, 98, 99] are more interesting from a
practical point of view because their architecture resembles to the general e-mail
one. Following we will describe these proposals and we will explain why they are
not a proper solution for the CEM service.
Bahreman and Tygar [95] proposed 2 different CEM protocols, one with inline
TTP (B-CEM) and the other one without TTP (S-CEM). In the B-CEM proposal the
sender uses an inline TTP, the Postmaster, to deliver CEMs. It provides non-repudia-
tion of origin, submission and receipt evidence, but it fails tomeet the non-selective
receipt, verifiability of the TTP, and confidentiality requirements. Moreover, fair-
ness depends on the assumption that the TTP cannot misbehave and there are no
network failures. Even though the authors recommend that messages exchanged
should beMIME compliant, it cannot be easily deployed on the existent Internet e-
mail architecture where senders and recipients can be registered with different mail
providers, and thesemail providers should not be consideredTTPs. The S-CEMpro-
posal assumes that senders and recipients have equal computational power, which
is unrealistic.
Zhou and Gollman [96] proposed a protocol where a CEM is delivered through
a set of delivery agents. The protocol provides evidence of submission, delivery and
receipt, but fairness is not addressed. Moreover, it relies on the honest behaviour of
users and delivery agents.
With their TRICERT protocol, Ateniese et al. [97] proposed an optimistic pro-
tocol, which makes use of an offline TTP and a unique semi-trusted postal agent,
which acts as a proxy between the sender and the recipient to ensure a fair ex-
change. However, from a trust point of view, the protocol is more beneficial for
the sender since she can choose the postal agent. Further, by looking at the decen-
tralized Internet e-mail system, this approach cannot be easily deployed on top of
the existing architecture for e-mail. Senders and recipients can be registered with
different mail providers, thus a protocol with at least two mail transfer agents is re-
quired. Park and Cho [98] enhanced the TRICERT protocol adding a delivery dead-
line to avoid indefinite delays on the e-mail delivery. Neither Ateniese et al.’s [97]
nor Park and Cho’s [98] solutions meet the verifiability of TTP requirement, thus in
case of dispute, fairness relies on the TTP’s good will.
Liu et al. [99] presented an optimistic CEM protocol based on the current e-mail
infrastructure. Their approach is the most practical, using Mail User Agents (MUA)
as client applications and Mail Transfer Agents (MTA) as intermediaries (each par-
ticipant chooses his own). However, to solve recovery protocol requests, the TTP
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requires contacting the end-users, which is not practical. As Ateniese et al. [97],
Liu et al. [99] assume that the TTP and the sender’s MTA are trusted entities, i.e.,
they cannot cheat. Moreover, the recipient’s MTA is also trusted, none of the MTAs
(sender and recipient) is verifiable, and the protocol does not provide the necessary
non-repudiation services.
3.3 Certified Electronic Mail Overview
This section presents an overview of the CEM proposals. The proposal with un-
trusted MTAs is described in section 3.4 and the proposal with trusted MTA in sec-
tion 3.5. Figure 3.1 sketches the entities and sub-protocols involved in the propos-
als. As we can see, a CEM protocol consists of a delivery sub-protocol and a set of
resolution sub-protocols. If all the participants behave honestly the TTP will not
intervene, and only the delivery sub-protocol will be executed. To solve the pos-
sible claims devised from a problematic delivery of a CEM, we use the resolution
sub-protocols. In the CEM architecture three different entities can be distinguished
(figure 3.1):
• UAX The User Agent is the end user’s application. A user agent can behave as
sender (UAS) and/or recipient (UAR).
• MTAY The Mail Transfer Agent is an entity who offers e-mail services, and
in particular CEM services. We can distinguish the sender’s MTA, the MTAS ,
and the recipient’s MTA, theMTAR .
• TTP The Trusted Third Party is an external entity to the conventional trans-
ferring e-mail system that guarantees fairness for the CEM service.
Typically when describing protocols where two participants are involved, we re-
fer to them as Alice and Bob (A and B). Hence, even though the user agents (UAX )
andmail transfer agents (MTAY ) are software entities, to ease the protocol descrip-
tion we will assign different gender to sender (she) and recipient (he) entities, while
the TTP will remain neutral (it).
Following there is a list of assumptions common to both CEM protocol propos-
als:
• The TTP is a semi-trusted entity, as defined by Franklin and Reiter [100]: it
can misbehave but it cannot collude with other parties.
• The communication channel between user agents and mail transfer agents,
and between mail transfer agents are unreliable (messages can be lost), and
they are resilient between the TTP and the participants (messages can be de-
layed, but they will arrive).
• TheUAS has knowledge of the recipient’s e-mail address, and his public key
PKUAR (key management is not addressed).
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Figure 3.1: CEM Architecture
To simplify the protocol description, we have explicitly omitted the references to
some values as the e-mail recipient’s address, the identity of entities (we can assume
that it is embedded in the signature), a delivery identifier, etc. In some messages,
though, we have added a string to help identify the type of message (see table 3.4,
e.g., “LIST ", “CANCEL", etc.).
3.3.1 Evidence Generation
During a CEM protocol execution several evidence will be generated. The aim of a
CEM protocol is to exchange an encrypted message and its corresponding decryp-
tion key, for an evidence proving the recipient is able to read the message. Table 3.1
describes the general nomenclature used along the protocols, and the composition
of the evidence and the affidavit (evidence generated by the TTP). Following we list
and describe these evidence (see its use and time of generation in the correspond-
ing protocol description, sections 3.4 and 3.5):
K−NRO Non-Repudiation of Origin (NRO) plus Key (PKUAS (k)). Both values are
generated by the UAS. The NRO is an evidence proving that the UAS has
generated the CEM. The Key is not an evidence by itself; it is the symmetric
key used to encrypt the CEM (Ek (C )). To maintain confidentiality, this value
k is encrypted with theUAR ’s public key, therefore only theUAR will be able
to open it. It is the only evidence that the TTP is not able to generate.
NRS Non-Repudiation of Submission. This evidence is created by the MTAS when
she receives a new CEM submission from theUAS . It proves that theUAS has
sent a new CEM, and that her MTA has received it.
NRK Non-Repudiation of Knowledge. This evidence is generated by theUAR when
he receives a new CEM. It proves that theUAR knows he has a new CEM.
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tD Deadline for the intervention of the TTP.
Ek (C ) The encryption of message C using symmetric key k.
PKUAR (k) The encryption of symmetric key k usingUAR ’s public key.
SX [m] The signature of X on the hash of messagem.
NRO SUAS [Ek (C ),PKUAR (k),LTSNRO , tD ]
NRS SMTAS [Ek (C ),LTSNRO ,LTSNRS , tD ]
NRK SUAR [Ek (C ),LTSNRO ,LTSNRK , tD ]
NRS
′
SMTAS [PKUAR (k),NRO,LTSNRS′ ]
NRD SMTAR [Ek (C ),PKUAR (k),LTSNRO ,LTSNRD , tD ]
NRR SUAR [Ek (C ),PKUAR (k),LTSNRO ,LTSNRR , tD ]
K −NRO SUAS [PKUAR (k),NRO]
NRSTTP STTP [Ek (C ),LTSNRO ,LTSNRS , tD ]
NRKTTP STTP [Ek (C ),LTSNRO ,LTSNRK , tD ]
NRS
′
TTP
STTP [PKUAR (k),NRO,LTSNRS′ ]
NRDTTP STTP [Ek (C ),PKUAR (k),LTS(NRO,NRD) , tD ]
NRRTTP STTP [Ek (C ),PKUAR (k),LTS(NRO,NRR) , tD ]
cemA Ek(C ),LTSNRO , tD
cemB PKUAR (k),NRO
LTSEV Local TimeStamp for evidence EV (NRO,NRK ,etc.).
N −NRK STTP [Ek (C ),LTSNRO , tD ,“CANCEL"] evidence
of delivery canceled
NACK SX [request ,“NACK "] signature of X on the request
received with a not acknowledgement
SY NCHRS[X ] SY NCHRS containing message X
Table 3.1: Evidence and General Notation used along the CEM Protocols
NRS
′
Non-Repudiation of Key Submission. TheMTAS generates this evidencewhen
she receives the K −NRO from theUAS . It proves theUAS has delivered the
K −NRO to theMTAS , and that theMTAS has received it.
NRD Non-Repudiation of Delivery. Evidence generated by the MTAR when he re-
ceives the K −NRO from theMTAS . It proves the K −NRO has arrived to the
recipient’s inbox (MTAR ).
NRR Non-Repudiation of Receipt. Evidence generated by theUAR , stating that he
has received the non-repudiation of origin NRO, and the key to decipher the
encrypted CEM, i.e., the K −NRO.
SYNCHRS Synchronization Response. It is generated by the MTAs as response to a
synchronization request SY NCHRQ . It states the time atwhich users checked
92
3.3. Certified Electronic Mail Overview
their CEM inbox, and the content of the response received.
Affidavit If the TTP receives enough information it can generate affidavits (evi-
dences signed by the TTP, see table 3.1) of all evidence except the K −NRO.
A CEM is represented as a set of information. It is composed of the content mes-
sageC encrypted with the symmetric key k, a timestamp, the delivery deadline, the
key k encrypted with theUAR ’s public key and the non-repudiation of origin:
CEM = {Ek(C ),LTSNRO , tD ,PKUAR (k),NRO} = cemA +cemB
3.3.2 Some Remarks on the Delivery of a CEM
Following a similar approach than traditional e-mail, the User Agent (UA) receives
the messages and evidence from their MTA by executing a synchronization opera-
tion: LIST and FETCH in IMAP [101], LIST and RETR in POP3 [102]. This operation
is executed on a regular basis (asynchronously), and its objective is to fetch new
CEM and evidence from the MTA. These operations will be referred as synchro-
nization requests (SY NCHRQ ) and synchronization responses (SY NCHRS). Even
though in figures 3.2 and 3.3 the messages follow a sequence from message 1 to
message N, the messages related to synchronization operations are not part of a
sequence, because they are executed at the UA’s will (as in traditional e-mail). It
means that the UAS may execute the SY NCHRQ many times before getting any
evidence.
In a same way, an extension of the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP [103])
can be defined to submit and forward CEMs. In order to deliver a CEM, sender and
receiver must be registered to enhanced MTAs (offering CEM services), and use en-
hanced UAs (supporting CEM services). The possible intermediary MTAs (between
theMTAS andMTAR ) can be regular e-mail servers, because they will just forward
the messages received.
3.3.3 Behaviour of the TTP
The resolution sub-protocols are a set of claims (the participants claim they have
not received some evidence) that all participants can make (UAs and MTAs), di-
rected to the TTP, and its corresponding responses. To solve the claims, the TTP
is able to contact the mail transfer agents (MTAS and/or MTAR ), but not the user
agents (UAS and/orUAR). This decision increases the complexity of the protocol,
but from a practical point of view it increases its feasibility. The MTAs are server
entities (they offer CEM services), while the UAs are client entities, therefore we
can assume that the MTAs will be online always, while the UAs will only be online
when they are executing an operation (sending or retrievingmessages): they are not
servers.
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3.3.4 Some Remarks on theMail Transfer Agent (MTA)
Notice that even the MTAs are untrusted, they are allowed to contact the TTP and
request evidence. This may seem a contradiction: if we do not trust the MTAs,
then why should we “trust" they are going to contact the TTP when the delivery
sub-protocol is interrupted? Moreover, from a security point of view, the MTAs are
not needed. We can take a protocol designed with direct communication between
sender and recipient and encapsulate the information they exchange within an e-
mail message, as Blundo et al. [86] did. The rationale behind this decision is the
same that we followed when we decided which participants can be contacted by
the TTP (section 3.3.3): increase the protocol’s feasibility, by integrating it with the
e-mail service and by protecting the honest MTAs. On one hand, the traditional
e-mail service is well-known, users are familiar with it. On the other hand, the ob-
jective of anMTA is to deliver messages, therefore when the delivery sub-protocol is
interrupted, an honest MTA will be able to contact the TTP and finish the delivery
(fulfilling its duties).
3.3.5 Delivery Deadline tD and Local TimeStamps
We establish a delivery deadline tD that is a value indicating a time limit for the
delivery of a CEM. In particular, it states the limit for the TTP’s intervention, gener-
ating new evidence. When theUAS initiates the delivery sub-protocol she chooses a
tD , according to the message content or some other criteria. Therefore, at any time
t < tD during the delivery sub-protocol execution, any party can contact the TTP to
ask for resolution (sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.3). After t ≥ tD the TTP will only issue evi-
dence coherent with the decisions it took during t < tD , i.e, the TTP will not contact
any MTA to solve the requests, it will only use the evidence collected and/or gen-
erated before tD . Knowing tD , theUAS andUAR are responsible of contacting the
TTP at t < tD in case they do not have all their evidence. Otherwise they risk losing
fairness.
The Local TimeStamps (LTSNRO , LTSNRS , ...) are values stating the time at
which the evidence were created (stated by its generator). In case we need stronger
assertions, a TimeStamp Authority should be used to sign the timestamp evidence.
Regarding clock synchronization, we will assume that the TTP’s clock is the refer-
ence.
3.4 Optimistic CEMProtocol with UntrustedMail Transfer Agents
In the next sections (3.4.1 and 3.4.2) we present the first proposal of an optimistic
CEM protocol to consider multiple and untrusted MTAs. As it is described in figure
3.1, the protocol consists of a delivery sub-protocol (section 3.4.1), and a set of res-
olution sub-protocols (section 3.4.2). Finally, in section 3.4.3 we review the security
requirements presented in section 3.2. Besides the commonassumptions explained
in section 3.3, the CEM protocol with untrusted MTAs assumes the following:
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UAS MTAS MTAR UAR
M1 {cemA}
M2 {NRS}
M3 {cemA}
M4
M5 {cemA}
M6 {NRK }
M7 {NRK }
M8
M9 {NRK }
M10 {cemB }
M11 {NRS
′
}
M12 {K −NRO}
M13 {NRD}
M14
M15 {K −NRO}
M16 {NRR}
M17 {NRR}
M18
M19 {NRD, NRR}
SYNCH
SYNCH
SYNCH
SYNCH
Mx {Y }: Message number x delivers evidence Y
P
H
A
SE
1
P
H
A
SE
2
Figure 3.2: CEM Delivery Sub-Protocol (Untrusted Mail Transfer Agent (MTA))
• TheMTAS ,MTAR and the possible MTAs intermediaries are untrusted enti-
ties. They canmisbehave and collude with other parties.
3.4.1 Delivery Sub-Protocol
In figure 3.2 and table 3.2 we describe the protocol execution flow and the content
of the messages. A CEM is delivered in two phases. In the first phase (messages 1
to 9), theUAS and theUAR exchange the encrypted CEM for evidence proving the
UAR has received it, i.e., he knows he has received a new CEM. In the second phase
(messages 10 to 19), they exchange the key to decrypt the CEM content and the non-
repudiation of origin for evidence proving theUAR has received it, i.e., he is able to
open the CEM and knows who has sent it. The rationale behind these two phases is
to allow theUAS to send a CEM using untrusted intermediaries, the MTAs, and to
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Delivery Sub-Protocol
M1 =m1,SUAS [m1] wherem1 = Ek (C ),LTSNRO , tD
M2 =m2,SMTAS [m2] wherem2 = LTSNRS ,NRS
M3 =m3,SMTAS [m3] wherem3 = Ek (C ),LTSNRO , tD
M4 =m4,SUAR [m4] wherem4 = “LIST", LTSRQ = SY NCHRQ
M5 =m5,SMTAR [m5] wherem5 = LTS(RQ ,RS,NRO),Ek (C ), tD
M6 =m6,SUAR [m6] wherem6 = LTSNRK ,NRK
M7 =m7,SMTAR [m7] wherem7 = LTSNRK ,NRK
M8 =m8,SUAS [m8] wherem8 = SY NCHRQ
M9 =m9,SMTAS [m9] wherem9 = LTSNRK ,NRK
M10=m10,SUAS [m10] wherem10 = PKUAR (k),NRO
M11=m11,SMTAS [m11] wherem11 = LTSNRS′ ,NRS
′
M12=m12,SMTAS [m12] wherem12 =m10,SUAS [m10]
M13=m13,SMTAR [m13] wherem13 = LTSNRD ,NRD
M14=m14,SUAR [m14] wherem14 = SY NCHRQ
M15=m15,SMTAR [m15] wherem15 = LTS(RQ ,RS),m10,SUAS [m10]
M16=m16,SUAR [m16] wherem16 = LTSNRR ,NRR
M17=m17,SMTAR [m17] wherem17 = LTSNRR ,NRR
M18=m18,SUAS [m18] wherem18 = SY NCHRQ
M19=m19,SMTAS [m19] wherem19 = LTS(RQ ,RS,NRD,NRR) ,NRD,NRR
Table 3.2: Protocol Notation (Untrusted Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs))
fulfil the non-selective receipt requirement: once a recipient knows he has received
a CEM (phase 1), he cannot prevent its delivery.
Delivery Execution
The delivery sub-protocol starts when the UAS sends the first part of the CEM,
cemA , to the MTAS , in exchange for the NRS (M2). In the next steps the MTAS
and theMTAR exchange cemA , for the NRK . But before theMTAR can deliver the
NRK to theMTAS , theUAR must execute a SY NCHRQ (M4) operation and receive
a new CEM as a response (M5). After receiving the response, theUAR will send the
NRK (M6) to the MTAR . Now the MTAR can deliver the NRK to the MTAS (M7).
Before continuing, theUAS has to execute a SY NCHRQ operation to download the
NRK (M8 andM9).
The second phase of the protocol starts when theUAS sends the second part of
the CEM, cemB , to the MTAS in exchange for the NRS
′
(M10 andM11). In the next
step, the MTAS and MTAR exchange the K −NRO for the NRD (M12 and M13).
To continue with the sub-protocol execution, theUAR has to execute a SY NCHRQ
(M14) operation to obtain the K −NRO as a response (M15). Finally, the UAR de-
livers the NRR to the MTAR (M16), the MTAR sends it to the MTAS (M17) and the
UAS obtains it as a response (M18) to a SY NCHRQ message (M19) from theUAS.
96
3.4. Optimistic CEM Protocol with Untrusted Mail Transfer Agents
Delivery Cancelation
As we have explained, the delivery is done in two phases: first we exchange the
cemA for the NRK , and later we exchange the cemB and K −NRO for the NRR.
During the first phase of the protocol execution and before the NRK (or NRKTTP )
is generated, the TTP can cancel the delivery by issuing an N−NRK (Negative Non-
Repudiation of Knowledge, evidence of cancelation, table 3.1). Once the TTP has
issued an N −NRK , it will answer with it to any claim regarding the same protocol
execution. The NRK (or NRKTTP ) proves that theUAR is aware he has a pending
delivery, therefore after it has been issued, the protocol cannot be canceled, except
when the UAS misbehaves, i.e., she does not deliver the K −NRO (see K −NRO
resolution in section 3.4.2).
3.4.2 Resolution Sub-Protocol
The communication betweenUAs and MTAs, and between MTAs is done through
Internet, an unreliable channel (i.e., messages can be lost or delayed). Moreover,
the MTAs are untrusted, meaning that they can misbehave. Therefore, the delivery
sub-protocol execution may be interrupted by a communication problem or the
intervention of a malicious entity. In this situation, either sender or recipient can
find themselves in a disadvantageous position: theUAS may deliver the K −NRO
and not receive the NRR, or theUAR may not receive the K −NRO. To avoid these
unfair situations, we need the resolution sub-protocols.
The resolution sub-protocols are a set of claims (they claim they have not re-
ceived some evidence) each participant canmake, and the corresponding TTP’s re-
sponse. In table 3.3 we have the set of different requests the TTP admits. As we can
see, each claim is related to one kind of evidence (NRS,NRK , etc.), and each partic-
ipant is only allowed to request evidence related to his role in the CEM delivery, e.g.,
theUAS is the only one allowed to demand the NRS and the NRS
′
. A special case
are theNRR andNRK resolution requests, which have different content depending
on the participant who demands it.
NRS Resolution
Only the UAS can send the NRS resolution request. If the TTP has previously re-
ceived a request of later evidence (NRK , NRS
′
, NRD, NRR, K −NRO), it will issue
an NRSTTP (or an NRS, if available), and it will deliver it to theUAS, along with the
evidence obtained on previous requests. Otherwise, the TTP will contact theMTAS
sending a message equivalent in content to M1 (table 3.2): m1, STTP [m1]. If the
MTAS answers with the NRS, the TTP will deliver it to theUAS . In case the MTAS
does not answer, the TTP will contact theMTAR sending the samemessage (notice
m1 =m3 in table 3.2). If theMTAR has some delivery evidence (NRK , NRD, NRR),
the TTP will deliver it to the UAS , along with an affidavit NRSTTP . If the MTAR
answers with a NACK , it means he does not have any information on the CEM de-
livery or he has received the CEM but he does not have the NRK yet. Therefore, the
TTP will send a N−NRK to theMTAS ,MTAR (if available) and theUAS, canceling
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ClaimRequest Who can claim it
MNRS =mNRS ,SX [mNRS ] UAS
MNRK =mNRK ,SX [mNRK ] UAS,MTAS
⋆ =m
NRK
′ ,SX [mNRK ′ ] MTAR
M
NRS
′ =m
NRS
′ ,SX [mNRS′ ] UAS
MNRD =mNRD ,SX [mNRD ] UAS,MTAS
MNRR =mNRR ,SX [mNRR ] UAS,MTAS
⋆ =m
NRR
′ ,SX [mNRR ′ ] MTAR
MK−NRO =mKNRO ,SX [mKNRO ] MTAR ,UAR
MSYNCHRS =mSRS ,SX [mSRS ] UAR
mNRS = cemA
mNRK = cemA ,NRS
m
NRK
′ = SY NCHRQ ,SY NCHRS[cemA ]
m
NRS
′ = cemA ,cemB ,NRK ,K −NRO
mNRD = cemA ,cemB ,NRK ,NRS
′
,K −NRO
mNRR = cemA ,cemB ,NRK ,NRD,K −NRO
m
NRR
′ = SY NCHRQ ,SY NCHRS[cemB ,K −NRO]
mKNRO = cemA ,NRK
mSRS = “LIST", LTSRQ
⋆ TheMNRK andMNRR depend on who sends it.
Table 3.3: Resolution Sub-Protocol Requests (Untrusted Mail Transfer Agents
(MTAs))
the delivery. In case the MTAR does not answer, the TTP will also cancel the deliv-
ery issuing the N −NRK . From now on, the TTP will answer with a N −NRK to any
request regarding this CEM delivery.
NRK Resolution
If the UAS sends the NRK resolution request, the following can happen. If any
party has previously contacted requesting the NRK , the TTP will deliver the same
evidence. If a previous request has demanded later evidence (NRS
′
, NRD, NRR or
K −NRO), the TTP will already have the NRK (see table 3.3), thus, it will deliver it
along with other later evidence obtained during previous requests. Otherwise, the
TTP will contact theMTAS sending amessage equivalent in content toM1 plus the
NRS: m1, NRS, STTP [m1,NRS]. If the MTAS answers with some evidence (NRK
and/or NRD and/or NRR), the TTP will deliver it to the UAS , otherwise (NACK
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or no answer) the TTP will contact the MTAR sending the same message it sent to
the MTAS . If the MTAR answers with some evidence (NRK and/or NRD and/or
NRR), the TTP will deliver it to theUAS, otherwise (NACK or no answer) the TTP
will cancel the execution and deliver an N −NRK to the UAS, and both MTA (if
available). Notice that if the MTAS is the one who requests the NRK , the TTP can
skip contacting her, and go directly to theMTAR .
When theMTAR is the one who sends the request (table 3.3), the following can
happen. If theUAR has previously sent a SY NCHRS request including a SY NCHRQ
with the same timestamp than the one included in the MTAR ’s NRK request, and
the TTP has sent a NACK as response (the TTP has not been able to obtain the
SY NCHRS), the TTP will also send a NACK to theMTAR (to maintain coherence).
Otherwise, the TTP will answer by issuing a non repudiation of knowledge affidavit,
NRKTTP . Note that SY NCHRQ and SY NCHRS are linked by their timestamp val-
ues.
NRS
′
Resolution
Aswith theNRS, only theUAS can send the NRS
′
resolution request. If the TTP has
received a previous request demanding later evidence (NRD, NRR), it will issue a
NRS
′
TTP (or a NRS
′
, if available), and deliver it to theUAS, along with the evidence
obtained on previous requests. Otherwise, the TTP will contact the MTAS sending
her a message equivalent to M10: M10, STTP [M10] (M10 contains the K −NRO). If
the MTAS answers with the NRS
′
, the TTP will deliver it to the UAS. In case the
MTAS does not answer, the TTP will deliver an affidavit to theUAS, NRS
′
TTP .
NRD Resolution
The UAS and the MTAS can send the NRD request. If any party has previously
contacted the TTP and demanded theNRD, the TTPwill deliver the same evidence,
either the NRD or NRDTTP . Otherwise, the TTP will send a message equivalent to
M10 plus m11 (which contains the NRS
′
) to the MTAS : M10, m11, STTP [M10,m11].
If theMTAS answers with the NRD, the TTP will deliver it as a response to theUAS .
But if the MTAS sends a NACK or fails to answer, the TTP will contact the MTAR
sending a message equivalent to M12: m12, STTP [m12]. If the MTAR answers with
the NRD, the TTP will deliver it as a response (either to the UAS or the MTAS ).
But if the MTAR sends a NACK or fails to answer, the TTP will deliver an affidavit,
the NRDTTP . If the MTAS is the requesting party, the TTP will follow the same
execution flow but without contacting theMTAS .
NRRResolution
If the UAS sends the NRR resolution request, the following can happen. If some
other party has previously contacted the TTP and claimed the NRR, the TTP will
send the same evidence to the requesting party. Otherwise, the TTP will send a
message equivalent in content to the MTAS , M13: m13, STTP [m13]. If the MTAS
answers with the NRR, the TTP will deliver it to the UAS . But if the MTAS sends
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a NACK or fails to answer, the TTP will contact the MTAR sending the same in-
formation it sent to the MTAS . If the MTAR answers with the NRR, the TTP will
deliver it to theUAS . But if theMTAR sends aNACK or fails to answer, the TTP will
deliver an affidavit: the NRRTTP (either to theUAS or theMTAS ). If it is theMTAS
who claims the NRR, the TTP will skip contacting theMTAS and it will contact the
MTAR directly.
When the MTAR is the one who sends the NRR resolution request (table 3.3),
the following can happen. If theUAR has previously claimed he has not received the
SY NCHRS , and the TTP has sent a NACK as response (the TTP has not been able
to obtain the SY NCHRS), the TTP will also send a NACK to the MTAR (to main-
tain coherence). Otherwise, the TTP will answer by issuing an affidavit, NRRTTP .
Remember that SY NCHRQ and SY NCHRS are linked by their timestamp values.
K−NRO Resolution
The MTAR and theUAR can claim the K −NRO. If theUAS or MTAS have previ-
ously contacted the TTP requesting the NRS
′
, NRD or NRR, the TTP will already
have the K −NRO (see table 3.3), thus, the TTP will deliver it to the requesting party
(either the MTAR or theUAR). Otherwise, the TTP will send a message equivalent
in content to M7 to the MTAR : m7, STTP [m7]. If the MTAR answers providing the
K −NRO, the TTP will deliver it. In case the MTAR answers with a NACK or does
not answer (the server is down or does not want to answer), the TTP will follow the
same procedure with the MTAS : it will send m7, STTP [m7]. If the MTAS answers
with the K −NRO, the TTP will deliver it (either to theUAR or the MTAR ), other-
wise, the TTP will deliver a NACK .
Note that following the K −NRO claim, theUAR can find himself in a situation
where he does not receive the key neither from the MTAR nor from the TTP (it an-
swers with a NACK ). But since tD states the time limit for the protocol execution, if
theUAR receives a NACK from the TTP after tD , and neither theMTAS norMTAR
do have the K −NRO (or they claim not having it), theUAR can assume the delivery
has been canceled. The UAS has no means to obtain the NRR, neither from the
TTP (it will not issue an affidavit after tD ), nor from the MTAR (the UAR will not
deliver the NRR before receiving the K −NRO).
SYNCHRS Resolution
Only the UAR can request this evidence. If the MTAR has previously contacted
the TTP claiming he has not received the NRK , the TTP will already have the cor-
responding SY NCHRS (SY NCHRQ and SY NCHRS are linked through the times-
tamp), thus, the TTP will deliver it to theUAR . Otherwise, the TTP will resend the
SY NCHRQ (signed by the TTP) to the MTAR . If the MTAR answers with M5, the
SY NCHRS , the TTP will deliver it to theUAR . In case the MTAR does not answer
(the server is down or does not want to answer), the TTP will deliver a NACK to the
UAR . The UAR will try again sending a new SY NCHRQ to the MTAR , and/or the
TTP.
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TheUA is a software entity that can have two roles, sender and recipient. The
objective of the SY NCHRS claim is to protect the UAR (UA acting as recipient)
against possible protocol malfunctions due to network errors or malicious users,
when receiving a CEM. With the SY NCHRS claim, the UAR can obtain evidence
from the TTP that he contacted theMTAR but did not receive any evidence of a new
CEM (the MTAR does not answer or the message is lost). And in case the MTAR
answers with an empty SY NCHRS , theUAR can provide this evidence to prove the
MTAR misbehaviour. Imagine the situation where theUAR sends a SY NCHRQ and
theMTAR answers with an empty SY NCHRS , meaning there are no newCEMs, but
in fact, there is a new CEM. Then, the MTAR contacts the TTP asking for the NRK
(section 3.4.2), obtaining an affidavit. From here, the MTAR continues the delivery
sub-protocol execution without relaying the messages to the UAR . Therefore, the
UAS will receive the NRKTTP and will continue with the second phase. Once the
UAS receives the NRD, she will be able to claim the NRR and obtain it from the
TTP (section 3.4.2). Thus, at the end of the protocol execution, the UAS will have
evidence that the UAR has received the CEM and the corresponding key to deci-
pher it, the NRR, but theUAR will not have any evidence of the existence of such
a CEM: he may lose fairness. With this claim he will be able to prove the MTAR ’s
misbehaviour.
3.4.3 Security Analysis
In this sectionwewill review the accomplishment of the requirements wepresented
in section 3.1, to prove that our protocol meets them.
CLAIM 3.1: CEM Effectiveness: If sender and recipient behave according to the
protocol and there are no communication errors, the TTP will not intervene.
PROOF. Following the delivery sub-protocol execution (see figure 3.2 and sec-
tion 3.4.1), we can see that the TTP does not intervene. Therefore we can affirm
that if every party involved behaves correctly (and there are no network errors), the
UAS will obtain her evidence (NRS, NRK , NRS
′
, NRD and NRR) and theUAR will
obtain his (cemA , cemB and K −NRO) without TTP’s intervention, meeting the ef-
fectiveness requirement.
CLAIM 3.2: CEM Fairness: The UAS will receive her evidence if the UAR can
obtain his. And theUAR will receive his evidence if theUAS can obtain hers.
PROOF. Assuming an honest senderUAS , the recipientUAR can obtain the K −
NRO from the MTAR or the TTP. Following the delivery sub-protocol (see figure
3.2), theUAS must have received the NRK or NRKTTP in order to deliver the K −
NRO (M10). Therefore, if theUAS does not receive theNRR (either because of some
party misbehaviour or a lost message), she can contact the TTP and obtain it. In a
“worst case scenario", where bothMTAs aremisbehaving or having communication
problems (not answering), the UAS can contact the TTP and obtain the NRS
′
TTP
first, then the NRDTTP and finally the NRRTTP (see section 3.4.2).
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Assuming an honest recipientUAR , the senderUAS can obtain evidence of re-
ceipt (NRR or NRRTTP ), from the MTAS or the TTP. If theUAS obtains the NRR,
following the protocol (see figure 3.2) it means the UAR has already received the
K −NRO (M15 andM16), even when the TTP intervenes (the TTP obtains the NRR
from the MTAR , see NRR resolution in section 3.4.2). And if theUAS obtains the
NRRTTP , it means the TTP already has the K −NRO (see table 3.3), therefore the
UAR can contact the TTP and obtain it.
As a conclusion, we can affirm that our proposalmeets the fairness requirement.
CLAIM 3.3: CEMTimeliness: The delivery of a CEMwill finish in a finite amount
of time, maintaining fairness for all honest participants.
PROOF. The delivery deadline tD establishes a time limit for the TTP’s interven-
tion. After tD , the TTP will not generate new evidence (affidavit) neither contact the
MTAs to solve a claim, it will answer according to the evidence received and gener-
ated before tD . Therefore, at any time t < tD any party can contact the TTP and ask
for resolution (section 3.4.2). In particular, before the NRK is generated, the deliv-
ery can be canceled (the TTP issues aCANCEL token, anN−NRK ). After the NRK
is generated, the TTP can provide the evidence needed by the UAS and the UAR
to consider the message delivered (obtaining it through the MTAs or generating an
affidavit).
Therefore we can affirm that, either by TTP’s intervention, the correct execution
of the delivery sub-protocol or because of the deadline tD , the delivery can finish
in a finite amount of time t ≤ tD , maintaining fairness for all parties: the protocol
meets the timeliness requirement.
CLAIM 3.4: CEM Verifiability of TTP: Whatever the TTP’s behaviour (honest or
dishonest), both UAs maintain fairness.
PROOF. TheTTP is a semi-trusted entity (as definedby Franklin andReiter [100]),
i.e., it can misbehave but not collude with other entities. To lose fairness, one par-
ticipant (eitherUAS or theUAR) should have evidence of delivery and the other one
evidence of delivery canceled or failed. In particular we can have two situations.
In the first situation, theUAS sends the K −NRO to the MTAS (M10, figure 3.2)
but it never reaches its destination (network failure), and therefore the MTAS will
not send the NRS
′
. Then theUAS contacts the TTP claiming she has not received
theNRS
′
and the TTP answerswith aNRS
′
TTP
without contacting theMTAS . Later,
the UAS contacts the TTP and claims the NRD and the NRR, and again, the TTP
issues an affidavit (NRDTTP and NRRTTP ) without contacting the MTAs (the K −
NRO has never reached the MTAS ). At this point the TTP has the K −NRO, there-
fore the UAR should be able to receive it after contacting the TTP. But every time
theUAR contacts the TTP before tD , it sends a NACK , and when theUAR contacts
again, after tD it delivers a NACK too. Which leaves us in a situation where theUAS
has evidence of delivery and the UAR evidence of failed delivery. But confronting
the evidence, the UAs will be able to prove the TTP’s misbehaviour. The NRRTTP
proves that the TTP had the K −NRO, and therefore the TTP should not have sent
an NACK after tD .
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In the second situation, due to a network failure, the message M1 (figure 3.2)
never reaches the MTAS . TheUAS sends an NRS request to the TTP and it issues
an affidavit without contacting the MTAS . Since the MTAS has not received the
CEM (cemA), the UAS will not receive the NRK and she will claim it to the TTP,
and, again, it will issue an affidavit without contacting the MTAs. From here, the
execution follows the previous paragraph (the UAS claims the NRS
′
, NRD, NRR
and receives an affidavit from the TTP), with the exception that theUAR does not
know he has received a CEM, therefore he will not contact the TTP. At the end of
the protocol execution, the UAS will have proof of delivery while the UAR has no
proof at all. When confronted, theUAS will be able to prove the TTP’smisbehaviour
by asking evidence of its resolutions, in particular the NRK resolution. To deliver
a NRKTTP , the TTP must have previously received a resolution request from the
MTAR , claiming the NRK .
The TTP’s misbehaviour can be proved, therefore we can affirm that our proto-
col meets the verifiability of TTP requirement.
CLAIM 3.5: CEM Confidentiality: The content of a CEM is only available to the
UAS and theUAR .
PROOF. The UAS sends the content of the certified message C encrypted with
a symmetric key k, and this key encrypted with PKUAR , the recipient’s public key.
Therefore, the content of the message is only known to the senderUAS and the re-
cipient UAR , who is the only capable of obtaining the symmetric key k. Thus we
can affirm that the protocol meets the confidentiality requirement.
CLAIM 3.6: CEM Non-Selective Receipt: Once the NRK is generated, either by
theUAR or the TTP (NRKTTP ), the delivery cannot be canceled by the recipient.
PROOF. The UAR sends the NRK after receiving a SY NCHRS , stating that he
knows he has a pending CEM delivery. If by any chance the UAR tries to reject
the CEM, by not sending the NRK , the MTAR can contact the TTP and obtain an
affidavit from the TTP, the NRKTTP . Thus, theUAR has no chance to reject an in-
coming CEM. Therefore, we can affirm that our protocol meets the Non-Selective
Receipt requirement.
CLAIM 3.7: CEMNon-Repudiation: None of the participants in the delivery of a
CEM can deny having participated, neither can they be excluded from it.
PROOF. Along the protocol execution, evidence is generated as non-repudiation
proof for various services. In particular, the protocol offers:
• NRO, Non-Repudiation of Origin. When the UAS issues a message, she in-
cludes her signature on the message as proof she is the originator. If theUAS
tries to deny having originated it, theUAR can prove it using theUAS ’s signa-
ture on the message (this evidence is part of the K −NRO).
• NRS, Non-Repudiation of Submission. When theUAS delivers a CEM to her
MTAS , she receives the MTAS signature on the message, as proof she has
sent it. Thus, theMTAS cannot deny having received the CEM.
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• NRK , Non-Repudiation of Knowledge. When the UAR receives a synchro-
nization response, SY NCHRS , including new CEM, he sends his signature to
the MTAR as proof that he knows there is a pending delivery. This avoids the
UAR to deny knowing he had received a CEM.
• NRS
′
, Non-Repudiation of Key Submission. When theUAS delivers the K −
NRO to herMTAS , she receives theMTAS signature on themessage, as proof
she has sent the key and NRO. Thus, theMTAS cannot deny having received
the K −NRO evidence.
• NRD, Non-Repudiation of Delivery. When the MTAR receives the key from
theMTAS , he sends his signature on the message, as proof the K −NRO is in
the recipient’s inbox. Thus, theMTAR cannot deny having received it.
• NRR, Non-Repudiation of Receipt. When theUAR receives a SY NCHRS in-
cluding the K −NRO, he sends his signature to theMTAR as proof of receipt.
This prevents theUAR to deny having received a CEM and its corresponding
key to decipher it.
3.5 Optimistic CEMProtocol with TrustedMail Transfer Agent
In order to reduce the complexity of the protocol with untrusted MTAs, and follow-
ing our goal of designing feasible protocols, in this section we present another CEM
protocol following the next assumption (besides the common assumptions, section
3.3):
• Each user trusts his ownMTA (theUAS trusts the MTAS , and theUAR trusts
the MTAR ). The other MTAs participating in the protocol are considered to
be untrusted for that user.
It may seem a strong assumption, but as Ateniese et al. [97] explain in their
paper, either theUAS chooses his ownMTA or there is a business relation between
them, in which the MTA agrees to provide CEM services to the UAS or both. The
UAR , on the other hand, has the same relationwith his ownMTA and trusts the TTP
(which is semi-trusted and verifiable) to solve any problem related to the delivery.
Figure 3.1 sketches the entities and sub-protocols involved in the proposal. As
we can see, the CEM protocol consists of a delivery sub-protocol (explained in sec-
tion 3.5.2) and a set of resolution sub-protocols (explained in section 3.5.3). Finally,
in section 3.5.4 a review of the security requirements is presented.
3.5.1 Motivating Example
In our optimistic proposal, the MTA where a user is registered with is trusted by this
user, while the other possible participant MTAs are untrusted entities. To illustrate
the practical use of our proposal, we present two example scenarios where the pro-
tocol could be applied.
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The first scenario that we present is a B2B environment. Alice, who works as
sales representative at ACME,must notify Bob, Bit inc.’s Chief Executive Officer, that
there will be a modification in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) both companies
signed. The notification gives Bit inc. 3 months to decide whether to agree or not
with the new SLA terms. If there is no communication from Bit inc. in this period of
time, ACMEwould take for granted that Bit inc. accepted thenew terms and thenew
SLA will take effect automatically. To notify Bob, Alice sends a CEM using ACME’s
certified e-mail service. Since Alice works at ACME, she can trust the MTAACME ,
but not the MTABitinc. . It will make no sense for the MTAACME to act against her,
it would be against its own interests. In a same way, Bob can trust the MTABitinc.
when sending or receiving certified e-mails.
Our second example of scenario where it could be applied is within the public
administration. Arya, who works in the public administration (PA), has to notify
Bronn that he has to pay his taxes before the end of the year or he will receive a fine.
To send the notification, Arya sends a CEM using the PA’s CEM services. Since she
is sending a notification on behalf of the public administration, she can trust that
the MTAPA will not act against her, but she cannot trust the possible intermediary
MTAs nor Bronn’s MTA. In a same way, Bronn who has chosen his own MTA, can
trust his MTA will not act against him. The objective/interest of Bronn’s MTA is to
provide users with CEM services, but to do so it needs the user’s trust. Therefore,
acting again its users could jeopardize its own interests, losing its users trust.
In both examples, the users and their MTA (UAS and MTAS ,UAR and MTAR )
share a common interest/objective: either they belong to the same company or ad-
ministration or there is a commercial contract binding both entities. We can gen-
eralize these examples and affirm that the CEM protocol we present in this section
can be applied to any scenario where the users and their MTAs share a common
interest.
3.5.2 Delivery Sub-Protocol
In figure 3.3 we can see the delivery sub-protocol flow, themessages exchanged and
the order in which they are exchanged. In tables 3.1 and 3.4 we can see the general
nomenclature and the composition of these messages and evidence. As shown in
figure 3.3, if every party involved behaves correctly, the TTP will not intervene in the
message delivery (in fact, it does not appear in this figure).
Notice that there is no reference to a non-repudiation of receipt (NRR) evi-
dence neither in figure 3.3 nor in table 3.4, but we listed it as a requirement (section
3.1). Instead, we can see an evidence namedNon-Repudiation of Knowledge,NRK ,
which proves that the recipient knows he has received a CEM, even though he does
not have access to a necessary key yet. But if we can also prove that he has access
to this key, we can consider it delivered. Therefore, our evidence of receipt will be
the combination of two different evidence: evidence of knowledge, proof that the
recipient knows he has a CEM in his inbox, and evidence of delivery, proof that the
message decryption key is in the recipient’s inbox, i.e., the recipient has access to it
(NRR ≡ NRK + NRD).
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UAS MTAS MTAR UAR
M1 {cemA ,cemB ,NRO,K −NRO}
M2 {NRS}
M3 {cemA}
M4
M5 {cemA}
M6 {NRK }
M7 {NRK }
M8 {cemB }
M9 {NRD}
M12
M13 {NRK ,NRD}
M10
M11 {cemB }
SYNCH
SYNCH SYNCH
Phase 1
Phase 2
Figure 3.3: CEM Delivery Sub-Protocol (Trusted Mail Transfer Agent (MTA))
Delivery Sub-Protocol
M1 =m1,SUAS [m1] wherem1 = Ek (C ),PKUAR (k),LTSNRO , tD ,NRO,K −NRO
M2 =m2,SMTAS [m2] wherem2 = LTSNRS ,NRS
M3 =m3,SMTAS [m3] wherem3 = Ek (C ),LTSNRO , tD
M4 =m4,SUAR [m4] wherem4 = “LIST", LTSRQ
M5 =m5,SMTAR [m5] wherem5 = LTSRQ ,LTSRS ,Ek (C ),LTSNRO , tD
M6 =m6,SUAR [m6] wherem6 = LTSNRK ,NRK
M7 =m7,SMTAR [m7] wherem7 = LTSNRK ,NRK
M8 =m8,SMTAS [m8] wherem8 = PKUAR (k),NRO,K −NRO
M9 =m9,SMTAR [m9] wherem9 = LTSNRD ,NRD
M10=m10,SUAR [m10] wherem10 = “LIST", LTSRQ
M11=m11,SMTAR [m11] wherem11 = LTSRQ ,LTSRS ,PKUAR (k),NRO,K −NRO
M12=m12,SUAS [m12] wherem12 = “LIST", LTSRQ
M13=m13,SMTAS [m13] wherem13 = LTSRQ ,LTSRS ,
LTSNRK ,LTSNRD ,NRK ,NRD
Table 3.4: Protocol Notation (Trusted Mail Transfer Agent (MTA))
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The CEM delivery is done in two phases: Firstly, theMTAS exchanges the cemA
(table 3.1) for the non-repudiation of knowledge, NRK . Secondly, the MTAS ex-
changes the cemB for the non-repudiation of delivery NRD. The first phase cor-
responds to the messages 1 to 7 (M1 to M7), and the second phase to the messages
8 to 13 (M8 to M13). In the following paragraphs we describe the execution of the
delivery sub-protocol, wheremessage x is a reference toMx from table 3.4.
The delivery sub-protocol starts when theUAR sendsmessage 1 (M1 from table
3.4) to the MTAS including the encrypted message Ek(C ), the key to decrypt it (the
key is encrypted with theUAR public key), a local timestamp value (LTSNRO ) indi-
cating the timeof creation, the deadline tD , and thenon-repudiationof originNRO.
The MTAS answers withmessage 2: a local timestamp, stating the time of submis-
sion LTSNRS , and the non-repudiation of submission NRS. Then the MTAS sends
message 3: the encrypted message Ek (C ), the timestamp received LTSNRO and the
deadline tD to the MTAR , and waits for the NRK and LTSNRK , message 7, which
has to be generated by the UAR . The UAR receives information on new e-mails
and/or evidence received by synchronizing with his MTAR . The UAR will send a
SY NCHRQ command to the MTAR in order to receive information of new deliver-
ies and evidence of pending ones, message 4. As a response, the MTAR will deliver
the new CEM received and/or new evidence of pending deliveries. If the response
contains new deliveries, theUAR will send the NRK to the MTAR , message 6, and
theMTAR will forward it to theMTAS ,message 7.
After receiving the NRK , message 7, the MTAS will start the second phase of
the protocol, exchanging the cemB , message 8, for the NRD, message 9. The sec-
ond phase will end after the UAS has received both the NRK and NRD evidence,
messages 12 and 13, and theUAR receives the cemB ,messages 10 and 11.
3.5.3 Resolution Sub-Protocols
To solve the resolution requests theTTPmayneed to contact themail transfer agents
(MTAS and/orMTAR ) to obtain the evidence claimed. In some occasions, the TTP
will not be able to obtain such evidence, but it will have enough information to
generate an affidavit (table 3.1). It may also occur that the TTP cannot obtain the
evidence neither issue an affidavit, then the TTP will send a NACK (table 3.1) as a
response. Similarly, the MTAs will answer with a NACK when they do not have the
evidence the TTP is requesting (or they claim they do not have it).
Before the NRK (or NRKTTP ) is generated (message 6), the TTP can cancel the
delivery by issuing a N −NRK (table 3.4). After the NRK is generated, the TTP will
assure the execution is carried out, by delivering the necessary evidence, the NRD
or NRDTTP , and the K −NRO (the key and the NRO).
The resolution sub-protocols are a set of requests where the participants claim
they did not receive some evidence. In table 3.5 we have the set of different requests
the TTP admits. As we can see, each claim is related to one kind of evidence (NRS,
NRK , etc.), and each participant is only allowed to request evidence related to his
role in the CEMdelivery, e.g., theUAS is the only one allowed to demand theNRS. A
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ClaimRequest Who can claim it
MNRS =mNRS ,SX [mNRS ] UAS
MNRK =mNRK ,SX [mNRK ] UAS ,MTAS
⋆ =m
NRK
′ ,SX [mNRK ′ ] MTAR
MNRD =mNRD ,SX [mNRD ] UAS ,MTAS
MK−NRO =mKNRO ,SX [mKNRO ] MTAR ,UAR
MSYNCHRS =mSRS ,SX [mSRS] UAR
mNRS = cemA
mNRK = cemA ,NRS
m
NRK
′ = SY NCHRQ ,SY NCHRS[cemA ]
mNRD = cemA ,cemB ,NRK ,K −NRO
mKNRO = cemA ,NRK
mSRS = “LIST", LTSRQ
⋆ TheMNRK depends on who sends it.
Table 3.5: Resolution Sub-Protocol Requests (Trusted Mail Transfer Agent (MTA))
special case is the NRK resolution request, which has different content depending
on the participant who demands it.
NRS Request
Only theUAS can send the NRS claim request. If the TTP has received a previous
request claiming later evidence (NRK , NRD or the key), it will issue aNRSTTP (or a
NRS, if available), and it will deliver it to theUAS , along with the evidence obtained
on previous requests. Otherwise, the TTP will contact theMTAS sending amessage
equivalent in content toM3 (table 3.4): m3, STTP [m3]. If the MTAS answers, either
aNACK or theNRS, the TTPwill deliver the evidence to theUAS . In case theMTAS
does not answer, the TTP will contact the MTAR sending the same message. If the
MTAR has some delivery evidence, either the NRK or both NRK and NRD, the
TTPwill deliver it to theUAS, along with an affidavitNRSTTP . If theMTAR answers
with a NACK , it means he does not have any information on the CEM delivery or
he has received the CEM but he does not have the NRK yet. Therefore, the TTP
will send a N −NRK to theMTAS ,MTAR (if available) and theUAS, canceling the
delivery. In case the MTAR does not answer, the TTP will also cancel the delivery
issuing the N −NRK . From now on, the TTP will answer with a N −NRK to any
request regarding this CEM delivery.
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NRK Request
If theUAS or theMTAS request theNRK , the following canhappen. If any party has
previously contacted claiming the NRK , the TTP will deliver the same evidence. If
a previous request has claimed later evidence (NRD or the K −NRO), the TTP will
already have the NRK , thus, it will deliver it along with other evidence obtained
during previous requests (NRD or NRDTTP ). Otherwise, the TTP will contact the
MTAR sending amessage equivalent in content toM3: m3, STTP [m3]. If theMTAR
answerswith some evidence (NRK and/orNRD), the TTP will deliver it to theUAS ,
otherwise (NACK or no answer) the TTP will cancel the execution and deliver a
N −NRK to theUAS , and both MTA (if available).
When theMTAR is who sends the request (table 3.5), the following can happen.
If theUAR has previously sent a MSY NCHRQ (table 3.5) request including the same
LTSRQ than the one included in the MTAR ’s NRK request (MNRK ), and the TTP
has sent a NACK as response (the TTP has not been able to obtain the SY NCHRS),
the TTP will also send a NACK to the MTAR (to maintain coherence). Otherwise,
the TTP will answer by issuing a non repudiation of knowledge affidavit, NRKTTP .
Note that SY NCHRQ and SY NCHRS are linked by their timestamp values.
NRD Request
TheUAS and the MTAS can claim the NRD. If any party has previously contacted
the TTP and claimed the NRD, the TTP will deliver the same evidence, either the
NRD or NRDTTP . Otherwise, the TTP will send to theMTAR amessage equivalent
in content to M8: m8, STTP [m8]. If the MTAR answers with the NRD, the TTP will
deliver it as a response. But if the MTAR sends a NACK or fails to answer, the TTP
will deliver an affidavit, the NRDTTP .
K−NRO Request
TheMTAR or theUAR can claim the K−NRO. If theUAS orMTAS have previously
contacted the TTP requesting the NRD, the TTP will already have the K −NRO,
thus, the TTP will deliver it. Otherwise, the TTP will send to the MTAS a message
equivalent in content to M7: m7, STTP [m7]. If the MTAS answers providing the
K −NRO, the TTP will deliver it. In case the MTAS answers with a NACK or does
not answer (the server is down or does not want to answer), the TTP will deliver a
NACK .
Note that following the latter claim, the UAR can find himself in a situation
where he does not receive the key neither from the MTAR nor from the TTP (it an-
swers with a NACK ). But since tD states the time limit for the protocol execution,
if the UAR receives a NACK from the TTP after tD , and the MTAR does not have
the K −NRO, theUAR can assume the delivery has been canceled. TheUAS has no
means to obtain the NRD, neither from the TTP (it will not issue an affidavit after
tD ), nor from theMTAR (she will not sendM9 after tD ).
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SYNCHRS Request
Only theUAR can send this request. If theMTAR has previously contacted the TTP,
claiming he has not received the NRK , the TTP will already have the corresponding
SY NCHRS , thus, the TTP will deliver it to theUAR . Otherwise, the TTP will send to
theMTAR theM4 signed: M4, STTP [M4]. If theMTAR answerswith the SY NCHRS ,
the TTP will deliver it to theUAR . In case the MTAR does not answer (the server is
down or does not want to answer), the TTP will deliver a NACK to theUAR .
3.5.4 Security Analysis
In this section wewill review the accomplishment of the requirements we have pre-
sented in section 3.1, to prove that our protocol meets them.
CLAIM 3.8: CEM Effectiveness: If all participants in a CEM delivery behave ac-
cording to the protocol and there are no communication errors, the TTP will not in-
tervene.
PROOF. Following the delivery sub-protocol execution (see figure 3.3 and sec-
tion 3.5.2), we can see that the TTP does not intervene. Therefore we can affirm
that if every party involved behaves correctly and there are no network failures, the
UAS will obtain her evidence (NRS, NRK and NRD) and theUAR will obtain his
evidence (Ek(C ), PKUAR (k) and NRO) without TTP’s intervention, meeting the ef-
fectiveness requirement.
CLAIM 3.9: CEM Fairness: The UAS will receive her evidence (NRS, NRK and
NRD) if an only if the UAR obtains his (the message, the key and the NRO), and the
UAR will receive his evidence if and only if the UAS obtains hers.
PROOF. Assuming an honest senderUAS , the recipientUAR can obtain themes-
sage Ek (C ) and the K −NRO from the MTAR or from the TTP. If theUAR obtains
the K −NRO from the MTAR , it means the MTAR has already delivered the NRK
to the MTAS . Thus she can contact the TTP and obtain the NRD or an affidavit
(NRDTTP ). Moreover, the sender UAS can also contact the TTP and obtain the
NRK and NRD (or NRDTTP ). In the case theUAR obtains the K −NRO from the
TTP, theUAS or the MTAS have contacted previously claiming the NRD, therefore
they already have all the evidence they need. In any case, theUAS can obtain her
evidence, thus fairness is maintained.
Assuming an honest recipient UAR , the sender UAS can obtain her evidence
(NRK and NRD) from the MTAS or from the TTP. These evidence can be the orig-
inal value (signed by the recipient) or an affidavit from the TTP. If theUAS obtains
her evidence from the MTAS and it is signed by the recipient, it means the recipi-
ent has already received theK−NRO: theMTAR sends the NRD after receiving the
K −NRO. If the evidence contains an affidavit (NRDTTP ), it means theMTAS con-
tacted the TTP claiming the NRD, therefore the TTP has the K −NRO and theUAR
can contact the TTP and claim it. In the case theUAS obtains the evidence from the
TTP (the original or an affidavit), it means the TTP already has the N −NRO (see
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MNRD in table 3.5), therefore the UAR can contact the TTP and claim it. In both
situations, theUAR can obtain his evidence, thus, fairness is maintained.
As a conclusion, our proposal meets the fairness requirement.
CLAIM 3.10: CEMTimeliness: The delivery of a CEMwill end in a finite amount
of time, maintaining fairness for all honest participants.
PROOF. Along with the parameters sent within the message, there is the deliv-
ery deadline tD . After tD , the TTP will not generate new evidence, i.e, the TTP will
not contact anyMTA to solve the claim, and it will answer according to the evidence
received before tD . If before tD any user has not received his evidence, hemust con-
tact the TTP and ask for resolution. In the case of theUAS , she may claim the NRS,
theNRK or theNRD. Meanwhile theUAR will claim theK−NRO. Moreover, at any
time t < tD during the protocol execution, any party can contact the TTP and claim
resolution. In particular, before the NRK is generated (M6 in table 3.4), the delivery
can be canceled (the TTP issues a N −NRK ). After the NRK is generated, the TTP
can deliver the NRD or NRDTTP and the K −NRO, evidence needed by the UAS
and the UAR to consider the message delivered. Therefore we can affirm that, ei-
ther by the TTP’s intervention, the correct execution of the delivery sub-protocol or
because of the deadline tD , the delivery can finish in a finite amount of time t ≤ tD ,
maintaining fairness for all honest parties.
CLAIM 3.11: CEMVerifiability of TTP: If the TTP issues wrong evidence, the par-
ticipants can prove it.
PROOF. The TTP could misbehave and, as a result, an honest party could lose
fairness. The TTP could try to influence the delivery result, so that one party, either
UAS or theUAR , has evidence of delivery, and the other one, evidence of delivery
canceled. In particular we can have three different situations.
In the first situation, the UAS contacts the TTP claiming she has not received
the NRS or the NRK . The TTP can answer with a N −NRK , but do not deliver it
to theMTAs. Therefore the delivery will continue, theMTAS will receive the NRK
and NRD; and the UAR the message Ek [C ], and the K −NRO. This could be an
unfair situation, but theUAS will be able to detect itwhen she executes a SY NCHRQ
message. She has a N −NRK , but the MTAS holds the evidence of delivery NRK
and NRD.
A second case can happen when theUAS contacts the TTP claiming she has not
received theNRS, themessage has not reached theMTAS , therefore it has not been
sent. But the TTP can answer with the NRSTTP and NRKTTP , without contacting
any MTA. Later, the UAS claims the NRD, and receives a NRDTTP from the TTP,
again without contacting any MTA. TheUAS has all delivery evidence and theUAR
does not have anything. When theUAS tries to “enforce" the delivery, theUAR will
be able to prove the TTP’s misbehaviour by requesting evidence:
• to generate the NRSTTP , the TTP must have previously received a request
(signed) either by theMTAR or theUAR .
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• to generate the NRKTTP , the TTP must have the corresponding SY NCHRQ
and SY NCHRS (M4 andM5 in figure 3.3 and table 3.4).
Finally it can happen that theUAR and/orMTAR contact the TTP claiming they
have not received the key. The TTP can answer with a NACK , until tD expires, even
when it already has the key. Therefore, the honestUAS will have the evidence of de-
livery and theUAR will have nothing. But if theUAS tries to “enforce" the delivery,
theUAR and/or the MTAR will be able to prove they contacted the TTP, and got a
NACK , proving the TTP’s misbehaviour.
In all situations the TTP’s misbehaviour can be proved, therefore we can affirm
that our protocol meets the verifiability of TTP requirement.
CLAIM 3.12: CEMConfidentiality: Only theUAS and theUAR have access to the
content C of a CEM.
PROOF. The UAS sends the content of the certified message C encrypted with
the symmetric key k, and this key k encrypted with PKUAR , the recipient’s public
key. Therefore, the content of themessage is only known by the senderUAS and the
recipientUAR who is the only capable of obtaining the symmetric key k. Thus we
can affirm that the protocol meets the confidentiality requirement.
CLAIM 3.13: CEM Non-Selective Receipt: Once the NRK is generated, either by
theUAR or the TTP (NRKTTP ), the delivery cannot be canceled.
PROOF. The UAR sends the NRK after receiving a SY NCHRS , stating that he
knows he has a pending CEM delivery. If by any chance the UAR tries to reject
the CEM, by not sending the NRK , the MTAR can contact the TTP and obtain an
affidavit from the TTP, the NRKTTP . Thus, theUAR has no chance to reject an in-
coming CEM. Therefore, we can affirm that our protocol meets the Non-Selective
Receipt requirement.
CLAIM 3.14: CEMNon-Repudiation: None of the participants in the delivery of
a CEM can deny having participated, neither can they be excluded from it.
PROOF. Along the protocol execution, evidence is generated as non-repudiation
proof for various services. In particular, the protocol offers:
• NRO, Non-Repudiation of Origin. When the UAS issues a message, she in-
cludes her signature on the message as proof she has created it. If the UAS
tries to deny having originated it, theUAR can prove it using theUAS ’s signa-
ture on the message.
• NRS, Non-Repudiation of Submission. When theUAS delivers a CEM to her
MTAS , she receives the MTAS signature on the message, as proof she has
sent it. Thus, theMTAS cannot deny having received the CEM.
• NRD, Non-Repudiation of Delivery. When the MTAR receives the key from
the MTAS , he sends his signature on the message, as proof the CEM is in the
recipient’s inbox. Thus, theMTAR cannot deny having received it.
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• NRR, Non-Repudiationof Receipt. TheUAR cannot deny having received the
CEM. To provide NRR, we introduce the NRK , Non-Repudiation of Knowl-
edge. When theUAR receives a SY NCHRS including new CEM, he sends his
signature to the MTAR as proof that he knows there is a pending delivery
(NRK ). This avoids theUAR to deny knowing he had received a CEM. There-
fore, if we combine theNRK andNRD, we have that: theMTAR cannot deny
having received the K −NRO, and the UAR cannot deny knowing he has a
message. Therefore we can affirm that the UAR knows he has a CEM, and
that he has the means to fetch it and open it, so, we can consider the message
received, NRK + NRD ≡ NRR. Thus, we can affirm that our protocol meets
the Non-Repudiation of Receipt requirement.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter of the dissertation two contributions related to Certified Electronic
Mail (CEM) as a fair exchange application have been presented. The contribu-
tions are two optimistic CEM protocols designed following the current e-mail ar-
chitecture. Most of the previous proposals presented protocols where the sender
and recipient have direct interaction, or they communicate through only one inter-
mediary, which does not reflect the current e-mail infrastructure where each user
chooses his own Mail Transfer Agent (MTAS and MTAR for sender and recipient,
respectively). Moreover, we can have many MTAs between the MTAS and MTAR .
In addition, the protocol flow of each proposal has been designed to mimic the be-
haviour of POP3 or IMAP, used in the traditional e-mail by the users to fetch the
messages from their MTA. These features, the architecture and protocol flow, facili-
tate the deployment of the proposals on the existent Internet e-mail infrastructure,
reducing costs formail providers in terms of infrastructural investments, and allow-
ing senders and recipients to use standard Internet e-mail clients, with minimum
modifications.
The proposal in section 3.4 is the first of its kind to assume all MTAs are un-
trusted entities, they can cheat and collude, whereas the second proposal (section
3.5) assumes that each participant trusts his ownMTA (the sender trusts theMTAS ,
and the recipient trusts the MTAR ) while consider the other ones untrusted. Both
proposals meet all the core security requirements (effectiveness, fairness, timeli-
ness and non-repudiation), two additional ones, verifiability of the TTP and con-
fidentiality, and one specific to CEM protocols, non-selective receipt. In the case
of the non-repudiation requirement, the proposals provide evidence of the whole
process: origin, submission, delivery and receipt. Thus, in a CEM delivery involving
a sender, a sender’s transfer agent, a recipient’s transfer agent, and a recipient, no
one can deny having been involved.
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ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SCHEMES
In this chapter of the dissertation a fair scheme for electronic bearer bank checks is
presented. The scheme allows payments of large amounts, with anonymity in pay-
ment, with anonymous transferability and guaranteeing that all valid checks will be
paid (in cash or depositing in bank accounts). It meets all the core fair exchange re-
quirements (section 1.2.1) and the three main properties of the paper-based bearer
bank check. First, this scheme allows payments of arbitrary amounts (those agreed
between the bank and the client). Moreover, the scheme allows e-checks to be
transferred, with no need for the receiver to deposit the e-check at the bank. Fi-
nally, the proposed scheme can maintain the anonymity of all users involved in a
chain of transfers of an electronic check, so-called bearer check.
4.1 Legal Issues
Definition and types of checks can vary from country to country, but it is commonly
accepted that a check is a negotiable instrument in writing containing an uncondi-
tional order, signed by the maker, directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of
money only to the order of a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument, and
a bank is always the drawee.
According to the "ConventionProviding aUniformLaw for checks" [104], a paper-
based check is a payment instrument that should contain: a) The term "check" in-
serted in the body of the instrument and expressed in the language employed in
drawing up the instrument; b) An unconditional order to pay a determinate sum
of money; c) The name of the person who is to pay (drawee); d) A statement of the
date when and the place where the check is drawn; e) The signature of the person
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who draws the check (drawer); and optionally, f) A statement of the place where
payment is to be made.
Depending of the content of a check, and without being exhaustive, checks can
be classified as:
• Open check or uncrossed check: A check is call "Open" when it is possible to
get cash over the counter at the bank. The holder of anOpen check can do the
following: a) Receiving themoney over the counter at the bank; b) Depositing
the check in his account; c) Passing it to someone else by signing on the back
of the check (process called endorsement).
• Crossed check: The payment of crossed check is not made over the counter
at the bank. This check can only be paid into the bank account of the payee.
A check can be crossed by drawing two transverse parallel lines across the
check, with or without the writing "account payee" or "not negotiable". This
is an interesting option because open checks are subject to risk of theft, and
so it is dangerous to issue such checks (in paper). This risk can be avoided by
issuing crossed checks.
• Bearer check: A check which is payable to any person who presents it for pay-
ment at the bank counter. A bearer check can be transferred bymere delivery
and requires no endorsement.
• Order check: An order check is one which is payable to a particular person.
In such a check the word "bearer" may be cut out or cancelled and the word
"order" may be written. The payee can transfer an order check to someone
by signing his name on the back of it (an endorsement). If the words "not to
order" are written in the check, it means that the check cannot be endorsed.
• Banker’s draft or bank check: This is a check issued or drawn by a bank (the
bank is the drawer and the drawee). It can be usually obtained from a bank
for a small fee. This is useful for making large value payments where cleared
funds are required and where it may be risky using cash.
• Guaranteed or certified check: In this kind of check the bank (drawee) guaran-
tees that it will pay the amount indicated in the check.
This dissertation proposes a solution for a specific kind of check: an open bearer
bank check. An open bearer bank check should meet the following generic re-
quirements: a) It is payable to any person who presents it for payment at the bank
counter, and transferable by mere delivery; b) It is issued or drawn by a bank (the
bank is the drawer and the drawee), so, the requester does not sign the check nor
any personal information is contained in the check; c) It is possible to get cash over
the counter at the bank; d) The requester can be identified by the issuing bank, but
he can remain anonymous in front of other users; e) The payee can remain anony-
mous, and transfer the check anonymously; f) Payment is guaranteed.
From now on, we will refer only to this kind of check, electronic bearer bank
check.
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4.2 Bearer Check Scenario
This section defines the role of the different entities involved in our electronic check
scheme. Most entities involved in the scheme are the same as in the paper world:
• Payer (Pr ): an entity registered with the issuer (a bank) who wishes to obtain
an e-check so as to make a payment to another entity.
• Payee (Pe ): an entity who receives an e-check from a payer. In our scheme, a
payee, having received an e-check, can become a payer for another entity and
with the "same" e-check.
• Issuer (I ): the bank responsible for issuing e-checks to payers.
• Acquirer (A): the bank to which the payee is a registered account holder. The
payee could also withdraw/cash the e-check value over the counter at the
payer’s bank I .
Additionally, in our scheme, a new entity is necessary:
• Trusted Third Party (TTP): this entity will guarantee the fairness of exchanges
among all parties involved in an e-check transaction.
Legal terminology and technical terminology does not always coincide, there-
fore it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms payer, payee, drawer and
drawee. The latter two are standard legal terms in the law relating to checks (see
section 4.1), while the first two are terms used in e-checks papers. The drawer is the
(individual or legal) person issuing a check, signing it, and therefore he is liable for
the payment of the check. The drawee is the entity that will pay the amount indi-
cated in the check, if there is enough money in the drawer’s account. The drawee
has always to be a bank. The payer is the person using a check for making a pay-
ment (he can be a drawer or not). The payee is the entity accepting a check as a
method of payment in exchange of goods or services.
Perhaps the more confusing situation is when the payer is not the drawer. It is
the case of bank checks: the bank is the drawer and gives the check to the requester
client that will act as a payer in a payment to a payee. Another case is when a payee
has received a bearer check and decides to pay with it (without depositing it): in the
new payment he will be the payer and he will not be the drawer (who is the bank
signing the check).
4.3 Requirements for Electronic Bearer Bank Checks
We can classify e-check requirements into three categories: security requirements,
functional requirements, and finally, legal requirements. Despite the previous clas-
sification, some requirements are difficult to classify because they can have an im-
pact on more than one category.
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4.3.1 Security Requirements
We are in front of a kind of fair exchange of values (e.g., an e-check for an account
decrement or increment), and so, fair exchange requirements as defined in section
1.2 must be met. In particular, the e-check proposal meets all the core require-
ments: effectiveness, fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation. But as application
of fair exchange, the e-check proposal also requires some specific security require-
ments, related to electronic bearer bank checks. For other kinds of e-checks, differ-
ent requirements can be necessary. For instance, an electronic order check requires
the payee’s identity can be specified on the e-check at the issuing phase [25, 105].
Thus, payee’s anonymity is not a requirement for that kind of e-check, but it is re-
quired for electronic bearer bank checks.
Core Fair Exchange Security Requirements
Following we describe the core fair exchange security requirements applied to elec-
tronic bearer bank checks.
Definition 4.1 (e-check Effectiveness) If every participant in an exchange (payment,
deposit/cashing or transferringwith/of an e-check) behaves according to the protocol,
the TTP will not intervene.
Definition 4.2 (e-check Fairness) Every honest participant (A) in an exchange (pay-
ment, deposit/cashing or transferring with/of an e-check) will receive what is waiting
for from the other participant (B), or the TTP will provide him (A) with evidence (or
proof) that the other party (B) is not behaving as expected.
This requirement ensures that at the end of an exchange between two or more en-
tities, or everybody achieve the expected items, or nobody can stand in a privileged
situation. This property can be useful for multiple processes related to e-checksman-
agement:
• obtaining/paying: if the payer’s account is decremented for a specific amount
then he should receive a valid e-check from the issuer.
• transferring: if the payer delivers a valid e-check to the payee, the payee must
provide the service or good, or a proof that she has received the e-check.
• depositing/cashing: if the payee sends a valid e-check to the bank for depositing
or cashing, then his account must be increased by the corresponding amount
or he has to receive the amount in cash.
Definition 4.3 (e-check Timeliness) Every participant in an exchange (payment, de-
posit/cashing or transferring with/of an e-check) can be sure this exchange will finish
in a finite amount of time and, once the exchange is finished, fairness will be main-
tained.
Definition 4.4 (e-check Non-repudiation) None of the participants in an exchange
can deny having participated nor be excluded of it. In particular:
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• obtaining/paying: the payer (Pr ) cannot deny having requested an e-check EC
with a face value Q, and the Issuer (I ) cannot deny having issued it.
• transferring: in this exchange the payer (Pr ) remains anonymous, therefore the
issuer (I ) cannot prove that a particular Pr requested to change the ownership
of an e-check EC, but it can prove that whoever demanded it, was the owner.
And I cannot deny having changed the ownership of EC.
• depositing/cashing: the bearer (P) cannot deny having requested depositing the
e-check EC, and the issuer (I ) cannot deny having deposited it. If P decides
to cash EC, his identity will remain anonymous. Therefore as in the case of
transferring an e-check, I can prove that whoever cashed it, was the owner.
And I cannot deny having cashed it.
Specific Electronic Bearer Bank Checks Security Requirements
Here we list security requirements specific to e-checks that we are considering.
Definition 4.5 (Unforgeability) Only authorized entities can issue valid e-checks.
In other words, it cannot be possible to forge e-checks to be given in good, as if they
were issued by an authorized issuer. This property is directly related with non-repu-
diation of origin property, and therefore with integrity and authenticity properties.
In our scenario only banks can issue electronic bearer bank checks.
Definition 4.6 (Non-overspending) An e-check only belongs to one user at a given
time.
A payer cannot be able to pay twice with the same e-check. He can make copies
of one e-check, but only one of them will be given as good. The use of the same
e-check has to be prevented or, at least, detected.
Definition 4.7 (Anonymity) Users of e-checks (payers/payees) should be able to re-
main anonymous in non-identified processes related to the e-check.
Paper-based bearer bank checks allow that payers and payees remain anonymous
in front of the bank when they pay with, transfer or cash the check. Obviously, de-
positing is a process without anonymity: the user has to provide his bank account
information.
Definition 4.8 (Transferability) Apayee can transfer an e-check (previously received
as payment) to another payee without depositing or cashing it, and without losing
anonymity.
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Payees receiving an e-check in a transfer (not directly from an authorized issuer;
the bank) must be able to verify if the e-check is valid (it will be easy if unforgeabil-
ity is met) and it has not been already spent by the transferor entity (or previous
transferors). Anonymity must not be lost in the transfer process. An e-check can be
transferred indefinitely without being necessary to deposit it. Observe that a trans-
fer is not an endorsement; the latter is a non-anonymous process.
Definition 4.9 (Untraceability) Together with anonymity, privacy is also related to
the impossibility to track the entities involved in a chain of transfers by the bankwith
the same or a different e-check.
A bank can identify two of the entities involved in the chain of transfers: the initial
payer (who is an identified client of the bank and requests the issue of an e-check)
and the last payee (who deposits the e-check in her bank account). But the interme-
diaries payees of that chain cannot be identified by the bank. Moreover, a specified
entity cannot be linked to a particular e-check because neither the identity of the
owner of the e-check is included in the content of the e-check nor the intermedi-
aries are identified by the bank.
4.3.2 Functional Requirements
Now we are listing some functional requirements. These requirements are not so
directly related to security, but they can be as important as those explained previ-
ously.
Definition 4.10 (Online operations) Paying with an e-check or transferring it re-
quires a persistent connection with an entity different from the payer and the payee
(e.g., a trusted centralized system).
Typically offline options are preferred, alleging costs, possible bottleneck, etc.; but
in a e-world where millions of transactions with credit card are made online, and
with companies working with great computational power (Google, Facebook, etc.),
it seems that this argument is no longer valid. In terms of security, online operations
for payment and transfer are better in order to carry out double-spending checking.
Definition 4.11 (Efficiency) Processing an e-check has not to be resource consum-
ing, mainly, on the client side.
We have to bear in mind that e-checks should be held in portable devices (PDAs,
smart-phones, etc.). Mobile terminals can be limited in terms of computational
power, and so protocol operations and especially cryptographic operations have to
be reduced only to necessary ones.
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4.3.3 Juridical Requirements
In this section we will explain the legal requirements to be met by electronic bearer
bank checks.
Definition 4.12 (Content) A bearer check must contain the following information:
the words "bearer check", the sum of money to be paid, the name of the entity who
is to pay (drawee), the signature of the person who draws the check (drawer) and,
optionally, date when and place where the check is drawn, and a statement of the
place where payment is to be made.
The check can contain more information (a serial number for every check, etc.),
but the data specified above is the content according to the Geneve "Convention
Providing a Uniform Law for Checks" [104].
Definition 4.13 (Drawee and drawer) Onall checks the draweemust be a bank,and
for bank checks the drawer must also be a bank.
Thismeans that the signature contained in a e-checkmust be performed by a bank.
4.4 RelatedWork
There are some proposals to provide security to electronic checks [106, 105, 107,
108, 24, 109, 25, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115]. However, the vast majority of the pro-
posed solutions do not fit the definition of check, or do not accomplish security
requirements for electronic bearer bank checks [106, 105, 107, 108, 24, 109, 25] (see
section 4.2).
The first solutions for e-checks appear in the literature in the late 80’s [110, 111,
112, 113], but it is from 2002 when it receives more attention [114, 106, 115, 105,
107, 108, 24, 109, 25]. However, not all previous solutions we find in the literature
using the word e-check can be considered as a proper e-check. This is the case of
some works such as [110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115]. It is easy to detect this kind of
solutions because all of them include a refund process that it is not allowed in the
paper-based checks. In fact, these schemes are more similar to cash-like payment
systems, as stated by [114]: "We must not confuse the checks explained here with
conventional paper-based checks". Therefore, these solutions are not useful as sub-
stitutive of paper-based checks.
This way, we can consider that there are, mainly, a few solutions which fit the
legal check definition [106, 105, 107, 108, 24, 109, 25]. Among these references, we
can differentiate twomain types of checks based on its use or their definition: order
checks and bearer checks. Despite the efforts dedicated to the study of electronic
checks in general, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one proposal that
address the problem of electronic bearer checks. But we review the order checks
because some of them mention that their solutions could work as another type of
e-check.
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4.4.1 Order e-checks
In the order e-check classification, we find some solutions [105, 107, 24, 116] whose
main objective is providing an scheme where specific information, such as payee
identity, face value and date can be specifiedwhen the payermake effective the pay-
ment to the payee. That is, they want to provide flexibility to the e-check scheme.
But, those schemes have amain problem; the availability of the funds is not guaran-
teed. So, if there are insufficient funds available for the payment, the corresponding
e-check is a loss for the payee. To solve this problem Hsin et al. [105] propose to
balance between flexibility and warranty. To do so, the authors consider twomodes
of operation. In the first one, it works as the above solutions, all the information
is attached to the e-check at the time of the transaction between the payer and the
payee. In the second one, the bank transfers the money from the payer’s account to
a special holding account, providing a certification from the bank that guarantees
the funds. The face value must be fixed at issuing phase, but the other information
(payee’s identification and pay date) can be defined later, preserving some flexibil-
ity. Besides, Hsin et al. [105] state their scheme provides privacy. This is not com-
pletely achieved, at least from the payment and deposit points of view. The payee
must be identified by the bank at depositing stage because the e-check includes the
identity of the payee fixed by the payer at paying phase.
Chang et al. [109] highlight as an important requirement themutual authentica-
tion between a payer and a payee to enhance the system security. It can be useful in
some applications for e-check, but it is not an intrinsic requirement for checks (look
at paper-based checks), in the sameway that fair exchange of an e-check for a prod-
uct or service can be very important, but not an intrinsic requirement of e-checks.
In this vein, Chen et al. [25] and Pasupathinathan et al. [108] provide solutions with
anonymity for thepayer. This anonymity is based onpseudonymsprovided orman-
aged by the bank; therefore strictly speaking we cannot affirm that it is anonymity.
Whatever case, we have to remember that from a juridical point of view, one of the
compulsory fields of a paper-based check is the signature of the entity who draws
the check, and the aim of this signature is to be able to identify the payer. Therefore,
the e-check must be paid to the entity to whom the e-check is issued, making the
e-check non-transferable and non-anonymous.
Another issue considered by some authors is the performance efficiency. It has
been considered from two points of view. On one hand, improving the use of every
individual e-check. For example, [107] tries to improve the efficiency of Chaum’s
scheme [111] from the computational point of view using hash based computation
and avoiding the use of public key cryptography. On the other hand, we find the use
of booklet checks to avoid contacting the bank for every required e-check [109, 24].
However, the main problem from a security point of view, is the way in which
the payment/transfer is performed. The authors focus on providing proposals for
working offline [107, 108, 24], that is, the transaction between the payer and the
payee does not require the bank intervention. The objective is improving the avail-
ability and reducing the burden on the solution. In this way, when the payee re-
ceives the e-check, she can verify its authenticity but not its double-spending be-
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cause double-spending check is made at deposit phase (after payment), but a large
amount e-check should not be accepted without prior double-spending check. To
solve that, in [109, 25] the double-spending is prevented with an online verification
with the bank, avoiding drawbacks of prior solutions.
The FSTC’s e-check system [26] requires a special mention since it is an elec-
tronic payment instrument specifically developed for the Internet and designed to
work like paper-based checks. The FSTC’s e-check is based on the same legal frame-
work that applies to paper-based checks and thus all existing legislations and ac-
count agreements that apply to paper-based checks still hold for electronic checks.
However, as indicated in the analysis done by [108], there are various security issues
concerning confidentiality, privacy and traceability that are yet to be addressed. For
example, the payee has unrestricted access to the payer’s account information. In
addition, the FSTC’s system leaves the smart card as the only source of proof for
transactions, so the loss of the smart card by a payer also implies the loss of proofs
for all transactions. A final concern with the system is traceability of payment in-
structions. The smart card stores all e-check transaction details. Because of limited
memory in the card, they have to be returned to either the issuer or to a trusted third
party (TTP). This raises the issue of payer privacy for transaction details because the
issuer or TTP will be able to obtain all transaction details including the purchasing
details of the payer, opening payer’s privacy issues.
4.4.2 Bearer e-checks
Despite the efforts dedicated to the study of electronic checks in general, to the
best of our knowledge, there is only one proposal that addresses the problem of
electronic bearer checks [106]. In this scheme [106], an e-check is payable to any
person who presents it for payment at the bank, but the amount of money is trans-
ferred from the payer’s account to the payee’s account. So, the scheme inherits the
same problem that the vast majority of order e-checks, where the bank transfers the
authority to draw e-checks to the payer (signer). That is, the payment of the e-check
to the bearer is not guaranteed. Thus, it is not useful for payments of large amounts
of money.
The authorsmention that their solution is offline, however, the scheme requires
the interventionof a new entity, a third party (TTS - Time-StampService), for double-
spending detection support. The TTS is contacted by the payee at the transfer pro-
tocol. At this stage, the entity receiving the e-check verifies two things: the authen-
ticity of the e-check (non-forgery), and the proof of possession of the entity trying to
transfer the e-check. However, the way for proving whether the e-check has already
been used is contacting the bank, and that is not considered by the authors. Of
course, offline schemes can decrease the overhead of transactions but they can also
reduce the level of security. Moreover, in the scheme proposed in [106], different
e-checks from a same customer can be linked because a consumer’s pseudonym is
included in each e-check, thus, it detracts from payer privacy.
Finally, a very important issue is that the proposal in [106] does not allow a real
transferability, in the sense that an e-check cannot be transferred indefinitely from
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a payer to a payee without being necessary a deposit to a bank, and without losing
payee’s anonymity.
We proposed an scheme for electronic bearer bank checks [117] based on hash
operations. In this scheme, when the bearer of the e-check must prove he is the
legitimate owner of the e-check, he must send a secret value. This secret value
is linked to a public value embedded in the e-check, and these values are related
through a hash operation. Thus, if problems arise, and the e-check cannot be de-
posited or transferred, the secret value is revealed to the bank or the TTP (used for
providing fairness). In this case, the bearer of the e-check can lose the fairness in
the e-check process, and even worst, the bank or the TTP could be in an advanta-
geous position. That is, a fraudulent bank or TTP may try to cash the e-check, or
they could provide another entity with the secret value linked to the e-check. So,
the e-check could be cashed or transferred by an entity other than the legitimate
owner of the e-check.
Our proposal [117] [106] [105] [107] [24] [25] [118]
Unforgeability X X X X X X X X
Non-overspending X X X X X X X X
Anonymity X X ∗ X ∗ – – ∗
Transferability X ∗ – – – – – –
Untraceability X X – – – – – –
Fairness X ∗ – – – – – –
Operations
Payment ON ON OFF ON/OFF ON OFF ON ON/OFF
Transfer ON ON ON – – – – –
Drawer B B Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr Pr
XYES –NO ∗ partially ON online OFF offline
Table 4.1: E-Check Solutions - A Comparative Analysis
4.4.3 Conclusions
The Table 4.1 shows a comparison of the requirements met by the proposals pre-
sented in section 4.4 and our proposal. As a conclusion, we want to emphasize
that although there are a few solutions accomplishing e-check definition, theirmain
drawback is that they are designed for order or nominative e-check scenarios where
payee’s identity is provided in the e-check. Although authors such as Hsin et al.
[105] point out their schemes can be adapted to support another type of checks, the
fact is that they aremainly designed towork as non-anonymous checkswhere payer
and payee are identified in both payment and deposit phase. In fact, the solutions
are not real bank e-checks where the amount is fixed and guaranteed by the bank
at the issuing phase. Most of the authors have focused their efforts on allowing to
fix payer’s information and the face-value at the payment phase, but if the funds are
not guaranteed, the corresponding check translates into a loss for the payee. More-
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over, no solution allows a real transferability. Therefore, new solutions are needed
to accomplish with the requirements of anonymous, transferable and guaranteed
e-checks, in addition to maintain fairness in all processes involving an e-check as
defined in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.5 Cryptographic Background: Zero-Knowledge Protocol
In this section, we briefly review a zero-knowledge protocol which will be used in
our proposal as a building block. The aim of a zero-knowledge protocol is to al-
low a user A (the prover) to prove to another user B (the verifier) that A knows a
secret without revealing the secret to B (the verifier). This kind of protocol must
be complete and sound. Completeness means that an honest prover succeeds in
convincing an honest verifier, and soundness means that a dishonest prover does
not succeed in convincing the verifier of a false statement. In our proposal we use
the protocol defined by [119] because it was designed to be very fast and efficient,
mainly on the amount of computation performed by the prover (probably a mobile
device in our scheme).
In [119], the protocol is defined for a cyclic group Gq of order q with generator
g , more formally: Gq = 〈g 〉 = {g q : q ∈Z∗n}.
In order to prove the knowledge of a secret value x = logg y , the prover interacts
with the verifier as follows:
(1) PoKCommi tment : the prover generates a random value r
R
← Zq and sends
pokCo = g r to the verifier;
(2) PoKChallenge: the verifier replies with a challenge pokCh chosen at random
pokCh
R
← Zq ;
(3) PoKResponse: after receiving pokCh , the prover sends the third and last mes-
sage (the response) pokR = (r +pokCh ·x) mod q .
The verifier accepts, if: g pokR ≡ pokCo · ypokCh
For clarity, weuse thenotation introduced by [120] for proof of knowledge. Thus,
the scheme introduced above is expressed as follows: PK {(x) : y = g x }. In our pro-
posal, a payer or payee act as prover for convincing a verifier (payee or bank, re-
spectively) that he is the legitimate owner of an e-check using the PK scheme.
4.6 An Electronic Bearer Bank Check Scheme
In this section we present an electronic bearer bank check scheme that accom-
plishes all the requirements defined in section 4.3. Table 4.2 shows the notation
used along with the protocols description.
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4.6.1 Overview and Data Structure of the e-check
Remember that we can differentiate five participants in our scheme (see 4.2): the
payer (Pr ), the payee (Pe ), the issuer (I ), the acquirer (A) and a trusted third party
(TTP). In order to simplify the explanation we assume, as the vast majority of pro-
posals, that the payer and the payee are working with the same bank (I and A are
the same entity). In a real situation they may be different, and the current system of
clearing can be used.
Protocol Entities
Pr Entity who requests an e-check to the bank
Pe Entity who receives an e-check from Pr
I Bank responsible for managing e-checks
TTP Trusted third party involved in dispute resolution
General Used Notation
H(x) One-way collision resistant hash function over x
sKX and pKX X ’s key pair from a public key cryptosystem
Cer tX Public key certificate of entity X
SX (m) Digital signature ofmmade by entity X
x
R
← Z∗n x randomly chosen from Z
∗
n set
EX (m) -DX (m) Asymmetric encryption and decryption ofm using X ’s key
sX X ’s secret value from the PK scheme
wX X ’s Bank Account Number
τu Timemark indicating when an evidence was generated by the TTP
EC Electronic Check
Γ Content of an electronic check
Content of an electronic bearer bank check Γ
cid Text indicating the type of the e-check
Iid I ’s identification
Q Face value of the e-check
pX X ’s public value associated to sX
tcd Optional field about the way the e-check can be cashed
τexp Information about until when the e-check can be deposited
lcd Information about where the e-check can be deposited
Table 4.2: Notation Used in the Protocols Description
Figure 4.1 shows the protocol flow and the interactions among all involved par-
ticipants. Our scheme consists of threemain protocols and three dispute resolution
protocols whose objective is explained as follows:
• Payment protocol: this is the protocol by means of a user (the payer) obtains
an e-check with the agreement of his bank (issuer), and gives it to the payee.
The e-check is signed by the bank.
• Deposit or cashing protocol: this is the protocol by means of the holder of the
e-check (a payee) can deposit or obtain cash for an e-check at the bank.
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• Transfer protocol: this is the protocol by means of a user (a payee than now
acts as a payer) can transfer an e-check to another user (a new payee).
• Payment resolution protocol: this protocol will be invoked by the payer of an
e-check in case the bank does not follow the steps of the payment protocol.
• Deposit/Cashing resolution protocol: this protocol will be invoked by the bank
or the bearer of an e-check in case the other part does not follow the steps of
the deposit protocol.
• Transfer resolution protocol: this protocol will be invoked by the bank or the
bearer of an e-check in case the other part does not follow the steps of the
transfer protocol.
The dispute resolution protocols are necessary to ensure that no party involved
in an e-check payment, transfer or deposit, gains an unfair advantage over the other
party bymisbehaving, misrepresenting or by prematurely aborting the protocol ex-
ecution.
Figure 4.1: Protocol Flow and Involved Entities
Next, we define the format of an electronic bearer bank check in our scheme as
follows:
EC = [Γ,S I (Γ)] where Γ = (cid , Iid ,Q ,pX , tcd ,τexp , lcd )
The type of e-check determines its content as explained in section 4.1. The e-
check we are considering is an electronic bearer bank check, so the term "bearer
check" is contained on the e-check in order to fulfil legal requirements (cid = "bearer
check"). Iid is the identity of the bank issuing the e-check. Q is the amount to be
paid to the bearer of the e-check. pX is the public value of the PK scheme (ex-
plained in section 4.5). The secret value of thePK scheme sX must be only knownby
the owner of the e-check. The pair of values sX , pX will be used to verify if the entity
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trying to use the e-check is the legitimate and unique owner of the e-check execut-
ing the three step protocol defined in section 4.5. Note that pX is a fully anonymous
parameter: nobody can infer from this parameter the real identity of the owner of
an e-check. Optionally, the e-check contains a date (τexp ) and a place (lcd ) showing
when and where the e-check can be cashed or deposited. tcd is also an optional
parameter indicating if the e-check can be paid over the counter at the bank (open
check), or must be deposited at the bearer’s bank account (crossed check). Finally
we find the signature of the bank (I ) on the previous information (S I (Γ)).
4.6.2 Payment Protocol
Let us suppose Pr has to pay an amountQ to Pe . The payment protocolmust follow
the next steps (see figure 4.2):
Step 1. First of all Pe initiates the PK scheme. She obtains a secret value sPe , and a
public one pPe . This public value (pPe ) will be used as a proof of possession
of the e-check by Pe , and it will be necessary for transferring, depositing
and cashing operations in order the bank can verify that the bearer of the
e-check is its legitimate holder. This validation is carried out using the in-
teractive proof of knowledge protocol defined in section 4.5. Moreover, Pe
sends Q and 〈p,g ,q〉Pe to Pr . This information is signed by Pe to prevent
impersonation attacks [121].
Step 2. Pr verifies the signed data received from Pe . If it passes validations, Pr can
request I to generate an e-check. Pr provides I all information required to
draw the e-check. We call this information pre-check (∆), which contains
the face value (Q), the public values provided by Pe (〈p,g ,q〉Pe ), the type of
e-check to be issued ( cid = "bearer check") and his bank account number
(wPr ). The previous information is signed and sent along with his digital
certificate (Cer tPr ).
Step 3. I has to verify the identity of Pr and the pre-check’s signature. I has also to
check if Pr is a legitimate client of I and he has funds, or evenwithout funds,
if he is authorized to be issued an e-check for that amount (∆.Q). We assume
that this is the case (in other case an error message has to be sent). Then I
diminishes the amount ∆.Q from the payer’s account and issues a valid e-
check, with the amount ∆.Q and the public value provided by Pe (〈pPe 〉).
The identity of the bank (Iid ) has to be embedded in the e-check because
of legal requirements. I stores (〈EC,〈p,g ,q〉Pe ,w I 〉) for e-check validation
purposes when transferring and depositing. w I is the I ’s bank account from
which the e-check must be cashed. This bank transfer guarantees the pay-
ment of the e-check to its bearer. Finally, I sends the e-check to Pr . Note
that Pe remains anonymous in front of I .
Step 4. Pr verifies the received EC. Now Pr can change this e-check with Pe , typi-
cally for a service or a product, and involving a protocol for fair exchange of
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Payee (Pe) Payer (Pr ) Issuer (I )
M1 =m1,SPe (m1)
M2 =m2,SPr (m2),Cer tPr
M3 = EC = [Γ,S I (Γ)]
M4 = EC = [Γ,S I (Γ)]
m1 =Q ,〈p,g ,q〉Pe
m2 = ∆= cid ,Q ,〈p,g ,q〉Pe ,wPr
Γ = cid , Iid ,Q ,pPe , tcd ,τexp , lcd
Figure 4.2: Payment Protocol Flow
values. This kind of protocols can be found in the literature [122, 123, 124],
and it is out of the scope of part of this dissertation.
Step 5. Pe can verify that the EC received from Pr is a valid e-check, issued by I and
that she is the owner of the EC using her secret value 〈sPe 〉.
This first protocol could bedivided into twoprotocols: one to obtain the e-check
and the other one to pay with it. But in fact, it would be a waste of time and re-
sources, as explained next. Let us suppose we use two different protocols: one to
obtain an e-check and the other one to pay with it. In this case, the payer requests
the issue of an e-check to the bank. The payer provides his public value from the PK
scheme, alongwith the required information. Then the bank issues the e-check em-
bedding that data. Later, the payer can run the payment protocol; the payer must
contact the bank again, andmust prove he is the legitimate owner of the e-check ex-
ecuting the interactive proof of knowledge protocol defined in section 4.5. Finally,
the payee must provide her public value from the PK scheme and the bank must
sign a new e-check embedding the new public value.
As we can see, the above process requires that some of the protocols steps have
to be run several times. For example, the bank must sign the e-check twice. In
our proposal, the payer can directly request an e-check and pay with it in the same
process. This way, we reduce the computational cost on the participants, as we will
show in section 4.7.4.
Payment resolution protocol
If the bank I does not send themessage of Step 3 in the payment protocol (see figure
4.3), I has the consent of Pr to transfer an amount Q from Pr ’s bank account to I ’s
bank account, but Pr has not received the e-check corresponding to that transfer.
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Payer (Pr ) Trusted Third Party Issuer (I )
M1 =m2, Iid ,SPr (m2),SPr (m2, Iid ),Cer tPr
M2 =m2,SPr (m2),STTP (m2)
M3 = EC
M4 = EC
M5 = ev,STTP (ev)
IF OK: the TTP forwardsmessage to I
ELSE: the TTP sends evidence ev
(either I does not responds
or response is wrong)
ev problemwith I and Pr ’s consent: ∆,wPr ,τu
m2 = ∆= cid ,Q ,〈p,g ,q〉Pe ,wPr
Figure 4.3: Payment Resolution Protocol Flow
So, Pr has to contact the TTP to resolve the conflict, following the next steps (see
figure 4.3):
Step 1. Pr sends theTTP the informationhe sent to I at Step 2 in thepayment proto-
col (m2 = ∆ and Cer tPr ), along with the bank’s identity (Iid ). That informa-
tion is the Pr ’s consent to issue an e-check for an amountQ and to withdraw
an amountQ from the Pr ’s bank account.
Step 2. The TTP checks the information provided by Pr . If it passes validations,
the TTP will try to contact I ; if I replies according to the protocol, i.e., it
sends the issued EC to the TTP m3, the TTP will retransmit EC to Pr and
the protocol will finalize successfully. If I does not reply according to the
protocol, theTTPwill send an evidence signedmessage toPr (ev,STTP (ev)),
indicating a problemwith I and Pr ’s consent (∆) at time τu , in order Pr can
use it in front of a court. If necessary, this evidence allows Pr to recover the
money transferred by I from Pr ’s bank account.
4.6.3 Deposit/Cashing Protocol
An electronic bearer bank check can be deposited or cashed (as explained in section
4.6.1). The main difference is that, in the first case, the bearer (payer or payee) of
the e-check loses his anonymity (but he can transfer it anonymously, see section
4.6.4), while in the second one the bearer can remain anonymous. We assume that
the bearer of an e-check (P ) wants to deposit it at his bank (I ), and remember that,
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for clarity, the payer and the payee are working with the same bank. If it is not the
case, the bank of the payee (A) should have to contact with the bank of the payer
I (a clearance process) in order to verify that the e-check is valid: it has not been
deposited or transferred previously. The deposit protocol is as follows (see figure
4.4):
Step 1. When depositing, P has to send a valid EC to I . Additionally P has to pro-
vide his identity (Cer tP ) in order to deposit the amount Q in the correct
bank accountwP (in a cashing procedureP is not compelled to send neither
his identity nor wP ). Moreover, P must generate and send a commitment
value (pokCo) following the PK scheme. Similarly to the payment protocol,
P signs that information to be used with two purposes: as the P ’s consent to
deposit EC and as a mechanism to prevent impersonation attacks.
Step 2. I verifies: wP is a valid bank account at I , EC is a valid e-check (valid sig-
nature and non-expired) and it has not been deposited previously. If the
e-check is in the I ’s database of used e-checks, it means that it is a trial of
overspending the e-check. In this case I signs a proof of this fact, evidence
that can be used if disputes arise. If the e-check has not been used, I must
generate a challenge value (pokCh) following the PK scheme. I sends the
PK along with a message indicating that the e-check is blocked (pending of
finishing the deposit procedure).
Step 3. P checks if the status of EC is blocked, and uses his public value (pP ) and the
challenge value (pokCh) sent by I to calculate the response value (pokR).
This value is encrypted with I ’s public key and sent to I .
Step 4. I decrypts the value pokR . Now the bank verifies if P is the owner of EC
using the equation (1), section 4.5. If it passes validation, it proves P is the
legitimate owner of the e-check. Finally, I registers EC as an used e-check
for future trials of overspending, and increases P ’s account by Γ.Q . If the
verification fails, I sends an error message to P .
In case of cashing, I pays, over the counter, the face value of the e-check
Γ.Q to P . Obviously, in this case P has to physically be at the bank for the
cashing of the e-check.
Step 5. P verifies the message from I to know if the EC has been deposited or not.
Deposit/cashing resolution protocol
We can differentiate three cases depending on the entity who is not acting properly
and the step at which the protocol was interrupted. All resolution protocols have a
similar structure as the explained in Figure 4.3, but there are two main differences:
the message sent by the entity who requests the conflict resolution, and the evi-
dence generated by the trusted third party. Thus, for simplicity, wewill only explain
the main goal of each resolution protocol.
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Bearer (P ) Issuer (I )
M1 =m1,SP (m1),Cer tP
M2 =m2,S I (m2)
M3 =m3,SP (m3)
M4 =m4,S I (m4)
m1 = EC,wP ,pokCo
IF spent
m2 = {EC spent, proo f s}
ELSE PoKChallenge: pokCh = c
R
←−C⊆ [0,(q −1)]
m2 = {EC blocked, Γ.p,pokCh}
m3 = E I (pokR)
m4 = {EC deposited,wP }
Figure 4.4: Deposit Protocol Flow
• In the first case, if I does not proceed with the message of Step 2 (m2), unin-
tentionally or intentionally1 , P could not deposit the e-check before its expi-
ration date (Γ.τexp ), causing a loss for P . Thus, P has to contact the TTP send-
ing the deposit request previously sent to I (m1). The TTP checks the infor-
mation provided by P . If it passes validations, the TTP will try to contact I ; if
I replies according to the protocol (m2), the TTP will retransmit the informa-
tion toP , and the protocol will finalize successfully. If I does not reply accord-
ing to the protocol, the TTP will send a signed evidence to P (ev,STTP (ev)),
indicating a problem with I and the attempt of deposit at time (τu) ( ev =
problem with I and EC P’s deposit , wP , τu ).
• In the second case, if I does not proceed with the message of Step 4 (m4), P
has not received a deposit confirmation. Thus, P has to contact the TTP send-
ing the e-check blocked message received from I (m2,S I (m2)) along with the
response value previously sent to I (m3,SP (m3)). The TTP checks the infor-
mation provided by P . If it passes validations, the TTP will try to contact I .
If I replies according to the protocol (m4), the TTP will retransmit the infor-
mation to P , and the protocol will finalize successfully because the e-check
was deposited and P has a deposit confirmation from I . If I does not reply
according to the protocol, the TTP will send a signed evidence message to P
(ev,STTP (ev)), indicating a problemwith I and the attempt of deposit at time
τu (ev = problem with I and EC P’s deposit , wP , τu ).
1For example, P could be under a DoS attack [125, 126].
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• In the third case, if P does not proceed with the message of Step 3 (m3), it
means that the e-check will remain blocked and perhaps it is an attempt of
trap (the real owner of the e-check can be another user). I has to contact
the TTP to resolve the conflict. To do this, I sends the TTP the deposit re-
quest received from P (m1,SP (m1)) along with the e-check blocked message
(m2,S I (m2)) . The TTP will try to contact P ; if P replies with the response
value (m3 = E I (pokR)), the TTP will retransmit the information to I , and the
deposit protocol will continue its execution. If P does not reply according to
the protocol, the TTP will send a signed evidence to I (ev,STTP (ev)), autho-
rizing I to unblock the e-check at time τu (ev = the TTP authorizes I to
unblock EC, τu).
Note that the e-check is anonymous, and the owner of the e-check P has not
been identified by the bank during the payment or the transfer process. As the TTP
must contact P , P should provide to the bank an anonymous e-mail address at the
deposit stage. This way, the TTP can contact P , and in turn P can maintain his
anonymity.
4.6.4 Transfer Protocol
In this case, the owner (Pr ) of an e-check wants to transfer it to another user (Pe),
and the latter wants to remain anonymous, i.e. Pr probably knows Pe , but Pe wants
nobody else to know she will be the owner of the e-check (even the bank). The
transfer protocol is as follows (see figure 4.5):
Step 1. In the first step Pr sends to Pe the e-check, in order Pe can verify Pr has a
valid e-check.
Step 2. Pe verifies that the e-check is valid (valid signature, non-expired) and setups
PK scheme. From this setup, Pe obtains a secret value (〈sPe 〉), and a public
one (〈pPe 〉). These values are analogous to those generated by Pe at the pay-
ment phase (see section 4.6.2). The set of public values (〈p,g ,q〉Pe ) is signed
by Pe (to prevent impersonation attacks [121]), and sent to Pr .
Step 3. Pr verifies Pe ’s digital signature of 〈p,g ,q〉Pe . Next, Pr demands to his bank
to change the public value linked to EC. Pr has to send to I the e-check
and the public values 〈p,g ,q〉Pe protected in order an impostor could not
change them. Along with these values, Pr must generate and send a com-
mitment value pokCo starting the interactive three steps PK protocol. This
way, Pr will prove he is the legitimate owner of EC and in turn he is autho-
rized to transfer it.
Step 4. I verifies that the e-check is not spent yet, as in Step 2 of the deposit proto-
col. If the e-check has not been previously used, the status of the e-check
changes to blocked waiting for a future action from Pr (or the TTP if con-
flicts arise). It means that neither I nor other users can do nothing with that
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e-check. I generates a challenge value (pokCh ) using the commitment value
(pokCo) sent by Pr and following the PK scheme. After that, I sends a mes-
sage containing pokCh and indicating that the e-check is blocked (pending
of finishing the transfer procedure) for the values Γ.pPr −pPe .
Step 5. Similarly to Step 3 in the deposit protocol, Pr checks if the status of EC is
blocked, and uses his public pPr value and the challenge value pokCh sent
by I to calculate the response value pokR . This value is encrypted with I ’s
public key and sent to I .
Step 6. I decrypts the value pokR , and uses the equation (1) (see section 4.5) to
verify if Pr is the owner of EC : g pokR
?
≡ pokCo · (Γ.pPr )
pokCh . If it passes vali-
dation, I changes the EC’s owner adding Pe ’s public value (pPe ) provided by
Pr in Step 3 of this protocol. I stores the collected proofs during the transfer
process linked to the e-check, and the modified EC′ is sent to Pr .
Step 7. Pr can send the modified e-check EC′ to Pe . Probably this e-check will be
the item exchanged for another item using a protocol for fair exchange of
values (this part is out of scope of this protocol).
Step 8. Finally, Pe can verify she has a valid e-check, and more important, that she
is the only entity that can deposit or transfer this e-check, because she is the
owner of the secret value (〈sPe 〉) linked to EC
′ via Γ.pPe .
NowPe can deposit or transfer EC′. Wewant to remark that the protocol is anon-
ymous for originator (Pr ) and recipient (Pe ) in front of the bank. I will only know
that this e-check was issued some day to somebody, but now it can be transferred
anonymously to other entities. Moreover, and a key issue, the secret value is never
disclosed to any party other than the e-check owner.
Transfer resolution protocol
The entity transferring the e-check or the bank could not fulfil the flow of the trans-
fer protocol. We can differentiate three cases depending on the entity who is not
acting properly and the step at which the protocol was interrupted, similarly to the
deposit resolution protocol.
• In the first case, if I does not proceed with message of Step 4 (m4), Pr can-
not transfer the e-check to Pe . Thus, Pr has to contact the TTP sending the
transfer request previously sent to I (m3). The TTP checks the information
provided by Pr . If it is correct, the TTP will try to contact I ; if I replies with the
e-check blocked message, waiting transfer completion (m4,S I (m4)), the TTP
will retransmit the information toPr , and the protocol will continue its execu-
tion. If I does not reply according to the protocol, the TTP will send a signed
evidence to P (ev,STTP (ev)), indicating a problem with I and the attempt of
transfer at time τu (ev = problem with EC’s transfer , Γ.pPr −pPe ,τu ).
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Payee (Pe) Payer (Pr ) Issuer (I )
M1 = EC = [Γ,S I (Γ)]
M2 =m2,SPe (m2)
M3 = EC,E I (m2−pokCo)
M4 =m4,S I (m4)
M5 = E I (pokR )
M6 = EC
′
M7 = EC
′
m2 = 〈p,g ,q〉Pe
m4 = {EC blocked, Γ.pPr −pPe ,pokCh}
Figure 4.5: Transfer Protocol Flow
• In the second case, if I does not proceed with message of Step 6 (m6), Pr has
not received themodified e-check. This case is similar to the explained above.
Themain difference is the proof provided byPr to the TTP (m4,m5). But it has
the same resolution flow, with the same evidence provided by the TTP in case
I does not respond.
• In the third case, if Pr does not proceed with message of Step 5 (m5), the e-
check will remain blocked. This case matches up with the resolution case
explained in section 4.6.3. I must send the TTP the transfer request received
from Pr (m3) along with the e-check blocked message (m4,S I (m4)). The TTP
will try to contactPr and ifPr replieswith the response value (m5 = E I (pokR)),
the TTP will retransmit the information to I , and the transfer protocol will
continue its execution. If Pr does not reply according to the protocol, the TTP
will send a signed evidence to I (ev,STTP (ev)), authorizing I to unblock the
e-check at time τu (ev = the TTP authorizes I to unblock EC, τu).
In order to allow the TTP to contact Pr anonymously, the same process ex-
plained in section 4.6.3 (anonymous e-mail) can be used.
4.7 Discussion of Requirements Fulfilment
In this section we present an analysis of our scheme in order to prove that it fulfils
the security, functional and juridical requirements defined in section 4.3.
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4.7.1 Security Requirements
First we will review the accomplishment of the core fair exchange requirements.
CLAIM 4.1: e-check Effectiveness: If all participants in a transaction follow the
protocol rules, the TTP will not intervene.
PROOF. In section 4.6.2 we have the description of the payment protocol, and as
explained, only the payee Pe , the payer Pr and the issuer I are involved in a correct
execution of the protocol (see figure 4.2). In section 4.6.3 we have the description of
the deposit/cashing protocol, and as defined by the protocol, only the bearer B and
the issuer I are involved in an execution (see figure 4.4). In section 4.6.4 we have
the definition of the transfer protocol flow, and as it is explained, only the payee Pe ,
the payer Pr and the issuer I are involved in a correct protocol execution. Therefore
we can affirm that in any transaction defined in the e-check scheme presented in
this section: payment, deposit and transfer, the TTP will only intervene in case of
dispute.
CLAIM 4.2: e-check Fairness: At the end of an exchange between two or more
entities, either everybody achieve the expected items, or nobody can stand in a privi-
leged situation.
PROOF. If we assume Pr and Pe are honest, whatever the behaviour of I , Pr
and Pe maintain fairness. There are three possibilities in which I can try to obtain
advantage in front of clients:
1. At the payment phase I can obtain the consent of Pr to transfer the money
from Pr ’s bank account to a guaranteed I ’s bank account, but Pr does not
receive the corresponding EC from I . Pr will contact the TTP and if I does not
respond, Pr will receive proof to cancel the transfer from his account to I ’s
bank account. If I responds, Pr will obtain the corresponding EC.
2. At the deposit phase, two possibilities can arise:
a) I ignores the request from Pr to deposit the EC. Due to the EC has an
expiration time, Pr could lose the money. Pr will contact the TTP and if
I does not respond, Pr will receive proof with a time mark indicating I
is misbehaving at the deposit phase and before EC has expired.
b) After Step 3 I has the secret value linked to the EC, so I has all the re-
quired information about the EC. If the bearer of the EC does not receive
confirmation of deposit from I , the bearer will contact the TTP and if I
does not respond, he will receive proof demonstrating I has not made
the deposit.
3. At the transfer phase, I could prevent transferring EC, similar to the deposit
phase explained above. Thus, Pr will contact the TTP. If I does not respond,
Pr will receive proof to cancel the transfer. If I responds, Pr will obtain the
new EC.
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If we assume I is honest, whatever the behaviour of Pr and Pe , I maintains fairness.
There are two possibilities inwhich participants can try to obtain advantage in front
of I : when transferring and when depositing. In both cases, the same problem ap-
pears: the EC could remain blocked if P does not follow Step 3 when depositing or
Step 5 when transferring. In order to unblock the EC, I contacts and sends to the
TTP the evidence proving P ’s intention to transfer or to deposit the EC (SP (EC,wP )).
The TTP provides I with the authorization to unblock the EC if the bearer of the EC
does not respond, allowing I to accept new operations with the EC.
Fairness of the protocols for paying, depositing and transferring is guaranteed, if
necessary with the involvement of the TTP. If parties behave according to the proto-
cols, they will have at the end of the execution what they want: a payment, a deposit
or a transfer for an e-check. If some party misbehaves (or even if an unfair situation
arises due to communication problems), the TTP will solve the unfair situation or
will provide proof of misbehaviour in order to repair it in front of a court.
CLAIM 4.3: e-check Timeliness: Every protocol execution will finish in a finite
amount of time, without any participant losing fairness.
PROOF. In the case of the payment protocol, the role of the issuer I is to answer
the payer Pr request of an e-check, therefore as soon as it answers it can consider
the protocol finished. The resolution protocol allows the payer Pr to contact the
TTP and claim the check if he does not receive it from the issuer I . Therefore we
can affirm that the issuer I and the payer Pr can be sure the protocol finishes in a
finite amount of time, either because they follow the protocol flow or they contact
the TTP. And in any situation fairness is maintained. In the case of the payee Pe , the
exchange of messages M1 and M4 (figure 4.2) can be part of another fair exchange
(another payment protocol), which is out of the scope, e.g., M1 can be considered
as the end of a negotiation phase, andM4 the firstmessage of a fair exchange of val-
ues protocol, where they exchange an e-check for a service/receipt or digital goods.
Therefore, as a fair exchange protocol it meets the timeliness requirement.
In the case of the deposit protocol (figure 4.4), if the bearer P fails to receiveM2
orM4 he can contact the TTP to resolve the protocol execution, whereas the issuer
I can do the same if it fails to receive M3, therefore we can affirm that both bearer
P and issuer I can be sure that the protocol execution will end in a finite amount of
time, and that they will maintain fairness.
In the transfer protocol (figure 4.5), the payer Pr can contact the TTP if he fails
to receive M4 or M6 from the issuer I , whereas the issuer can contact the TTP if
it fails to receive M5 from the payer Pr . In any case, both (Pr and I ) can be sure
the protocol execution will finish either because they follow the protocol flow or
because they contact the TTP, and that they will maintain fairness. The payee Pe is
in the same situation that in the payment protocol, his exchange of messages with
the payer Pr is considered a fair exchange of values, out of the scope of the e-check
scheme. But as fair exchange protocol it must meet the timeliness requirement.
Therefore, we can affirm that any transaction in the e-check scheme will finish
in a finite amount of time either because the participants follow the corresponding
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protocol or because they contact the TTP, timeliness is met.
CLAIM 4.4: e-checkNon-repudiation: None of the participants in a transaction
can deny having participated nor be excluded of it.
PROOF. In the payment protocol (figure 4.2), the payer Pr requests an e-check
sendingM2, amessage that includes his signature, therefore he cannot deny having
requested it. The issuer I answers with the e-check EC which includes its identity,
therefore he cannot deny having issued it.
In the deposit protocol (figure 4.4), both bearer P and issuer I sign their corre-
sponding messages, therefore they cannot deny having requested the deposit of an
e-check or having deposited it. In the case of cashing the e-check, P does not sign
any message, but uses his public value pP and the challenge value pokCh sent by I
to generate the response value pokR , proving he is the owner. Therefore I can use
this pokR to prove the owner cashed the e-check.
In the transferring protocol (figure 4.5), the payer Pr does not sign the messages
he sends to the issuer I , but he proves he is the owner following the PK scheme
(as in the cashing protocol), whereas the issuer signs all its messages. Therefore the
payer Pr as owner of the e-check cannot deny having requested the transfer of it
(he cannot claim ownership of an e-check and deny having transferred it), and the
issuer cannot deny having changed the e-check’s ownership.
Thus, we can conclude that the e-check scheme meets the non-repudiation re-
quirement.
Following we review the specific security requirements.
CLAIM 4.5: Unforgeability: Only authorized entities can issue valid e-checks.
PROOF. Only I can issue a valid EC, and only an EC signed by I can be valid.
Therefore forgery is not possible. If an entity tries to modify information contained
in an EC, the validation of the signature of that EC allows detecting whether its con-
tent has been modified. The forgery of a complete EC is not feasible because the
payment and the transfer procedures require the knowledge of I ’s private key in or-
der to create a valid EC. Therefore nobody but I can create a valid EC because only
I knows the required private key.
CLAIM 4.6: Non-overspending: An e-check only belongs to one user at a given
time.
PROOF. When transferring or depositing an EC, I must verify if the presented EC
is already spent, i.e., if the status of the EC in I ’s database is spent. This is possible
because the scheme is online, thus, I is involved in each procedure, and he must
verify the status of the EC.
The EC’s status changes to spent when depositing, so an EC can be spent only
once since the bankmaintains a database of ECs that have been used, and therefore
it is impossible the overspending of an EC.
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CLAIM 4.7: Anonymity: Payers and payees remain anonymous in non-identified
processes related to the e-check.
PROOF. At the payment phase, we can observe that the receiver (Pe) remains
anonymous in front of the bank (I ). This entity does not know who will hold the
e-check rights. The information which I can access is Pr ’s identity and the set of
public values generated by Pe (〈p,g ,q〉Pe ). But I cannot infer Pe ’s identity from that
set of public values. It is even possible to pay with the e-check maintaining the an-
onymity of the sender (perhaps other problems can arise related to the purchase if
the client is not identified, but not for the payment itself). The same happens at the
transfer phase: the receiver (Pe) is not identified to carry out the operation. Pr can
transfer the e-check and only the receiver will be able to identify who Pr is. With
respect the EC, it conveys information about I ’s identity but not about the holder
of the EC. The only data generated by the holder and included in the EC is pPe ,
but it does not reveal any data about Pe ’s identity. Therefore, any entity other than
a bank’s client requesting the issue of an e-check or depositing the e-check in his
bank account, remains anonymous.
CLAIM 4.8: Transferability: A payee can transfer a received e-check to another
payee without depositing or cashing the e-check, and without losing anonymity.
PROOF. It is not necessary to deposit a received e-check: an e-check can be
transferred. When Pr transfers an e-check to Pe , Pr must prove he is the actual
owner of this e-check and request I to change the public value of the PK (pPr ) em-
bedded in the EC to a new one, pPe . At the end of the process, the new EC owner (Pe)
has an electronic check that contains her pPe . So, she is the only party that knows
the secret value linked to that EC. In addition, I hasmarked as used the public value
pPr . Thus, Pr can no longer prove he is the owner of the EC. Now, nobody but Pe
can transfer or deposit the EC.
Moreover, the requirements of unforgeability, non-overspending and anonym-
ity are met when transferring, as proved in claims 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, respectively.
Therefore, the transferability requirement is met.
CLAIM 4.9: Untraceability: An e-check cannot be linked to a particular payee in
a chain of transfers in front of the bank.
PROOF. A payee does not need to reveal her identity neither in the payment
protocol nor in the transfer protocol to I . As explained in claims 4.7 and 4.8, the
anonymity of a payee is guaranteed during the payment and transfer protocol. Of
course, the first payer (client of the bank who requests the issue of an e-check) and
the last payee (who deposits the e-check in her bank account) are the two entities
that can be traced. In fact, the e-check does not contain personal or related infor-
mation of involved entities. Therefore, the intermediaries entities in the chain of
transfers cannot be identified by the bank.
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4.7.2 Functional Requirements
CLAIM 4.10: Online Operations: Payment with an e-check, and transferring or de-
positing an e-check requires a persistent connection with the bank.
PROOF. Deposit operations have to be online in order to verify the e-check is
valid and avoid overspending. It may be questioned whether the transfer operation
should be online based on service availability issues, but we insist that nowadays it
is not a serious drawback (what about credit card operations in present millions of
operations). However, this must be online for proving EC is not spent before trans-
ferring. As explained in section 4.6 all the protocols require the online involvement
of the bank.
CLAIM 4.11: Efficiency: Processing an e-check is not computer consuming,main-
ly, on the client side.
PROOF. We proof this claim through a performance comparison conducted in
section 4.7.4.
4.7.3 Juridical Requirements
CLAIM 4.12: Content: The content of an e-check includes all the required data.
PROOF. EC = [Γ,S I (Γ)] where Γ = (cid , Iid ,Q ,pX , tcd ,τexp , lcd ) depicts the con-
tent of the e-check. As explained in section 4.6.1, EC contains both mandatory and
non mandatory data required for an electronic bearer bank check as specified in
section 4.1, where the identity of the drawer is I .
CLAIM 4.13: Drawee and drawer: The bank is the drawer and the drawee of the
e-checks.
PROOF. EC = [Γ,S I (Γ)] where S I (Γ) depicts the digital signature of the entity
who signs the e-check. In this case, the drawer is I , because I issues the e-check.
Moreover, the content of the e-check must include the drawee (the entity that must
make the payment), and we can observe the drawee is also I (Γ.Iid ). Therefore, I is
drawer and drawee of the e-check.
4.7.4 Performance Comparison
Weconduct a performance comparison among our schemeandTsao’s scheme [106],
the only previous solution designed for electronic bearer check scenario, as ex-
plained in section 4.4. For the comparison, we consider the computational cost
measured as the operations complexity performed in each protocol run by each in-
volved entity. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we have obtained the
computational cost as the number of long and short exponentiations. The rest of
operations have been considered not significant compared to exponentiation oper-
ations. A hash function cost (e.g. SHA2) can be considered equivalent to two mod-
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ular multiplications. Modular multiplications are negligible respect to exponenti-
ations because an exponentiation with a l-bit exponent is the order of l modular
multiplications. Thus, considering that a short exponentiation is about 160 bits, the
number of modular multiplications required in all proposals is very low with regard
to a modular exponentiation.
Payment Transfer Deposit
Pr Pe I Pr Pe I - TTS P I
[106] 4El +2Es 2El +6Es 5Es El 3El +4Es El 0 3El +4Es
⋆ El +2Es El +2Es El +Es 6Es El +3Es 5El +2Es El +4Es 4El +2Es
Es : short exponentiation, El : long exponentiation,⋆ our proposal
Table 4.3: Performance Comparison
Table 4.3 presents an analytical evaluation of the above parameters. In the pro-
posal of [106], the authors do not include certain operations required for validation
purposes. The most obvious example is the deposit protocol, which requires only
one step. It is clear that, at least, one more step is required, where the bank should
send a signed confirmation of the result of the deposit, and the bearer should check
the validity of that response. So, it is unrealistic that the bearer should not perform
any operation, as reflected in table 4.3. In contrast, our scheme includes all the
messages needed to provide confirmation of the state in each protocol run. Still,
our approach improves the performance on the payer/payee side. For example,
regarding to a transfer process, our protocol reduces the number of required oper-
ation by 1.5 at the payer side and by 2.5 at the payee side with regard to the transfer
process proposed in [106]. This outcome is similar in the payment protocol, where
the payer reduces by 3.5 the number of required operations and the payee requires
around less than half of the operations of Tsao’s scheme [106].
Finally, the results support our proposal to perform the protocols of issuing and
payment in the same process. Our payment protocol is equivalent to the delegation
and payment protocol in [106], so, as shown in table 4.3, the total cost on the payer
and payee is reduced in our scheme, by 3.5 at the payer side, and by 2 at the payee
side.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter of the dissertation a fair and efficient electronic bearer bank check
scheme has been presented. As bearer check scheme, the identity of the owner is
not included in the e-check, which offers him anonymity, and as a bank check, the
e-check funds are assured. The solution proposed meets the core requirements for
fair exchange protocols (effectiveness, fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation),
and five specific security requirements for e-checks. Two of them are generic to e-
check solutions, unforgeability and non-overspending, and the others are achieved
with new mechanisms that improve the security and functionality of the scheme,
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anonymous transferability and untraceability. Moreover, the proposed scheme ac-
complishes a security level similar to crossed checks because the holder of an e-
check must prove he is its legitimate owner, while maintaining his anonymity. Fi-
nally, the electronic bearer bank check scheme provides a lightweight solution for
the client side because this is, normally, the more restrictive participant in terms of
computational resources.
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CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has presented contributions on fair exchange applied to e-com-
merce (digital signature of contracts and payment systems), and certified e-mail.
Following we present these contributions, as well as the future work.
Digital Signature of Contracts.
This dissertation has presented digital Multi-Party Contract Signing (MPCS) solu-
tions for two new scenarios, previously not addressed in the fair exchange literature,
the Atomic Multi-Two Party (AM2P) and the AgentMediated Scenario (AMS). In the
AM2P scenario a consumer wants to sign a contract with a set of providers, with
two particularities: she wants to sign a different contract with each provider, and
she wants either all contract signatures or none. Whereas in the AMS, consumers
access to the providers through intermediaries. These intermediaries are the focus
of the scenario. On one side, an intermediary has to provide a client with some
services, while on the other side, he has to acquire those services from another pro-
vider, which, in turn, may have to contact other providers to acquire the services
requested. Both proposals are optimistic, i.e., if every participant behaves accord-
ing to the protocol rules, and there are no network errors, the TTP will not intervene
in the execution. Regarding the security requirements, both protocols meet all the
core security requirements: effectiveness, fairness, timeliness andnon-repudiation,
and two additional ones: verifiability of the TTP and confidentiality. Additionally,
the AMS protocol meets a specific requirement, the traceability, which allows the
TTP to identify all the participants in a transaction from a single request.
On the other hand, this dissertation presents a study of the efficiency of MPCS
protocols from their architecture point of view. Four of the most used architectures
(ring, sequential, star and mesh) are described, and with them the terms typically
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used to define the efficiency of a protocol, such as message and round. In addi-
tion, we define the term transmission and instead of using the typical messages
and round, we use this transmission term to measure the efficiency of a protocol.
Finally, we present an optimal MPCS solution for each of the architectures defined,
and we prove that those solutions are the most efficient, in terms of number of
transmissions, setting up a new lower bound for the efficiency of MPCS protocols.
As future work in the line of digital signature of contracts, we can define two
main lines of work. On one hand, we have the AMS protocol, which is the first to
address the digital signature of contracts in presence of agent intermediaries. Fur-
ther study on this field should address the efficiency of the protocols, and improve
the security requirements such as traceability, allowing a TTP to automatically trace
a transaction either backwards or forwards, without requiring to contact any partic-
ipant. Even though the solution proposed is optimistic, further work should not dis-
card online solutions, and must also consider other cryptographic primitives such
as hash chains or verifiable encryption. On the other hand we have the study on
the efficiency of MPCS protocols. Future work on this field should include the for-
malization of the base definitions, such as the security requirements and the terms
message, transaction etc. This formalizationwould facilitate the study through sim-
ulations and implementation of the current proposals described and further ones.
Moreover, the results may also be useful in other lines of work, such as formal veri-
fication of protocols.
Certified E-mail.
This dissertation has presented two optimistic Certified Electronic Mail (CEM)
protocols designed with the goal of achieve feasible solutions easy to implement,
use and deploy. Both protocols assume the participation of multiple Mail Trans-
fer Agents (MTAs) in the delivery of a certified message, following the current e-
mail architecture, therefore facilitating its integration in the e-mail infrastructure.
The proposals mimic the asynchronous nature of e-mail clients, where the User
Agents (UAs) synchronize with their MTA at their own will, which facilitates its as-
similation by current e-mail users. The first proposal is the first CEM protocol that
assumes that all the MTAs participating in an execution are untrusted, i.e., they can
misbehave and collude. Whereas the second proposal takes a different approach,
assuming that each UA trusts his ownMTA, reducing the complexity of the first pro-
posal. Both protocols meet all the core fair exchange requirements (effectiveness,
fairness, timeliness and non-repudiation) and two additional ones (verifiability of
TTP and confidentiality). In addition, the protocols also meet a specific require-
ment for CEM protocols, the non-selective receipt, which does not allow the recip-
ient to decide whether to receive a CEM or not, depending on its content. Finally,
since both protocols assume the participation of multiple MTAs, the proposed pro-
tocols provide all the required non-repudiation evidence: origin, submission, deliv-
ery and receipt.
Following the results presented in this dissertation, a natural extension of the
work presented on CEM protocols would be to develop both proposals into real
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applications. This goal implies the study of the current e-mail protocol standards
(SMTP, POP3, etc.) to develop the necessary modifications and/or extensions to
deploy both CEM proposals. The final goal of this line of work would be to make
a proposal of standard for CEM services using the CEM protocols presented in this
dissertation.
Payment Systems.
This dissertation presented a new e-check scheme as payment system. The
proposed solution allows the users to maintain their anonymity when transferring
and cashing the e-check, as paper bearer checks, while assuring the payment of
the funds, as in a paper bank check. The proposal meets all the core security re-
quirements for fair exchange protocols (effectiveness, fairness, timeliness and non-
repudiation) and a set of specific ones for e-checks: unforgeability, non-overspend-
ing, anonymity, transferability and untraceability. Additionally, the e-check scheme
proposed meets other requirements that have been defined as functional and ju-
ridical requirements. The proposed e-check scheme describes three protocols: a
payment protocol where the issuer generates an e-check, the deposit/cashing pro-
tocol, where the bearer can decide whether to deposit the e-check funds in a bank
account or to cash them, and a transfer protocol, where a payer decides to pay with
an e-check, i.e., he transfers the ownership of the e-check.
Further work in the line of payment systems should expand the e-check scheme
presented in this dissertation and include a proposal of payment by digital goods or
receipt, to complete the payment and transfer protocols proposed. Since there are
many kinds of paper based checks, further work should also consider the inclusion
of these other kind of checks (e.g. nominal checks) into the e-check scheme, there-
fore obtaining an e-check scheme that would allow users to work with any kind of
e-check.
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